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This thesis explores the issue of CEO compensation following mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) for Chinese firms. The objectives are presented as follows: 
First, to explore the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As 
decisions in Chinese firms. Second, to examine the factors influencing the 
determination of CEO compensation following M&As in Chinese firms. Based 
on a sample of 10,249 observations for Chinese listed firms and a quantitative 
research approach, the thesis finds that CEO compensation in Chinese firms is 
positively and significantly related to the M&As completion when controlling 
for factors including firm performance, corporate governance and the CEO 
political connection.  Regarding the determination of CEO compensation 
following M&As, none of the theories could perfectly explain the determination 
of CEO compensation following M&As. Some of the results are more consistent 
with the agency theory that the optimal CEO compensation arrangement is 
designed to align the interests of shareholders. For example, empirical results 
show that size and ROA are significantly and positively correlated to CEO 
compensation following M&As. Some results are more consistent with the 
managerial power theory. For example, CEO shareholding is significantly 
positively correlated to CEO compensation. The result of politically connected 
CEO is consistent with the managerial power theory combined with resource 
dependency theory. Specifically, a positive relationship exists between CEO 
compensation and CEO political connection.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the last few decades, issues related to executive compensation have 
been of great concern to academics, the business community, media, politicians, 
and the public in general. This has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis, 
which was partly blamed on excessive risk-taking by executives to achieve 
short-term financial goals at the expense of long-term economic stability (Keller 
& Stocker, 2008). Waldron (2012) showed that from 1978 to 2011, CEO (chief 
executive officer) compensation increased by about 725%, an increase 
significantly greater than the stock market and worker compensation growth in 
the same period (Waldron, 2012). In this regard, a recurring debate has centred 
on whether the compensation is excessive, and how the executives’ interests and 
those of shareholders and stakeholders can be aligned. This debate has 
increasingly led to greater oversight of executive compensation in many 
countries. For example, the US has witnessed a growing introduction of claw-
back clauses, mechanisms designed to retroactively reduce executive 
compensation (Boyd et al., 2012). In the UK, for example, there have been calls 
to curb executive compensation and a drive to give shareholders the power to 
block excessive compensation contracts.  
Academia has seen several studies examining the relationship between 
executive compensation and firms’ performance (e.g. Kato & Kubo, 2006; Rost 
& Osterloh, 2009; Ozkan, 2011; Heugens et al., 2012). Using different 
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performance measures such as accounting profits (e.g. Krauter, 2012; Core et al., 
1999) and stock market return (e.g. Conyon et al., 2011; Ozkan, 2011) the studies 
have generally failed to find consistent results. Another stream of literature has 
investigated the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
executive compensation (e.g. Fahlenbrach, 2009; Basu et al., 2007; Ozkan, 2007; 
Conyon & He, 2011), and these have demonstrated that executive compensation 
is influenced by governance mechanisms such as board independence, the 
presence of a remuneration committee, and CEO role duality. 
A recent stream of research has started to explore compensation in 
M&As, and this literature demonstrates that the problem of top executives’ 
compensation is also acute in M&As (e.g. Harford & Li, 2007; Bujela et al., 
2012). In particular, studies show that the top executives of bidding firms are, 
on average, awarded with higher compensation following completion of 
acquisitions, although the M&As destroy, instead of create, value for the 
acquiring shareholders (Khorana & Zenner, 1998; Bliss & Rosen, 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; 
Harford & Li, 2007). This is interesting, particularly given that top executives 
play a vital role in initiating and implementing acquisitions, and therefore 
acquisition is an important factor influencing executives’ compensation (Soojin, 
2010). Harford and Li (2007) argued that acquisitions give the bidding firm’s 
CEOs and board a good reason to re-package their compensation by increasing 
the size of the firm and changing its scope of operations. 
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A growing body of research on executive compensation and corporate 
governance (CG) has developed in China, given its tremendous economic 
growth and capital market developments (see Firth et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2010). The focus has been on the relationship between the top executives’ 
compensation and the firm’s performance (Firth et al., 2006; Kato & Long, 2006; 
Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011) and the role of 
CG in CEO compensation (Li et al., 2007; Buck et al., 2008; Ding et al., 2009; 
Conyon & He, 2012). However, this work has not yet examined the top 
executives’ compensation following M&As in China. 
China, as one of the largest and fastest growing transition economies, has 
a considerably higher annual GDP growth rate at between 8 and 12% (Gaur et 
al., 2013). In turn, M&As have become a popular strategic means for Chinese 
firms to chase growth, particularly since the setup of stock markets to assist in 
the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). According to Gaur et al., 
(2013), there are three reasons for Chinese firms to make M&As: Firstly, in order 
to have inorganic growth, making M&As tend to be a priority for Chinese listed 
firms as it is the quickest way to increase the size of the firm. More than 78% of 
Chinese firms tend to grow through M&As to achieve economies of scale. 
Secondly, when a firm needs to develop in a new market, or develop a new 
product, acquiring another firm can be an easy way to achieve the goal. Thirdly, 
in order to make Chinese firms internationally competitive, the Chinese 
government encourages Chinese firms to make M&As, and are always actively 
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involved in helping to privatize state-owned enterprises, thus allowing Chinese 
firms to list in Fortune 500 (Backman, 2001). Therefore, there has been a 
significant rise in both the number and value of acquisitions and mergers. The 
number of M&As increased from 171 cases in 2006 – with a total value of 
US$ 15.26 billion – to 1,232 cases in 2013 with US$93.20 billion, after the 
Chinese government started the Non-tradable Share Reform in April 2005 
(which saw non-tradable shares transformed to tradable shares). The numbers of 
M&As in China ranked only behind the US (Economist, 2011). 
Accordingly, many academics studied the performance of M&As for 
Chinese listed firms, particularly to investigate the market reactions to M&As 
(e.g. Chi et al., 2008; Boateng & Bi, 2014). They found a positive market 
reaction around M&As announcements. However, no research focused on CEO 
compensation following M&As in China. Interestingly, it was found that the 
CEOs of acquiring firms were, on average, awarded higher compensation 
following the completion of acquisitions. For example, CEO compensation of 
the Hai Tong Securities company increased to 6.74 million RMB in 2007 from 
0.76 million RMB in 2006 after a merger with Urban Agricultural trading 
company. The top three executives’ pay of Hua yuan Real Estate was 7.4 million 
RMB in 2008, but it increased 23.67 times compared to 2007 after acquiring Far 
Real Estate Co. In 2010, after making a merger, the top three executives’ pay at 
GF Securities increased 54 times in 2010 compared to 2009. In addition, many 
top executives’ pay rose more than 10 times because of acquisitions, such as 
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Foton Motor and Qingdao Haier. Given the considerable increase of CEO 
compensation following M&As, it is interesting to research into the 
determination of CEOs’ compensation following M&As for Chinese firms, 
particularly because CEOs play a vital role in initiating and implementing 
M&As and M&As is an important factor influencing CEO compensation.  
China presents a more interesting environment in which to test top 
executive compensation following M&As completion. For instance, China, as a 
transitional economy, has weak corporate governance. Therefore, managers can 
be powerful in Chinese listed companies as they can make use of poor corporate 
governance to receive higher compensation (Chen et al., 2010). 
Weak corporate governance in China has led to excessive powers of the 
CEO. Chen et al. (2010) argued that weak corporate governance was likely to 
give managers opportunities to extract corporate resources through excessive 
compensation. For example, a typical feature of the weak corporate governance 
in Chinese firms is the lack of efficient long-term incentives for CEOs. In China, 
CEO compensation generally includes salary and bonuses. However, long-term 
incentives are less commonly used in China as the presence of equity incentives 
is a very recent phenomenon, and until 2006 firms were allowed to reward 
options to top executives. The effect of the long-term incentives on 
compensation has been limited. Therefore, the lack of long-term incentives 
encourages CEOs to chase an increase in cash pay (Zhang & Guo, 2007). 
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Cash pay is mainly linked to the operating scope of a firm while the 
operating scope is directly related to a firm’s size. Achieving organic growth 
would be likely to take a long time for firms, thus CEOs are likely to seek out 
ways to realize inorganic growth. M&As are viewed as a quick way to increase 
firm size, and might give powerful CEOs a good reason to increase their 
compensation by increasing the size of the firm and changing the scope of its 
operations, even though in some cases the shareholders’ interests are damaged 
through inefficient overinvestment behaviour. 
In some cases, CEOs of Chinese firms have tended to hide their poor past 
operating performances through making inefficient M&As; in other words, 
when the company’s past operating performance is poor, powerful CEOs, in 
order to make a business to survive and to keep their positions, tend to adopt 
‘quick ways’ to conceal mediocrity (Zhang & Guo, 2007). Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990) studied that when poor operating performance threatened a senior 
executive’s job, executives have had greater motivation to engage in diversified 
acquisitions. The direct outcome of making M&As for CEOs is to obtain more 
power, more prestige, lower employment risks, and more convenient use of legal 
means to justify their high income. Therefore, powerful CEOs might make 
M&As to secure their jobs and earn higher compensation. 
In addition, the ownership of Chinese listed firms is very concentrated. 
Evidence showed that the median largest shareholder owned 42.61%, followed 
by just 5% of the second largest shareholder (Firth et al., 2006). In many cases, 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
16 
 
the largest shareholder is the state, which holds more than 50% of listed 
company shares. Given its dominance, many CEOs of Chinese listed firms are 
directly or indirectly appointed by the government, and in many cases they are 
former government officials (Firth et al., 2006). Many M&As deals for Chinese 
firms have been mainly driven by CEOs and government intervention (Li et al., 
2009). Chinese governments, in order to increase the performance of 
government, would encourage local firms to conduct M&As, which is likely to 
provide CEOs of firms with more opportunities to pursue private personal 
benefits. Those CEOs who have political connections with government are 
particularly more likely to be actively involved in M&As deals because they are 
able to obtain support from government.  
Therefore, given the significant rise in both the number and value of 
acquisitions and mergers, the compensation paid to the CEO of acquiring firms 
awarded following the completion of acquisitions, and weak corporate 
governance, it is necessary and valuable to examine the issue of CEO 
compensation following M&As for Chinese firms.  
 
1.2. Research aims and research questions 
1.2.1. Research aims 
The main aim of this research is to investigate CEO compensation for 
acquiring firms following the completion of M&As in China, mainly using the 
agency theory, managerial power theory, and resource dependency theory. 
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Specifically, the research has two main objectives: 
i. To explore the relationship between CEO compensation and 
M&As completion in Chinese firms. 
ii. To examine the factors influencing the determination of CEO 
compensation following the M&As in Chinese firms. 
 
1.2.2. Research questions 
The thesis addresses the following research questions: 
i. Is there a relationship between CEO pay and M&As 
completion in Chinese firms? 
ii. Do corporate governance factors influence CEO pay following 
M&As completion? 
iii. Does CEO pay in Chinese M&As link to corporate 
performance and CEO effort in completing the deal? 
iv. Do the effects of CEO political connection influence CEO pay 
following M&As? 
 
1.3. Summary research methodology 
The thesis is based on panel and cross-sectional analysis of a sample of 
10,249 observations from 2006 to 2013. The time span of the data chosen from 
2006 to 2013 is because of fact that M&As have grown significantly since the 
2005 Non-tradable Share Reforms. The required data is accessible mainly from 
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two databases in China: The China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) and Centre for Economics Research (CCER) databases. Where data 
was unavailable from the CSMAR and CCER, annual reports were used. The 
CSMAR mainly provides the data at firm level in relation to M&As deals and 
financial information, while the CCER provides the data at the firm level of CEO 
compensation and CG indicators for this study. The annual report mainly 
provides the CEO profile that specifies whether the CEO had a political 
connection.  
To answer the research questions, five empirical research models have 
been developed. The first three models are used to examine whether CEO 
compensation was correlated to the M&As decisions and addresses the first 
research question. Models 4 and 5 are used to examine the impact of a firm’s 
performance, M&As deals, corporate governance, and political connection on 
CEO compensation, thus addressing research questions two, three, and four. 
The measurements of independent variables (e.g. performance, corporate 
governance, political connection) were developed from prior studies (e.g. Core 
et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007; Li et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2012; 
Dai, 2014). The dependent variable was measured by the total CEO 
compensation, composed of salary and bonus.  
The data analysis included the descriptive analysis, univariate, and 
multivariate analysis. The descriptive analysis of the sample for the dependent 
and independent variables provided a preliminary understanding of the data and 
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its distribution. The data transformation was carried out when data of variables 
could not meet normality. The univariate analysis examined the correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables for each model, separately 
using Spearman’s rho correlations and to find the potential multicollinearity 
problems. Multivariate regression was used to test the hypothesis and to allow 
the isolation of the contribution of each independent variable to explain variation 
in the dependent variable by holding the effect of the other variables constant. 
Regression analysis was based on a set of assumptions which have to be tested 
before the analysis in order to ensure the validity of the results and the inferences 
drawn from the analysis. The assumptions refer to the normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Various checks were 
discussed to examine the data of this study against the assumptions of the OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) regression model. This section ended with a 
consideration of the selected estimation methods and the statistical justifications 
for the selection, including the fixed effect and two-step SGMM (System 
Generalized Method of Moments) methods. 
 
1.4. Contribution to knowledge 
The research makes significant contributions to the literature in general, 
and to Chinese CEO compensation in particular. The following contributions are 
presented: 
i.This study provides a contribution to CEO compensation following 
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M&As literature since it is the first to examine CEO compensation 
following M&As in China. The issue has been investigated in western 
developed countries in prior literature (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; 
Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012), but not in China. In 
the context of China, studies have focused on examining the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, 
and corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Li et al., 2007; Buck et al., 
2008; Conyon & He, 2008; Wan, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Ding et al., 
2010; Conyon & He, 2012). Therefore, this study extends Chinese 
literature on CEO pay by examining the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As. 
ii.Taking advantage of the institutional environment in China, this study 
provides contributions to literature by considering unique Chinese 
corporate governance factors and CEO political connections when 
examining the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As 
decisions and the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As. Previous studies only controlled for firm performance, size, 
and corporate governance when investigating whether CEO 
compensation was correlated to an M&As decision (e.g. Grinstein & 
Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Guest, 2009; Bugeja et al., 
2012). This study contributes to control more corporate governance 
factors (e.g. supervisory board and ownership characteristics) and CEO 
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political connections. Also, by investigating the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As in Chinese listed firms, this study 
contributes by providing an understanding of the influence of corporate 
governance factors (e.g. supervisory board and ownership 
characteristics) and CEO political connection on CEO compensation 
following M&As. The impact of these governance factors of CEO 
compensation following M&As have not been investigated in prior 
literature. 
iii.On an international basis, this is the first study to examine the impact 
of CEO political connections on the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As. The results demonstrating that 
politically-connected CEOs are rewarded higher compensation than 
non-politically-connected CEOs is new.  
 
1.5. Summary of the key findings 
This section presents a brief summary of the key findings: 
i. Regarding whether CEO compensation is correlated with M&As 
decisions, the empirical analysis results showed that CEO compensation in 
Chinese firms was related to M&As completion when controlling factors as 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries (size, market ratio, ROA, ROA growth, 
margin, margin growth, sales growth, and stock return). Also, CEO 
compensation in Chinese firms was related to M&As completion when 
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controlling for corporate governance factors and factors related to Chinese 
institutional environment (board size, independent ratio, supervisory size, 
block share, CEO share, remuneration, and political CEO). 
ii.Overall, regarding the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As, none of theories could perfectly explain the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As. Some results were more consistent with 
the agency theory that the optimal CEO compensation arrangement was 
designed to align the interests of shareholders; the measure of firm 
performance and managerial efforts should be positively correlated to CEO 
compensation. For example, the empirical results showed that size and ROA 
were significantly and positively correlated to CEO compensation. In 
addition, some of the results were more consistent with the managerial 
power theory. For example, the CEO shareholding was significantly 
positively correlated to CEO compensation, showing that the CEO 
shareholding gave CEOs more power to obtain higher compensation.  
iii.Regarding whether CEO compensation of acquiring firms was associated 
with CEO political connection, the result was consistent with the managerial 
power theory combined with resource dependency theory. Specifically, the 
positive relationship between CEO compensation and CEO political 
connection showed that those CEOs who brought many benefits and 
treatments to firms through political connections had more power and 
dominance in firms, thus obtaining more compensation.  




1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has presented the research problems and the overall thesis 
objectives. The summary of research methodology and key findings were then 
provided. Finally, the chapter summarises the contributions of this thesis and 
outlines its structure. 
Chapter two presents a description of the development of executive 
compensation in China and how to set executive compensation in Chinese listed 
firms. In addition, it discusses both Chinese corporate governance and legal 
systems and their implication for the determination of CEO compensation.  
Chapter three presents theoretical and empirical literature. A review of 
the literature associated to the study shows that three main theoretical 
frameworks have been used to explain and analyse the determinants of CEO 
compensation following M&As; they are, namely, agency theory, the managerial 
power perspective, and resource dependency theory. This chapter then reviews 
the prior empirical literature of determinants of CEO compensation. Finally, the 
relationship between CEO compensation and M&As decisions and determinants 
of CEO compensation following M&As has been discussed. 
Chapter four draws from previous studies on the literature about CEO 
compensation and on the unique Chinese contextual environment to develop a 
conceptual framework for the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As in China. It also assesses the hypotheses relating to the relationship 
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between CEO compensation and M&As decisions. The relationship between 
CEO compensation and the CG and criteria factors following M&As will be 
developed in this chapter. 
Chapter five develops the research philosophy and identifies the related 
research methods, followed by the empirical research models to carry out the 
analysis and the measurement of variables. The discussion of the sample 
selection and data collection procedures has been presented. Finally, data 
analysis of descriptive statistics and univariate and multivariate analysis is 
presented.  
Chapter six reports the results of testing the first hypothesis that 
relationship between CEO compensation and the M&As decision. The dataset 
used in testing the hypotheses is presented to provide an overall picture of the 
data. The normality and data transformations are then carried out for further 
analysis. Finally, the results of univariate and multiple regression analysis are 
presented. 
Chapter seven reports the results of the test of the hypotheses about 
determination of CEO compensation following M&As. The dataset used in 
testing the hypotheses is presented to provide an overall picture of the data. The 
normality and data transformations are then carried out for further analysis. 
Finally, the results of univariate and multiple regression analysis are presented. 
Chapter eight summarises the thesis and draws conclusions for the 
research followed by a summary of findings. Furthermore, this chapter provides 
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the implications of the findings for practitioners and regulators. Finally, the 
chapter outlines the study’s potential limitations and provides recommendations 
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Chapter Two: Chinese Institutional Environment 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a description of the development of 
executive compensation in China and the setting of executive compensation in 
Chinese listed firms. In addition, it discusses both Chinese corporate governance 
and legal systems and their implication for the determination of CEO 
compensation. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 demonstrates and 
discusses the evolution of executive compensation of SOEs and the setting of 
executive compensation in listed firms. Section 2.3 illustrates the internal 
corporate governance mechanism, including the ownership structure, board of 
directors, supervisory board, independent directors, and political connections. 
Section 2.4 presents and discusses weak legal systems and Section 2.5 
summarises the chapter. 
 
2.2 Executive compensation in China 
2.2.1 The Development of Executive Compensation in China 
With the economic transition from a planned to a market-based system, 
China has experienced a series of market-oriented reforms since 1978. 
Accordingly, the executives’ compensation system also went through a huge 
change.  
In the planned economy period before 1978, all corporations were state-
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owned. Managers were appointed by the government and firms had an inflexible 
and rigid pay system. All the profits the corporation created could not be kept 
and were returned to the state. Managers only received a fixed salary which was 
not linked to the firm’s performance, but to the size of the firm, job title, and 
even the region and industry (Kato & Long, 2006). 
The lack of incentive-based pay, and the poor economy, resulted in 
managers receiving a salary that was almost at the same level of pay as ordinary 
employees between 1950 and 1978, and managerial compensation was not 
linked too greatly to a firm’s performance (Lin, 2014). 
During the earliest economic reforms in the 1980s, management 
selection by competitive auction had been initiated (Groves et al., 1995). State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) started to create profit retention or profit sharing 
schemes (Sun & Tong, 2003); the SOEs were allowed to preserve some profits 
in order to pay managers. More delegation and decision-making was given to 
managers. The change in the executive compensation system helped firms to 
enhance performance (Jefferson et al., 2006). Lin (2014) stated that managers’ 
compensation had been increased and was about one to three times that of 
ordinary employees’ pay between 1986 and 1988. However, the difference in 
pay between executives and ordinary employees was smaller than in developed 
western countries.   
At the start of the 1990s, SOEs became listed firms through the 
establishment of two stock exchanges (Shenzhen and Shanghai) under 
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privatization reform. The purpose of the reform was: (1) diversifying ownership 
in listed firms; (2) providing SOEs with more autonomy in operations as listed 
firms; (3) improving corporate governance (Chen, 2010). In this context, SOEs’ 
annual executive compensation scheme was developed in 1992. The scheme 
required executive compensation consisting of a base salary and bonus 
(performance-related pay). The aim of the annual executive compensation 
system was to link executives’ compensation to the performance of a firm and 
to expand the difference between the compensation of executives and ordinary 
employees (Rampling et al., 2013). Thus, executive compensation was greatly 
enhanced and linked to firms’ performance (Chen, 2010). The annual executive 
compensation scheme turned out to be the main executive compensation practice 
for SOE firms (Kato & Long, 2006).   
After experiencing the reforms, executive compensation increased 
considerably between 2001 and 2011, growing up 3.5 times, 2.8 times faster than 
Brazil, 1.4 times faster than the US, 1.7 times faster than the UK, and 2.0 times 
faster than the whole of western Europe during the same period (Lin, 2014). In 
some cities, the top SOEs’ executive compensation was similar to private firms, 
but generally the pay of executives in SOEs was still smaller than foreign firms 
and joint ventures. The overwhelmingly rapid growth in executive compensation 
among SOEs in 2009 led to the government providing a recommendation 
(Guidance on Regulating the Compensation of Managers in Key State-owned 
Enterprises) that the executive compensation of SOEs could not be beyond 30 
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times that of ordinary employees to curb the fast growth in executive 
compensation. Moreover, the government further issued the guidance (State 
Council Notice on Furthering Distribution System Reform) that the growth rate 
of executive compensation in SOEs could not exceed that of the ordinary 
employees in 2013 (Lin, 2014).  
 
2.2.2 Setting executive compensation in listed firms 
Company Law in 2006 regulated the setting of executive compensation 
for Chinese listed firms. It regulated that the board of directors could make 
decisions on the employment and pay of executives (art. 47(9)). The Corporate 
Governance Code issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) in 2002 recommended that the board of directors was responsible for 
executive compensation and needed to explain it at the shareholders’ meetings 
and disclose it to the public. Also, the code suggested that executive 
compensation must be linked to both the firm’s and individual manager’s 
performance. 
The compensation committee is important for Chinese listed firms, 
which is similar to western countries such as the UK where the compensation 
committee plays a vital role in the setting of executive compensation (Zhu et al., 
2009). For example, the executive compensation scheme in UK listed firms is 
recommended to the board of directors by the compensation committee. 
However, under the 2002 Corporate Governance Code, it was recommended that 
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Chinese listed firms should set up a compensation committee approved by 
shareholder meetings, but it did not give specific details on duties and 
responsibilities of the compensation committee. The code simply gave a general 
suggestion demonstrating that firms should “study and review the remuneration 
policies and schemes for directors and senior management personnel” (arts. 70.). 
Therefore, the decisions made and the approval rights on executive 
compensation were left with the board. 
Furthermore, the independence of the compensation committee played a 
vital role in the process of the setting of executive compensation. For example, 
the NYSE Listed Manual required members of the compensation committee to 
be comprised of independent directors (Lin, 2014). But the corporate 
governance code of 2002 for Chinese listed firms states that: “Boards of listed 
firms are recommended to appoint compensation committees, consisting wholly 
or mainly of independent directors and chaired by an independent director” (art. 
52).  
This statement simply provides a recommendation and vaguely mentions 
“wholly or mainly” rather than giving a clear requirement for the composition 
of the compensation committee. In addition, Chinese listed firms do not usually 
disclose details of the composition of the compensation committee, therefore it 
is difficult for the compensation committee to maintain true independence.  
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2.3 Internal corporate governance mechanism 
2.3.1 The ownership structure 
The most distinctive characteristic of Chinese listed firms is concentrated 
ownership, particularly as the largest shareholder, in many cases, is the state. To 
appreciate how the ownership structure changes, it is necessary to understand 
two important reforms that have occurred since the early 1990s in China. The 
first one is the privatization of SOEs through the setting up of two stock 
exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen). The second is the split in share reform that 
allowed non-tradable shares to become tradable in 2005.  
The main aim of setting up two stock exchanges was to let SOEs raise 
capital, enhance operational efficiency, and improve the performance of SOEs 
(e.g. see Green, 2003). The privatization of SOEs resulted in the split share 
among Chinese listed firms. The split share structures mean there were two types 
of shares, namely tradable shares and non-tradable shares. The non-tradable 
share-holders were mainly the state (e.g. the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission) and legal persons held by state-controlled 
legal entities, but individual investors and private domestic and foreign 
institutional investors mainly held the tradable shares. Also, the shares could be 
categorized by A-shares, B-shares, H-shares, and N-shares. A-shares refer to the 
shares traded in Chinese Yuan on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzheng Stock Exchange (SZSE). B-shares of companies listed on the SHSE 
were quoted and traded in US dollars and, if listed on the SZSE, they were 
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quoted and traded in Hong Kong dollars. The shares of firms in mainland China 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and on US stock markets were called 
H-shares and N-shares, respectively. The non-tradable holders had the same 
voting rights and cash flow rights as tradable holders. The state held a great 
amount of the non-tradable shares, accounting for about two-thirds of each 
firm’s shares. It also possessed the largest ownership in many Chinese listed 
firms, highlighting that the state had a considerable influence on firms, for 
example with an influence on board decisions and executive compensation 
arrangements (Yang et al., 2011).   
However, the government gradually recognised the complexity 
surrounding tradable and non-tradable shares, and that the existence of plenty of 
non-tradable shares produced a substantial number of problematic issues. For 
example, the owners of the non-tradable shares lacked the motivation to increase 
the stock value and they could not obtain the profit from the stock price 
appreciations (Firth et al., 2010). The direct outcome of this was that the 
controlling shareholder embezzled from the listed firms as they could not benefit 
from trading the stock (Yang et al., 2011). It was reported by the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) in 2006 that the dominant shareholder 
embezzled the wealth from listed firms at a total of 57.7 billion Chinese Yuan in 
2003. In addition, it was difficult to engage in true mergers and acquisitions in 
the stock markets because of the non-tradable shares (Yang et al., 2011). The 
split share reform was therefore launched by the Chinese government in April 
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2005 to make the non-tradable shares become tradable. The holders of tradable 
and non-tradable shares would negotiate a compensation plan by themselves as 
the value could be diluted in the process of transforming non-tradable shares to 
tradable shares. For example, the holder of tradable shares would obtain some 
shares as one type of compensation from the non-tradable owners.  
After carrying out the split share reform, the non-tradable shares were 
gradually transformed to the tradable shares. For example, each firm had an 
average of 39.8% of tradable shares in 2003; by 2012 the mean (median) 
percentage of tradable shares was 76.5% (95.4%) (Jiang & Kim, 2015). In 
addition, the average proportion of state-owned shares had also been decreased 
because of the split share reform. The state shares decreased from 84 per cent of 
listed companies in the end of 2001 to about 50 per cent of listed firms’ shares 
reported at the end of 2009 (Yang et al., 2011). Also, about 40 per cent of the 
listed firms had the state as the dominant shareholder in 2013, lower than the 
approximate figure of 69 per cent in 2005 (calculated by the author through 
CCER (China Center for Economic Research)). In addition, the ownership of 
Chinese listed firms was concentrated. Evidence showed that the average largest 
shareholder owned 34.14 per cent, followed by just 9.51 per cent owned by the 
second largest shareholder (calculated through CCER) in 2013. This is very 
different from many developed western countries in which ownership is 
dispersed, and the shareholders usually hold a small proportion of ownership 
(typically less than 5%) (Conyon et al., 2015). Therefore, the privatization of 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
34 
 
SOEs and the reform of split share did not essentially change the ownership 
structure of Chinese listed firms. The state still had a considerable influence on 
firms. 
In the context of China’s socialist society, the state shares do not belong 
to any true owner. The Chinese government pronounced that the State Council 
of China was the ultimate holder of state shares, but the essence of a socialist 
society is that people in China own all properties and the State Council of China 
acts on behalf of all Chinese citizens. Thus in practice there is no actual holder 
for state shares (Oliver et al., 2014), it is impossible to supervise the state shares. 
Therefore, the absence of a proper holder for state shares can result in corruption 
as well as weak corporate governance for Chinese listed firms (Shi & Weisert, 
2002). 
As a consequence of the absence of supervision on state ownership, there 
is a serious insider control problem within Chinese listed firms. The failure of 
state supervision allows directors and management to have dominant power and 
collude with each other in listed firms. This is likely to make directors and 
management have more discretion, empowering them to engage in activities in 
their own interest (Oliver et al., 2014). Deng and Wang (2006) indicated several 
characteristics of insider control problem: (1) chasing for personal interests, for 
example, such as satisfying personal needs through grabbing firms’ wealth; (2) 
conducting market manipulation or insider trading; (3) searching and keeping 
useful resources, such as state-owned firms appointing many CEOs with 
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political backgrounds so as to retain the relationship with the government; (4) 
manipulation of accounts and of the public by faking financial information and; 
(5) excessively engaging in investment or disproportionately expending assets. 
Therefore, managers in firms which have the state as the dominant shareholder 
might have more power over the board and be able to extract more compensation 
as they control more economic resources, colluding with the board of directors 
and lacking effective monitoring. 
 
2.3.2 Board of Directors 
As is the case in many countries, Chinese listed firms are required to 
have a board of directors. The board of directors plays a vital role in the internal 
corporate governance system. The general responsibilities for boards of 
directors in Chinese listed firms are to (1) organise the board meetings; (2) carry 
out the resolutions from shareholders; (3) implement the operational and 
investments strategies; (4) deal with the financial fairs (e.g. making annual 
financial budgets); (5) setting up the firms’ internal management system; (6) 
recruit, monitor, and dismiss the top management, and set up their remuneration 
(Oliver et al., 2014). In China, the minimum size of the board required by the 
Corporate Governance Code in 2002 is 5 members and the maximum is up to 19 
members for listed firms (Jiang & Kim, 2015). 
PRC (People’s Republic of China) Company Law in 2006 highlighted 
that directors, senior managers, and supervisors need to comply with the laws, 
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administrative regulations, and articles of association of the firm and take on the 
responsibilities of loyalty and due diligence towards it. However, the law does 
not specify the loyalty in detail, only listing the many requirements forbidden 
between directors and managers. Those prohibited requirements are: (1) making 
corruption; (2) appropriating the firm’s asset; (3) opening accounts with the 
company’s capital in the (director’s) own name or that of others; (4) transferring 
capital to other parties with the company’s capital or providing security to third 
parties with the firm’s assets, without authorization from the constitution, or 
agreement from the shareholders’ general meeting or the board of directors; (6) 
making self-dealing transactions with the firm; (7) disclosing the concealment. 
The Guidelines of CSRC in 2006 only provide some simple explanations about 
the directors’ duty of diligence. Those are: (1) to treat all shareholders equally; 
(2) to comprehend the firm’s operation; (3) to make sure the disclosed 
information is complete, accurate, and true; and (4) to provide information and 
materials to the supervisory board. 
The information provided above regarding the loyalty or the duty of 
diligence is too general to show all situations, particularly not providing details 
of a director’s responsibility to set the executive’s compensation. Furthermore, 
there are no criteria for the law to punish the breaking of the duty of diligence 
and loyalty. As the Chinese court cannot make judgement on this misbehaviour, 
the loyalty or duty of diligence might not play their full role. Therefore, directors 
might commit misconduct on various kinds of activities including not effectively 
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arranging executive compensation with management (Lin, 2014). 
In addition, considering the collegiality, team spirit, and friendship etc. 
demonstrated by Bebchuk and Fried (2002), the directors do not generally go 
against the proposals of the firm’s executives. Given that the importance of 
Guanxi (the interpersonal relationship and networking) in China, directors 
would be more likely to stand by managers and agree with the decisions they 
made. Hence managers would become more powerful in firms, particularly 
when they are also the chairmen of the boards, and they can create more 
influence for firms, e.g. setting the executives’ compensation (Lu, 2008). In 
Chinese listed firms, there is a trend of separating the CEO from the chairman 
as the CSRC holds that CEO duality harms the effectiveness of corporate 
governance (Dai, 2014). Yang et al. (2011) calculated the CEO duality rate using 
the CCER database that only 2.2% of the listed firms had CEOs who also held 
the position of chairman of the board, lower than developed western countries, 
including the US. It is generally accepted that CEO duality not only impairs the 
independence of the board of directors, but leads to a more severe insider control 
problem in Chinese listed firms, thus making CEOs more powerful in setting 
their compensation (Dai, 2014). 
 
2.3.3 Supervisory Board 
It is worth noting that Chinese listed firms have had to carry out the two-
tier board system of corporate governance since 1994. The two-tier board system 
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includes both the normal board such as the US and the supervisory board as is 
the case in Germany (Chen et al., 2010). The requirement is that the supervisory 
board should compose of no less than three supervisors, and be comprised of 
representatives of shareholders and a reasonable proportion of employee 
representatives (Articles 52 & 53, PRC Company Law). Financial controllers, 
directors, and managers cannot be supervisors.   
The responsibility of the supervisory board is to review and audit the 
reports offered from the directors and to monitor the firm’s assets as well as the 
financial affairs. They are required to specialise in related accounting and law 
(Yang et al., 2011). The supervisory board can take part in board meetings, but 
have no voting rights. The main duty of the supervisory boards is to monitor the 
directors and managers. If any directors or managers breach the listed firms’ 
laws or rules, the supervisory boards can only raise the suggestion of dismissing 
the directors or managers, but have no deciding power (Jiang & Kim, 2015). 
Oliver et al. (2014) argue that those professional skills should have been 
beneficial to firms in monitoring managers’ behaviour, but supervisors are more 
involved in administrative activities rather than playing a monitoring role.  
Since the supervisory board has no true rights in terms of monitoring the 
directors and managers, the supervisory board in Chinese listed firms is not an 
effective mechanism. Unlike the supervisory board in Germany, the supervisors 
of Chinese listed firms have no voting rights, therefore they cannot appoint and 
dismiss the directors and managers and cannot take part in the operation of the 
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firms (Lin, 2004). Furthermore, employee representatives on supervisory boards 
would usually not disobey the suggestions proposed by the board, such as the 
executive pay plan, because the employees’ compensation is arranged by the 
boards. It was empirically found that the majority of Chinese supervisory boards 
agreed to the board’s proposals in 2011 (Lin, 2014). Additionally, because of the 
information asymmetric, supervisory boards lack sufficient information as this 
is controlled by CEOs and it is difficult for them to monitor managers (Tenev 
and Zhang, 2002). Therefore, the supervisory board is regarded as a simple 
decoration, cannot be a functional mechanism in Chinese listed firms, and 
effectively monitors and disciplines the directors and management. Management 
might not be aligning the interest of shareholders and extracting the higher 
compensation  
 
2.3.4 Independent directors 
Given the insider control problem in Chinese listed firms, the CSRC 
issued ‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of 
Directors of Listed Companies’ in 2002. 
The guidelines defined independent directors as “a director whom does 
not hold any position in the company other than director and who has no 
relationship with the listed company engaging him or its principal shareholders 
that could hinder his making independent and objective judgments”. According 
to the guidelines, listed firms needed to have at least two independent directors 
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on their boards by 30 June 2002, and at least one-third of the board members 
needed to be independent directors by 30 June 2003. The introduction of the 
independent directors in Chinese listed firms aimed to enhance the effectiveness 
of corporate governance and monitoring of executive directors and/or managers.  
The independent directors are nominated by the boards and approved at 
the shareholders’ meeting. They are required to possess a fundamental 
understanding of the operation of listed firms and understand the related laws 
and regulations; more than five years’ work experience in law, economics, or 
other fields are also a requirement of them (Liao et al., 2009). In order to satisfy 
the needs of qualified independent directors in Chinese listed firms, the CSRC 
introduced training courses for those candidates who could potentially become 
independent directors. However, Thian (2005) states that independent directors 
in Chinese firms generally do not have adequate knowledge and experience, and 
cannot therefore effectively monitor management.   
Independent directors are usually members of different committees (e.g. 
remuneration committee) which significantly monitor the process of the setting 
of compensation and nomination (Oliver et al., 2014). The independent directors 
have more rights than supervisors, such as voting and approval on managerial 
and financial decisions (e.g. information disclosure, merger and acquisition 
activities) (Yang et al., 2011). Therefore, independent directors are a useful 
corporate governance mechanism to oversee managers and reduce the agency 
cost for shareholders (Jiang & Kim, 2015).  
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However, as the controlling shareholders know that the independent 
directors would oversee them, the controlling shareholders who have much more 
impact on the board would appoint the minimum number of independent 
directors required by law. Given the prevalence of the controlling shareholder in 
Chinese listed firms, research shows that many Chinese listed firms’ boards are 
comprised of only one-third independent directors. This is different from the 
higher rate in western developed countries, for instance 78% in the US market 
(Conyon, 2015). 
Furthermore, Liao et al. (2009) state that independent directors in 
Chinese listed firms might be important for establishing connections with people 
to obtain outside resources. Lin (2014) argues that many independent directors 
in Chinese listed firms are not appointed based on their quality and skills, but on 
the basis of their ties being beneficial to the firms. Generally, there are two main 
types of independent directors in Chinese listed firms. The first one refers to the 
scholars who are the university scholars or researchers in research institutions. 
In Chinese culture, people tend to worship and respect authority, and the scholars 
themselves represent a sort of authority. They bring optimism to markets as they 
probably provide useful suggestions and resolutions for firms (Liao et al., 2009). 
The second one refers to the political connections which can bring 
beneficial ties to firms. Many independent directors are former government and 
military officials, particularly in the Central SOEs. The politically-connected 
independent directors build up a close relationship with the government, thus 
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providing more valuable resources and increasing a firm’s lobbying power 
(Rampling et al., 2013). Furthermore, evidence shows that in Chinese listed 
firms, independent directors are always the friends or previous schoolfellows of 
CEOs; they have a close social relationship within firms. Such independent 
directors having connections with CEOs might be more loyal to the CEOs rather 
than monitoring them (Westphal, 1999). In this case, the independent directors 
in Chinese listed firms are usually regarded only as ‘window-dressing’, and 
cannot be truly independent. Therefore, independent directors in Chinese listed 
firms tend to be the providers of resources instead of a monitor. 
 
2.4 External legal system  
A strong legal infrastructure can be a useful external monitoring 
mechanism to make sure participants in the markets fairly obtain the benefits 
and enhance the effectiveness of the corporate governance within firms (Bai et 
al., 2004). China, as a transitional economy, has a weak legal system and weak 
law enforcement. This is different from western countries which have strong 
legal and judicial frameworks. For example, courts in the US play an important 
role in supervising executive compensation through strictly monitoring the 
executives’ behaviour in setting their compensation (Wells, 2010). Compared 
with these developed countries, the degree of protections of China’s creditors 
and shareholders are significantly lower than the global average while law 
enforcement is also lower than other countries (Allen et al., 2005). 
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Although China initiates a number of company laws and corporate 
governance codes – such as the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms 
in China issued by CSRC in January 2002 based on the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance in 1999, and the PRC Company Law in 2006 – they are 
not playing an effective role in protecting minority shareholders and monitoring 
executives (Zou et al., 2008). The code only provides general, not clear, 
guidance on corporate governance to Chinese listed firms; for example, it does 
not give specific explanations on duties and responsibilities of the compensation 
committee. And the PRC Company Law does not provide the judicial 
explanation of the duty of loyalty and duty of diligence; for example, there is no 
specific interpretation of the director’s responsibility in setting executive 
compensation. Moreover, having the state as the regulator as well as the 
participant of the market (e.g. the controlling shareholder in listed firms) results 
in the legal system not being genuinely independent (Allen et al., 2005), a 
situation which might violate the effectiveness of corporate governance.   
Additionally, the cost of the breach of laws and regulations is quite low. 
Most of the penalties for breaking laws are required to range from 0.3 to 0.6 
million RMB. Therefore, relative to the huge benefits, executives are willing to 
take such low risks in going against laws and regulations (e.g. the illegal transfer 
of huge amounts of assets) (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Under a weak legal system and 
weak law enforcement in China, firms cannot effectively monitor CEOs’ 
behaviour, which leads to entrenchment, thus extracting higher compensation. 




2.5 M&A in China 
M&A began in China in 1993, but started to be prevalent in the late 1990s 
because of the development of capital market and corporate law. The 
privatization of SOEs makes the separation of ownership and control for Chinese 
firms. The owners keep supervision role in firms, but the managers have more 
control on firms and become the main initiator for M&A activities.  
Before 2005, the split share structures in China let tender offers difficult. 
In China, it is not common that both acquiring firms and target firms are publicly 
listed firms. Two main different M&A deals associated to listed firms exist in 
China. The first category is the acquiring firms are listed firms but the target 
firms are unlisted firms. The second category is either the acquiring and target 
firms are unlisted firms or the acquiring firms are unlisted firms but target firms 
are listed firms. Two third of the M&A deals are in the first category and one 
third are in the second category. Chinese acquiring firms and target firms, 
generally, are those unlisted firms that have relationship with government. To 
acquire the shares or assets of the listed firms, the acquiring firms prefer to go 
to the over-the-counter (OTC) market instead of the stock exchange. In China, 
there are tradable and non-tradable shares in listed firms and their price are 
different. It is more expensive to buy the tradable shares in stock exchange. 
Through the OTC market, it is not expensive for firms to buy non-tradable shares 
by bargaining with government or a holding company than buying tradable 
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shares through stock exchanges. Therefore, firms would prefer to buy non-
tradable shares or assets of listed firms rather than tradable shares through stock 
markets.  
However, as it is discussed above, the government gradually recognised 
the complexity surrounding tradable and non-tradable shares, it was difficult to 
engage in true mergers and acquisitions in the stock markets because of the non-
tradable shares (Yang et al., 2011). The split share reform was therefore launched 
by the Chinese government in April 2005 to make many non-tradable shares 
become tradable. This was a gradual process to avoid quick change of large 
blocks of shares: after one year, 5% could be sold, after two years, 10% could 
be sold. Therefore, a significant rise in both number of acquisitions and mergers 
take place since the split share reform in 2005. The number of M&As increased 
more than 600 % from 2006 to 2013.  
There are four main ways to complete acquisitions in China, they are 
Takeover by offer, Takeover by agreement, Free transfer and Judicial transfer. 
The first one is similar as US/UK practice, the second one refers to the transfer 
of up to 30% of the target’s shares at a mutually agreed price. The Free transfer 
and Judicial transfer involves some unique Chinese characteristics. For example, 
the Free transfer allows SOE to be transferred to the control of another SOE. 
And in Judicial transfer, the shares of a legal person shareholder might be 
transferred to another organization through a court judgement due to it is 
bankrupt.  





This chapter discussed the development of executive compensation and 
the setting of executive compensation in Chinese listed firms. Additionally, it 
discussed the internal corporate governance mechanism and an external weak 
legal system in China, how they function, and provided the implication of this 
on executive compensation. In addition, the development of M&A in China has 
been introduced.   
In terms of the development of executive compensation, it is argued that 
after a series of reforms from a planned to market-based system in China, 
managers have gradually gained more autonomy in firms’ operations and have 
more deciding power. Therefore, managers’ compensation has increased 
considerably from fixed pay to performance-related pay. In terms of the setting 
of executive compensation in Chinese listed firms, the compensation committee 
cannot perform as it does in western developed countries, such as the UK, as it 
does not have true independence, and there is no detailed disclosure of the 
composition of the committee.  
The most distinctive characteristic of Chinese listed firms is the 
ownership structure. Even experiencing two important reforms – including the 
privatization of SOEs and the split share form – it does not fundamentally 
change the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms. The ownership of 
Chinese listed firms is still very much concentrated. In many cases, the largest 
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shareholder is the state. The lack of the actual holder for the state share simply 
leads to the vagueness of monitoring, thus creating a serious insider control 
problem. The insider control problem permits directors and management to 
become dominant and collude with each other, empowering them to engage in 
activities in the interest of themselves, such as extracting excess executive 
compensation.  
Chinese listed firms are required to carry out a two-tier board system, 
including both the normal board and the supervisory board. The board of 
directors might not be an effective monitoring mechanism, as they are 
particularly limited in constraining excessive executive compensation. Neither 
the law nor regulation clearly specify the loyalty or duty of diligence, for 
example not providing details of a director’s responsibility to set the executive’s 
compensation, and the connections between directors and managers might lead 
to the directors not going against the managers’ proposals. Managers would 
therefore become more powerful in firms, particularly when they are also the 
chairmen of the board, and can put more influence on firms by, for example, 
setting the executives’ compensation. Additionally, the supervisory board should 
have played an effective monitoring role in Chinese listed firms, but supervisors 
have no true monitoring right towards the directors and managers (e.g. 
appointing and dismissing directors and managers), thus they are more involved 
in administrative activities instead of playing a monitoring role. Also, a lack of 
independence means the supervision board cannot also be an effective 
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governance mechanism.  
Independent directors are seen as a complement to the supervisory board 
in Chinese listed firms, and have more rights than the supervisory board. 
However, the low numbers of independent directors and social ties (e.g. political 
connections) might mean they do not play a mainly monitoring role, but be one 
kind of the mechanism to outside resources. Considering the ineffectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms, a CEO’s political connections can be viewed 
as a unique corporate governance mechanism to give firms alternative support 
(e.g. a tax reduction) to improve a firm’s efficiency and allow a CEO to have 
more power to influence the board of directors’ decisions, thus obtaining higher 
compensation.  
The external legal system is also weak in China. Laws and regulations 
do not effectively protect minority shareholders or monitor the executives as the 
Chinese legal system is not truly independent. Laws or regulations give only 
general and vague guidance, and the cost of the breach of the laws and 
regulations is quite low, most likely leading to executive misconduct.  
Overall, China presents a more interesting environment in which to test 
the applicability of different theories on CEO compensation. According to the 
above discussion, weak corporate governance and the external legal system 
might not effectively monitor directors and executives, resulting particularly in 
excessive CEO power and giving managers the opportunity to extract excessive 
compensation. 




Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop the theoretical and 
empirical literature and identify gaps. In terms of the theories, so far no one 
single theory can effectively explain CEO compensation in the academy. A 
review of the literature associated to the author’s study shows that three main 
theoretical frameworks have been used to explain and analyse the determinants 
of CEO compensation following M&As; agency theory, the managerial power 
perspective, and resource dependency theory. This chapter aims to review the 
previous empirical literature that discussed the related issues between executive 
compensation, corporate performance, and corporate governance mechanisms. 
A discussion on these relationships post M&As has also been completed. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 demonstrates and 
discusses the theoretical literature, including the agency theory, the managerial 
power perspective, and resource dependency theory. Section 3.3 illustrates the 
empirical literature that discusses the relationship between CEO compensation, 
corporate performance, and corporate governance, the relationship between 
CEO compensation and M&As decisions, and determinants of acquiring CEO 
compensation. Section 3.4 summarises the chapter and identifies gaps from the 
empirical literature. 
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3.2. Theoretical Literature 
3.2.1. Agency Theory 
The dominant theoretical approach used in these studies is the agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). It holds that the conflict of 
interest between the shareholder (principal) and manager (agent) is rooted from 
the separation of ownership and control which leads to the agency problem 
(Berle & Means, 1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that the 
agency relationship is that principals own the firms and hire managers to service 
them on their behalf, delegating some decision-making authority to managers. 
Principals hope managers use their professional talents to maximize their 
benefits; from the managers’ position, however, they might only aim to expand 
their personal benefits instead of caring about the principals’ interests and in 
increasing the firm’s value. Because of the separation of ownership and control, 
the managers’ activities are not observable, and this might provide managers 
with opportunities to take decisions to merely increase their personal wealth 
rather than increasing the principals’ benefits. Therefore, the agency problem 
means managers do not always act in the best interests of the principals. 
Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that there were two reasons for agency problems: 
Firstly, the principal and the manager have divergent purposes; secondly, the 
activities of managers are not observable. The unobservable behaviour of 
managers leads to an information asymmetry between the manager and the 
principal while the moral hazard arises (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Margiotta 
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and Miller (2000) state that moral hazard exists when shareholders give 
managers decision-making authority, whereas when managers’ actions cannot 
be observed directly, the manager has a different interest from the shareholders. 
Managers might engage in activities that do not benefit the shareholders, such 
as under-investment or over-investment in projects. Also, Margiotta and Miller 
(2000) argue that if firms are not concerned by the moral hazard issue, firms will 
suffer from numerous losses. They summarize three issues about the moral 
hazard as follows: (1) given that the firms do not make contract with managers 
to surmount the moral-hazard problem, there will be the loss of firm value; (2) 
managers will gain more if they are motivated by their personal interest rather 
than the firms value; (3) a shadow value will be obtained when a firm is willing 
to spend money for monitoring to remove the moral hazard. In this view, the key 
is for a firm to raise measures to eliminate the moral hazard to reduce the agency 
problem. 
To mitigate the moral hazard problem, principals must incur agency costs. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), there are three agency costs created 
by agency relationship, including monitoring expenditure by the principal, the 
bonding expenditures by the manager, and the residual loss. Monitoring costs 
are created when the principal designs related incentives for the agent to prevent 
the agent conducting inappropriate behaviour. Bonding costs refer to the 
principal having to pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to ensure 
that the performance of the agent would not damage the principal’s profit, or that 
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the principal will be compensated as a result of the aberrant activities of the 
agent (hiring the external independent auditor). The residual loss created as the 
cost of full enforcement of contracts outnumbers the profits (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). 
From the agency theory perspective, it is vital to address the agency 
problem to make the agent’s performance consistent with the principal’s benefit 
and to maximize the principal’s wealth. In order to reduce the agency costs, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasised that corporate governance mechanisms 
could provide a useful way for suppliers of finance to control the managers’ 
actions and to ensure they align with their interests. It also ensures that firms get 
profits for their investments. In the agency theory, Dey (2008) concluded that 
strong governance mechanisms could effectively help firms minimize agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers.  
Internal corporate governance mechanisms include well-designed 
compensation contracts, an effectively structured board, and an effective 
ownership structure that encourages managers to act in accordance with 
shareholder interest resulting in the effective monitoring of managers (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990; Daily et al., 2003). And external governance mechanisms include 
the market for corporate control that is particularly working as the internal 
mechanisms fail. 
Well-designed CEO compensation contracts play an important role in 
making sure managers act in the interest of shareholders. As discussed above, 
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moral hazard might occur when shareholders cannot directly observe managers’ 
behaviour, and managers engage in activities which harm the shareholders’ 
benefit. In this case, shareholders are motivated to design an effective 
compensation contract to encourage managers’ behaviour to align with their 
interests of them and maximize shareholders’ value. The compensation contract 
has been seen as a vital and explicit mechanism to reduce moral hazard as the 
managers’ incentive compensation can be correlated with observable variables 
related to managers’ performance, such as market returns or profitability 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). 
Therefore, in agency theory, executive compensation should be tightly 
related to corporate performance using the profits and share prices as measures 
(Dorff, 2004). The association between executive compensation and corporate 
performance demonstrates whether the compensation contract is optimal. The 
optimal contract would reward executives who work hard and spend much effort 
enhancing corporate performance. In line with this view, the Corporate 
Governance Code issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
in 2002 suggests the board of directors should be responsible for executive 
compensation and that this needs to be explained at the shareholders’ meetings 
and disclosed to the public. Also, the code demonstrates that executive 
compensation must be linked to a firm’s performance and each individual 
manager’s performance. 
According to Bebchuk et al. (2002), In order to guarantee the executive 
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compensation scheme optimal to the shareholders, three key channels has been 
mentioned as follows: (1) the boards of directors, acting as the monitoring role,  
decide the compensation scheme that expand the shareholder benefits; (2) also, 
the market has strong forces to limit the executives behaviour to choose the 
compensation scheme in the interest of shareholders; (3), finally, shareholders 
have voting rights to choose perfect pay design for executives, or to impede 
executive compensation scheme that not optimal for shareholders, which can 
form an effective mechanism to compel executives choosing the schemes that 
serve the best interest of shareholder and expand their value. 
To have well-designed CEO compensation contracts, an effective board 
structure (e.g. board independence, remuneration committees, the separation of 
CEO and chair positions) leads to the design of optimal incentive contracts for 
CEOs to maximize shareholders’ value (Filatotchev & Allcock, 2010). Under 
the agency theory, the board of directors, in order to align the interests of 
shareholders, would make effective CEO compensation to expand the 
shareholders’ benefits and firm’s performance. For instance, small board size as 
a measure of an effective board of directors allows more group cohesiveness and 
increases efficiency, thus it could help develop appropriate CEO compensation 
arrangements. The introduction of independent directors in firms could provide 
a board of directors with professional knowledge to design the CEO 
compensation contracts, and monitor CEOs with the prospect of sacking those 
who are performing poorly, thus preventing CEOs from extracting the rent, 
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especially greater compensation from shareholders. To comply with agency 
theory, the CSRC issued ‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to 
the Board of Directors of Listed Companies’ in 2002 in China. The introduction 
of the independent directors in Chinese listed firms aimed to enhance the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and monitor of directors and managers to 
avoid an insider-controlled board. The guidelines for introducing independent 
directors show regulators support the view of agency theory that corporate 
governance mechanisms play an important role in monitoring management and 
aligning in the interests of shareholders.  
Ownership structure, as an important corporate governance mechanism, 
also plays a vital role dealing with the agency problem. Generally, concentrated 
ownership monitors and disciplines management. Different countries adopt 
different ownership structures. A dispersed ownership structure is more widely 
employed in the US and UK, but continental European, Asian, and Latin 
American countries prefer to adopt the more concentrated ownership structure 
(Barca & Becht, 2001). Some researchers conclude which conditions determine 
the concentrated or dispersed ownership structure, for example Helwege et al. 
(2007) showed that dispersed ownership is determined by better stock market 
conditions, such as high returns and liquidity. Also, Foley and Greenwood (2010) 
examined a sample of several countries and found that investment opportunities 
and strong investor protection were also vital variables for firms to adopt the 
dispersed ownership structure. Taking the US and UK with dispersed ownership 
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as an example, La Porta (1998) provided evidence that countries with different 
legal origins had different degrees of investor protection, and that the US and 
UK belonged to the common-law countries with the strongest legal protection 
for investors. However, many firms in other countries do not have strong 
investor protection. Therefore, a concentrated ownership structure can provide 
more monitoring to compensate some weak corporate governance in those 
countries. In particular, concentrated ownership can increase the shareholders’ 
power to fire bad performing managers and prevent managers from extracting 
rents for themselves compared with dispersed ownership (Elston & Goldberg, 
2003); dispersed ownership also creates considerable managerial power, 
resulting in the CEOs extracting higher pay for themselves (Firth et al., 1999). 
The most typical feature of corporate governance for Chinese listed firms is 
different from other countries and lies in the ownership structure. Most Chinese 
listed firms have a dominant shareholder whose ownership share is much higher 
than the next largest shareholder. 
The largest shareholder usually has effective control to formulate the 
strategies and policies of the company (Firth et al., 2006). The block 
shareholders in China may be the state or private institutional investors 
(including foreign investors). Chen et al. (2010) argued that block owners in 
China have increasingly become a useful instrument to monitor management 
and constrain executive compensation, and empirically find that block 
ownership is negatively correlated to top executive compensation, showing that 
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block shareholders play a monitoring role in restraining managers’ self-dealing. 
Therefore, strong corporate governance mechanisms through effective 
internal and external control mechanisms constrain the managerial opportunism 
and maximize the shareholders wealth and achieve the firms’ goals. The agency 
theory predicts that CEOs aligning with the interests of shareholders, and under 
soundly monitored corporate governance, would obtain higher pay when a firm’s 
performance increases. The boards of directors would punish CEO misbehaviour.  
However, the weak corporate governance lead to greater agency 
problems, and managers might receive greater compensation. The CEO has 
more control and power over boards of directors, leading to boards of directors 
not functioning well. Particularly, during the setting process of compensation 
scheme, it might suffer from problems: (a) the CEOs might have an impact on 
the recruitment of directors. In most firms, CEOs dominate the selection of 
directors and they have responsibility to choose candidates for the boards. CEOs 
are driven by self-interest to select those directors who would not defend the 
CEO compensation scheme; (b) The independent directors appointed might not 
create a positive influence on the setting of executives’ compensation as the 
board and social dynamics, self-serving cognitive dissonance, insufficient 
incentives, economic benefits and cost, the market for directors and information 
disparity (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
When the boards of directors cannot play their duties, the market 
becomes another important mechanism to constrain the management behaviour. 
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In detail, it has been argued that markets for managerial labour, corporate control, 
capital, and products play a vital role in aligning interests between shareholders 
and executives (Fama, 1980). For example, executives’ incentives are influenced 
by the market for corporate control, executives have to make the firms perform 
better to attract potential acquirers willing to finance. However, Bebchuk and 
Fried (2002) argue that these market forces might not produce strong power to 
assist the boards limiting the excessive compensation of CEOs. For example, 
according to the empirical results by Jensen and Murphy in their seminal study 
in 1990, the dismissal risk for CEOs is small. It seems extremely impossible that 
such small dismissal risk for CEOs will prevent them from benefiting 
themselves and increasing their compensation. 
Apart from the boards and market forces to monitor the compensation 
arrangements of executives, as it is mentioned above, shareholders can take 
actions to influence the setting of executives’ compensation by having voting 
rights to choose perfect pay design for executives, or to impede executive 
compensation scheme that not optimal for shareholders. Nerveless, only if 
shareholders own a great amount of share in and/or they have seats on the board, 
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3.2.2. Managerial power approach 
Although the agency theory demonstrates that corporate governance can 
effectively monitor management and align the interests of management with 
shareholders, weakened corporate governance might provide CEOs with power 
to chase self-interests to extract more compensation. Given that weakened 
corporate governance might provide CEOs with power to chase self-interests 
and extract more compensation, ineffective boards of directors might allow 
CEOs to have more control and power over the board, leading to boards not 
functioning well. 
Managerial power theory holds that the CEO can exert power to 
influence their own compensation. CEO compensation is not only a way to 
address agency problems, but is also part of the agency problem because 
managers use the pay arrangements to engage in rent-seeking (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003; Chintrakarn et al., 2015). Bebchuk et al. (2002) argued that because of the 
control inefficiencies, powerful managers could influence the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms in determining a CEO’s compensation. For 
example, managers can use their power via their control of the board. 
Generally, the managerial power hypothesis maintains that the nature of 
the director selection process, the composition of the board of directors, directors’ 
incentives to please management, and the relative lack of director resources, 
support a finding that managers exert power over boards of directors (Dorff, 
2004). 
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The main channel for CEOs to gain power is the board, which determines 
the compensation scheme. CEOs will have a powerful impact on director 
selection; they can choose those directors who will stand by them, with this 
creating a great deal of power for CEOs to engage in activities to increase their 
pay packages. 
Core et al. (1999) concluded that the greater the power of CEOs on the 
choice of board members via their membership of the nominating committee, 
the higher the pay levels they obtain. In the election, Shareholders only need to 
decide whether to withhold their support from the board’s list of candidates. The 
lack of a proxy fight or other takeover attempt, and managers’ impact on 
choosing board of directors lead to the CEOs powerful. 
Due to the nature of the selection process, the board of directors are made 
up of those who possibly comply with management. Many directors are CEOs 
of other large, public firms. CEO-directors are more sympathetic to their 
colleague’s desire for a free hand in managing the firm. It is not difficult for 
them to ask for rise in their own compensation if CEO of comparable firms are 
paid more. If the directors are friends of the CEO, the friendship is likely to 
allow them not to be willing to defy the CEO decisions. And “celebrity” 
directors, prominent academics and retired politicians who usually are short of 
professional knowledge to evaluate and monitor the CEO’s behaviour.  
In the meantime, once directors are elected, they have little incentive to 
challenge management’s practices. the board and social dynamics (Bebchuk et 
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al., 2002) will increase the power of CEOs; they mean directors would never 
engage in any activities that threaten their interests, thus providing CEOs with 
the possibility of gaining more power. For example, the responsibility of the 
board lies in monitoring the CEO’s behaviour, but this might see them not 
wanting to take risks of being fired as CEOs would not hire directors who are 
not loyal to them. Most directors definitely want to keep their status, connections, 
and compensation (Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1995), so they may not go up 
against the CEO’s will. Under these circumstances, CEOs can take advantage of 
these social and psychological factors to increase their control and power on 
many aspects in firms, increasing their own benefits.  
Also, the managerial power hypothesis argues that directors who expect 
to challenge management have limited resources with which to do so. Directors 
have their main job and only spend part-time work for firms, but CEOs spend a 
plenty of working time for firms. Hence, directors would not be able to devote 
more attention to question managements.  
Additionally, as Jensen (1993), Bebchuk et al. (2002), and Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003) argued, another reason that CEOs become powerful lies in the fact 
they have better information than the board about the company, and they decide 
the board meeting schedule and which information will be presented to the board, 
more so if they are also the chairman of the boards.  
Many previous studies concluded the different sources of this power – 
which for example include the board size (Jensen, 1993), CEO duality (e.g. Lu 
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and Wei, 2008), and CEO ownership (Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013) – allow 
CEOs to appoint or select supportive board members (Fracassi & Tate, 2012) 
thereby perpetuating their power and influencing the compensation decisions 
(O’Reilly & Main, 2010). 
The size of a board can influence a CEO’s behaviour. Jensen (1993) 
argued that keeping boards small could help improve performance and that 
boards with more than seven or eight people will be likely to lead to ineffective 
perform and that it is easier for the executives to control them. Core et al. (1999) 
support that bigger boards are inclined to pay more and bigger boards remain 
CEOs with more discretion. It is supposed that larger boards are ineffective and 
related to higher managerial power (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). 
According to Adams et al. (2005), CEOs become more powerful when 
they are also the chair of the board since the chairman usually has a vital role in 
strategic decision-making, and CEO duality enhances the CEO’s impact on the 
nomination process of new directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). The Cadbury 
Report (1992) demonstrated that CEO duality damages a firm’s governance 
standards; the separation of the role of CEO and chairman indicates reduced 
managerial power (Conyon & Peck, 1998). 
Another important element in creating managerial power depends on the 
CEO shareholding. The CEO shareholding is a double-edged sword. On one 
hand, under the agency theory approach, the CEO shareholder tends to be an 
effective mechanism in protecting shareholders’ benefits (Jensen & Murphy, 
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1976, 1990). It offers long-term incentives to managers which aims to constrain 
managerial power. On the other hand, increasing CEO shareholding gives 
managers more control and power to influence their pay and enhances the 
possibility of entrenchment (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). Thus, with the 
excessive shares owned by the CEO, they have more managerial influence on 
internal control decisions, such as director elections and making decisions on 
the level and structure of CEO compensation (Finkelstein, 1992). Hence, the 
greater the percentage of shares owned by the CEO, the power increases and 
simultaneously the power will decrease along with the increase of the percentage 
of shares that outside shareholders have (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
 
3.3. Empirical Literature 
Based on the theories already discussed, this chapter aims to review the 
prior literature that discusses the related issues between executive compensation, 
corporate performance, and corporate governance mechanisms. Then, the 
discussion on these relationships post M&As has also been addressed.  
 
3.3.1. CEO Compensation and Corporate Performance 
In recent years, many studies have demonstrated that performance 
impacts favourably on CEO compensation. For example, Hall and Liebman 
(1998) present a strong relationship between a firm’s performance and CEO 
compensation, mainly created by the stock-holding options of the CEO. Kato 
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and Kubo (2006) found there was a positive pay-performance relationship on 
examining CEO compensation from a sample of listed and non-listed Japanese 
firms, which is consistent with the result of Kaplan (1994) on top executive 
compensation in Japan and the United States. 
Ozkan (2011) found there was a positive relationship between a firm’s 
performance and the level of CEO cash compensation and total compensation in 
UK non-financial firms, supporting the agency theory. Additionally, Van et al. 
(2012) used a multilevel meta-analytic method to test pay for performance 
relationship based on 332 prior primary studies conducted in 29 countries, 
showing performance was positively associated with CEO compensation 
modestly supporting the optimal contracting theory, which was consistent with 
the results of two prior meta-analyses on this topic (Rost & Osterloh, 2009; 
Tosiet al., 2000). A large amount of studies documented the positive relationship 
between executive compensation and company performance for Chinese listed 
firms. For example, Kato and Long (2006) worked on a sample of 937 Chinese 
publicly traded firms over time from 1998 to 2002 and found empirical evidence 
that there was a positive relationship between executive cash compensation and 
firm performance measured by stock returns. Firth et al. (2006, 2007) 
investigated a sample of 549 Chinese publicly traded firms during the period 
from 1998 to 2000 and also provided empirical evidence that accounting 
performance was related to executive cash compensation, but no relationship 
existed between the executive cash compensation and stock returns, consistent 
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with the results of Wang and Xiao (2011). 
Working on the sample of 1,342 unique publicly traded Chinese firms 
listed on the domestic exchanges from 2001 to 2005, Conyon and He (2011) also 
found empirical evidence that executive cash compensation was positively 
related to both stock market performance and accounting performance measured 
as shareholder returns and ROE (return on assets) respectively after controlling 
for firm size, growth opportunities, independent directors, and time and industry 
effects with fixed effect model. The most unique feature of this study was 
different from previous studies and lies in identifying the impact of CEO equity 
incentives on Chinese listed firm performance and found that the CEO equity 
incentives were positively correlated to the firm’s performance, consistent with 
the view that CEO equity incentive provides effective monitoring on CEO 
behaviour and can align the shareholders’ interest with CEO (Core & Guay, 1999; 
Holmstrom, 1979). Continually, Conyon and He (2012) expanded the sample 
size into 2,104 unique Chinese publicly traded firms over the period from 2000 
to 2010 to examine the determination of executive compensation in Chinese 
listed firms with the same method and still give the same empirical outcome that 
executive cash pay was positively related to firm’s performance. 
However, some studies do not show empirical evidence to support the 
agency theory that a firm’s performance should be positively correlated to CEO 
compensation. For example, Gregg et al. (2005) found there was a weak 
association between cash compensation and performance based on a sample of 
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large UK companies during the period 1994-2002. Ozkan (2006) found that 
there was no significant relationship between a firm’s performance and CEO 
compensation, which was consistent with her findings in 2007 while measures 
of board and ownership structures explained a significant amount of cross-
sectional variation in the total CEO compensation, including cash and equity-
based compensation (Ozkan, 2007). Girma et al. (2007) also found that there 
was a weak relationship between pay and performance for the purpose of 
examining the impact of the Cadbury reforms on the CEO pay for a sample of 
UK companies. In China, for example, Firth et al. (2007) found there was no 
relationship between CEOs’ pay and companies’ stock returns. 
 
3.3.2. CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance 
3.3.2.1. Board Size 
Boards play an important role in monitoring the management of firms. 
On one hand, some researchers argued that larger boards would be more 
functional than small boards as they can provide CEOs with high quality advice 
and counsel (Dalton et al. 1999) and offer higher levels of company performance. 
On the other hand, some researchers maintained the size of boards should remain 
small as bigger boards lead to poor communication and decision-making, and 
that such costs would outnumber the benefits of larger size; small board size 
provides more group cohesiveness (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). The 
larger size of boards tends to be related with ineffective boards and higher 
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managerial power (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Hence, making board sizes 
small might increase efficiency.   
With regard to CEO compensation, a large amount of empirical evidence 
shows that board size is positively correlated to executive compensation (e.g. 
Yermack, 1996; Core et al., 1999; Chalmers et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2007), which 
demonstrates that larger boards might result in larger agency problems and 
provide CEOs with more power to extract rent from compensation. 
Core et al. (1999) examined how corporate governance mechanisms 
influenced executive compensation and corporate governance using a sample of 
205 publicly traded US firms from 1984 to 1986. The empirical results showed 
that board size was positively correlated to CEOs’ compensation, including 
salary, cash, and total compensation separately, which indicated that CEOs 
might exact more compensation with a bigger board size. The results also 
showed that in the case of bigger boards, the CEOs’ compensation was 
significantly negative with the corporate performance measured as firm 
operating and stock return performance, demonstrating that weaker corporate 
governance might lead to more agency problems.  
Similar to the results obtained by Core et al. (1999), Chalmers et al. 
(2006) provided empirical results that board size was significantly positively 
correlated to the total Australian CEOs’ compensation, fixed salary, and bonus. 
They argued that this was consistent with the managerial power theory that the 
board monitoring power would reduce with the bigger board size and that it was 
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not difficult for CEOs to extract the rent from compensation. However, it also 
found that there was no significant association between board size and stock 
compensation (options and shares). 
Fahlenbrach (2009) examined the impact of corporate governance and 
shareholder rights on CEO compensation using a sample of large US public 
firms between 1993 and 2004. It was found that board size, as a measure of 
board quality, was significantly positively related to total CEO compensation. 
Simultaneously in the case of larger boards, the sensitivity of pay-for-
performance was significantly low, which was also consistent with the 
managerial power theory and indicated that larger boards impaired monitoring 
for management 
Other empirical studies have investigated the impact of board size on 
corporate performance (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Mangena et al., 2012). Yermack 
(1996) provided empirical evidence that smaller boards were more effective and 
that board size was negatively linked to the firm’s value using Tobin’s Q as an 
approximation of market valuation based on the sample of 452 large US firms 
between 1984 and 1991. The results were also robust to control for company 
size, industry membership, inside stock ownership, growth opportunities, and 
alternative corporate governance structures. Consistent with Yermack’s results, 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examined firms in Singapore and Malaysia and offered 
similar findings that there was a negative relationship between board size and 
firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. In Yermack’s results, there was no evidence 
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to prove the inverse relationship between firm value and board size with size 
below six. Eisenberg et al. (1998) updated and confirmed Yermack’s results and 
used a random sample of about 900 small Finnish firms to provide a similar 
outcome of an inverse association between board size and profitability of firms 
using industry-adjusted return on assets as a measurement. 
However, Yermack’s (1996) results are only partly confirmed by Bhagat 
and Black (2000); for example, the board size was significantly negative related 
to firm performance measured as SAL/AST between 1991 and 1993. 
However, the empirical results of an inverse relationship between board 
size and firm value was criticized for not controlling endogeneity problems 
(Wintoki, 2007). Then Wintoki’s (2007) use of a dynamic panel GMM 
(generalized method of moments) estimator to control the endogeneity problem 
found there was no relationship between board size and corporate performance.  
Although a large amount of empirical literature provided an inverse 
relationship between board size and firm value, some researchers still challenge 
this argument and find that, in some specific conditions, large board size can 
bring some beneficial outcomes. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2006) found 
evidence that the non-profit’s board size was positively associated with the 
number of programme activities chased by the organisation. This means that not-
for-profit organisations pursued more objectives and have larger boards. 
In terms of China, working on a sample of total of 206 Chinese listed 
firms during 2000–2001, Li et al. (2007) examined the determination of CEO 
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compensation in Chinese listed firms and found no relationship between board 
size and CEO compensation, suggesting that compensation standards have an 
influence on CEO compensation levels. They argued that the result indicated 
that large board sizes did not seem to weaken the control of the board of directors 
and that the CEO did not use the large board size to extract higher pay. Buck et 
al. (2008) used a sample of 601 Chinese listed firms from 2000-2003 to examine 
the relationship between top executive compensation and a firm’s performance 
controlling the corporate governance mechanisms, and found empirical evidence 
that board size had no significant influence on top executive compensation. 
 
3.3.2.2. Supervisory Board 
Two main typical types of board structures are dominant in the firms of 
different countries; the Anglo-Saxon style one-tier board (i.e. the board of 
directors) or the Germanic style two-tier board consisting of both a board of 
directors and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) (Peck & Ruigrok, 2000). For 
example, Korn-Ferry (1996) classified the UK and Italy into the one-tier board 
structure while Denmark and the Netherlands were in the two-tier board 
structure. Generally, the supervisory board is chaired by the non-executive 
directors and is comprised of the shareholders, employees and bank 
representatives (Luo, 2005). The supervisory board in large public firms in 
Germany usually has 19 members (Kaplan, 1997). The main role of the 
supervisory board is to appoint, supervise, and dismiss the members of the board 
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of directors, and watch over management performance (Hopt et al., 2004). Also, 
the supervisory board is responsible for the financial statements and approval of 
the consolidated financial statements, as well as for the effective compensation 
arrangement of top management (Dyballa & Kraft, 2015). 
According to the agency theory, the supervisory board should be 
independent from management and the non-executive directors have to remain 
independent, thus conducting an effective monitoring function in compliance 
with the shareholders’ interests (Andreas et al., 2012). An inefficiency problem 
of the supervisory board may arise when the supervisory boards are not 
dominated by the shareholders themselves, but the former executive board 
members become the members of the supervisory board in the same firm, and 
interlocked board members exist. From this point, the supervisory board might 
not fully represent the shareholders’ interests and could lead to self-interested 
behaviour by management (Dyballa & Kraft, 2015). However, empirically, 
Balsmeier et al. (2015) worked on a sample of the 100 largest companies in 
Germany and found that supervisory board members with simultaneous outside 
directorships were positively correlated to executive turnovers, showing the 
effective monitoring function of interlocked board members. 
Few studies have examined the relationship between the supervisory 
board size, corporate performance, and executive compensation. Van et al., 
(2003) examined the characteristics of board and firm performance in the 
Netherlands using a sample of 94 Dutch listed non-financial (mainly 
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manufacturing) firms in 1996, and provided empirical evidence that the size of 
the supervisory board was negatively correlated to the firm’s performance, 
showing that the supervisory board in Dutch firms did not function well. Fiss 
(2006) examined the social influence effects on executive compensation using 
original data on German firms and a longitudinal design, and found that the 
supervisory board size was positively and significantly correlated to executive 
compensation even controlling firm size, which was consistent with the 
argument that large board size cannot effectively supervise management 
(Yermack, 1996). 
Chizema (2008) investigated the disclosure of individual compensation 
in Germany using data on large German firms for 2002-2005 and found that the 
size of the supervisory board was negatively and significantly associated with 
individual disclosure of executive compensation. 
Listed firms in China adopted a two tier board structure including the 
board of directors and supervisory board. On one hand, the supervisory board 
was regarded as an effective monitoring mechanism to management and the 
board of directors (Xiao et al., 2004). According to the ‘The Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China’ issued by the CSRC in 2002’, the 
main duty of the supervisory boards was to monitor the directors and managers 
and firms’ financial activities. Dahya et al. (2002) concluded there were four 
main roles of the supervisory board in Chinese listed firms; honoured guest, 
friendly advisor, censored watchdog, and independent watchdog. Logically, the 
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function of the supervisory board was to protect shareholders’ interests and 
rights and improve corporate governance and corporate performance (Shan and 
Xu, 2012). For example, Dahya et al. (2002) indicated that a negative market 
reaction occurred when a company failed to include a supervisory report in its 
annual report; Firth et al. (2007) showed that supervisory boards resulted in an 
improvement in the quality of accounting information; Ding et al. (2009) found 
a negative association between supervisory board size and the pay of the chair 
of the board of directors. 
On the other hand, some researchers argued that the supervisory board 
in Chinese listed firms could not perform the monitoring role (e.g. Xi, 2006; 
Tam, 1995). Firstly, the members of supervisory board did not possess adequate 
qualifications and lacked professional knowledge and work experience (Tian, 
2009). Secondly, Ding et al. (2010) held that, differently from German 
supervisory boards that have the power to appoint and dismiss board directors, 
the supervisory boards for Chinese firms cannot influence executive decisions 
and have no right to select directors, managers, and financial officers, thus their 
responsibilities are more abstract in nature. Thirdly, because of the information 
asymmetric, supervisory boards lack efficient information that is controlled by 
CEOs, and it is difficult for them to monitor the managers (Tenev et al., 2002). 
Therefore, the supervisory board in Chinese listed firms is more like a decoration 
instead of a truly effective monitoring mechanism. 
Empirically, Chen et al. (2010) examined the internal control on Chinese 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
74 
 
executive compensation in a balanced panel sample of 502 Chinese listed firms 
between 2001 and 2006, and found that there was no significant relationship 
between the supervisory board size and executive compensation. The empirical 
result was consistent with the outcome from Li et al. (2007). They also failed to 
find any association between supervisory board size and CEO compensation. 
Ding et al. (2010) worked on a sample of 1,345 observations in 2005 and 1,410 
in 2006 to examine the relationship between CEO compensation and the 
supervisory board under the reform of corporate governance in Chinese listed 
firms. They found that before the reform of corporate governance, the 
supervisory board did not affect executive compensation, but positively 
influenced it after the reform of corporate governance; it also found that 
supervisory board size was positively correlated to the total executive 
compensation, but negatively correlated to the pay-performance sensitivity for 
the combined total sample. Also, Jia et al. (2009) found that the CSRC possibly 
penalized the listed firms with bigger supervisory boards.  
 
3.3.2.3. Board Independence 
As discussed in the theory framework, the independent director’s 
mechanism plays a vital role in monitoring and is used to protect shareholders’ 
benefits to enhance their value. Independent directors, or outside directors, as an 
important part of boards of directors, are managers of other firms or important 
decision agents in other complex organisations. Their main responsibilities are 
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providing professional knowledge to assist managers in handling specialised 
decision problems such as corporate law or relevant technology, and have 
motivations such as reputation to monitor managers, thus reducing the agency 
problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This is also supported by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) in that more independent boards do more monitoring, and that 
outsider-dominated boards could reduce the bargaining power of managers as 
they would be more likely to sack poorly performing CEOs than insider-
dominated boards. Thus, independent directors can effectively prevent the 
managers extract the rent, especially the greater compensation from 
shareholders. 
However, some researchers argue that outside directors are generally 
hired by managers; they might have hidden associations with managers (e.g. 
Core et al., 1999), thus having less monitoring on managers and controlling their 
compensation. 
Great amounts of literature have discussed the impact of independent 
directors on CEO compensation and produced mixed findings. Lambert et al. 
(1993) investigated the structure of the organisational incentive in a sample of 
large publicly traded US firms and found the percentage of outside directors 
appointed by CEO was positively correlated to the level of CEO compensation, 
supporting the managerial-power theory. Boyd (1994) provided similar findings. 
Core et al. (1999) examined the influence of independent directors on CEO 
compensation in a sample of US large firms. They classified the independent 
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directors as grey directors (if they obtained payments from firms exceeding 
board pay) and interlocked directors (other inside director of firms sit on the 
board of outside directors). They found CEO compensation was positively 
correlated to the percentage of outside directors, and the grey outside directors, 
and was negatively correlated to the insider directors, but was not significantly 
related to the interlocked directors. This was not consistent with the results of 
Hallock (1997) who found that interlocked directors had a positive relationship 
with the CEO total pay in 500 firms in 1992. 
Ozkan (2007) worked on a sample of 414 UK firms for the fiscal year 
2003-2004 to examine whether corporate governance affected CEO 
compensation and found that CEOs were paid higher compensation with a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors on their boards, indicating that non-
executive directors do not play an effective monitoring role for CEOs. 
However, some empirical literature provides an inverse relationship 
between CEO compensation and independent directors and a positive 
monitoring function of independent directors. For example, Basu et al. (2007) 
found evidence that outside directors, as one of the monitoring mechanisms, can 
effectively tackle the agency problems in Japanese business environment, and 
provided empirical findings that the outside directors were significantly 
negatively related to the CEO cash compensation for 174 large Japanese firms 
during 1992-1996. 
Previous research about the influence of independent directors on CEO 
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compensation gave less consideration to the bias caused by endogeneity and 
outliers. Wan (2009) looked at the endogeneity and outlier problems and found 
evidence that there was no relationship between CEO total pay and a board that 
had a greater number of independent directors. 
Other literature investigated the relationship between the firm’s 
performance and the independent directors. For instance, Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) found that a significant positive share price reaction was influenced by 
the proportion of outside directors appointed by managers. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) found that bidding firms on which 
independent outside directors held at least 50% of the seats had significantly 
higher announcement-date abnormal returns than other bidders. Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) found the proportion of independent directors was positively 
correlated to the firm’s performance. However, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
examined the influence of seven control mechanisms on a firm’s performance in 
a sample of nearly 400 large US firms and found evidence that a large percentage 
of outside directors had a negative impact on a firm’s performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q in OLS estimations. In addition, Klein (1998) showed that the change 
in market value of equity was significantly negatively related to the proportion 
of independent directors, but the proportion of independent directors had no 
significant relationship with return on assets and raw stock market returns. 
Bhagat and Black (2000) examined whether board independence enhanced the 
firm’s value in the large and long-term sample of large US firms and found that 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
78 
 
profitability was lowered by increasing the independent directors. 
In terms of China, independent directors were emphasised as the better 
practice of corporate governance to optimize such structures. Regarding the 
impact of independent directors, the findings were also mixed. Fan et al. (2007) 
found that the non-executive directors were related to CEO turnover, thus 
showing that independent directors played a positive monitoring role for CEOs. 
However, Tian and Lau (2001) study the 207 Chinese listed firms for 1996-1997 
and found no positive association between reported performance and the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. Conyon and He (2011), 
working on a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms listed on the domestic 
exchanges from 2001-2005, found evidence that more independent directors on 
the board brought firms a higher pay-for-performance association and firms with 
more independent directors on the board were possibly likely to fire the CEO 
for poor performance, which was consistent with the argument that independent 
directors make a positive monitoring governance. However, Conyon and He 
(2008) found evidence in Chinese listed firms that firms with a greater 
proportion of independent directors on the board had higher executive pay and 
greater CEO equity incentives in a sample of 1481 unique firms over the period 
2001-2005, which seems to go against the monitoring function of independent 
directors. In addition, Conyon and He (2012) continued to find that the 
proportion of independent directors had little impact on CEO compensation in 
both OLS and fixed-effect models. 




3.3.2.4. CEO Duality  
CEO duality means that the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board 
of directors. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argued that the agency problem 
was becoming more severe in cases where the CEO also sat on the board as 
chairman. CEO duality increases CEO power and boards are no longer 
independent. For example, those CEOs who are also the chairman of boards 
dominate both the agenda and content of board meetings (Mallette & Fowler, 
1992), which would potentially reduce the board monitoring function, thus 
increasing the CEO entrenchment (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994) and might 
influence the board to set compensation to favour themselves. In addition, CEOs 
holding both positions have more dominance on the selection of new directors, 
which increases the risk of opportunistic and inefficient behaviour of CEOs, thus 
impairing shareholder benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, according to the agency theory, to avoid increasing CEO 
entrenchment, the CEO should be separate from the chairman of the board of 
directors. However, some researchers argue that CEO duality provides 
integrated leadership and highlights the role of the CEO in charge of a firm’s 
operation, thus reducing the internal or external equivocalness and increasing 
performance (e.g. Donaldson, 1990; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1993). 
With regard to the influence of CEO duality on a firm’s performance, the 
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empirical findings are mixed. Rechner and Dalton (1991) found evidence that 
when CEOs were separate from the chairman of boards, the firms performed 
better in return on equity, return on investment, and profit margin in a sample of 
Fortune 500 firms. Sanda et al. (2010) also provided a similar finding on a 
positive association between a firm’s performance and non-joint CEO leadership. 
Goyal and Park (2002), working on the 3,239 firm-years representing 823 
control firms from 1992-1996, showed that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
firm performance was significantly lower when the CEO and board chair 
positions were held by the same individual. 
However, Daily and Dalton (1992) did not find evidence that CEO 
duality had an association with the performance of entrepreneurial firms in a 
sample of 100 small US firms listed in Inc. magazine’s annual ranking of the 
fastest-growing businesses in 1990, consistent with the results for Dalton et al. 
(1998) with meta-analyses of 31 empirical studies of board leadership structure. 
In addition, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) did not find evidence that CEO duality had 
a relationship with firm value. 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) worked on a sample of various 
organisations and sizes, yielding variation, providing empirical evidence that 
firms with a CEO duality leadership structure received more shareholder returns 
measured as ROE (return on equity) than those firms adopting the independent 
structure. Dey et al. (2011) took empirical analyses to doubt the view in support 
of the separation of role of CEO and chairman of boards. They examined the 
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relationship among the firm’s performance, CEO compensation, and combining 
or not combining the roles of CEO and board chairman and found that firms with 
the joint structure had higher pay-performance sensitivity in CEO compensation 
contracts and significantly lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity with a 
separate role of CEO and chairman of the board. In addition, Brickley et al. 
(1997) documented that the costs of separation of the role of CEO and chairman 
of boards were larger than the benefits for most large US firms and CEO duality 
was not correlated to the inferior performance. 
In terms of the impact of CEO duality on CEO compensation, Cyert et 
al. (2002), found evidence that CEOs obtained higher compensation when they 
also sat on the chair of the board, in particular, the CEO who was also the 
chairman received about 36% greater equity compensation than a non-chairman 
CEO in a sample size at 1,648 firms for 1992 and 1993. Core et al. (1999) and 
Boyd (1994) found similar empirical evidence that CEO compensation was an 
increasing function of CEO duality. 
According to Fan et al. (2007), the phenomenon of firms with a joint 
leadership structure was common in Chinese listed firms. The leadership 
structure on corporate performance and CEO compensation in China also 
involved different findings. Tian and Lao (2001) examined the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on organisational performance in Chinese 
shareholding companies with special attention to China’s unique institutional 
environment and its impact on the board and found firms with CEO duality 
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received better corporate performance. However, Chen et al. (2010) documented 
that CEO duality created a considerable impact on the Chinese compensation 
contracting process and made CEOs receive a high level of compensation, which 
was consistent with managerial power theory. Li et al. (2006) documented that 
CEO compensation was not significantly correlated to the CEO duality for 
Chinese listed firms. 
 
3.3.2.5. CEO Shareholding 
According to agency theory, CEO shareholding has been recognised as 
a mechanism to monitor managers, and boards can take advantage of the stock-
based incentives to prevent managerial opportunism and arrive at higher 
corporate performance, thus protecting the shareholders’ benefits (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). However, in the view of managerial 
power theory, some researchers hold that excess CEO shareholding might lead 
to managers having more power on the board and making use of power to extract 
benefits for themselves rather than increasing shareholders’ benefits (Holderness 
& Sheehan, 1988; Lambert et al., 1993). 
Increasing stock ownership gives managers more control and power to 
influence their pay and enhances the possibility of entrenchment (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989). 
Empirically, Morck et al. (1988) examined the association between the 
management shareholding and market valuation of the firm measured as Tobin’s 
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Q in a cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980, finding a significant 
nonmonotonic relationship which was that the market valuation increased at low 
levels of managerial ownership and decreased at higher levels. Shuto and Takada 
(2010) examined the relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism in Japan, the results show that, consistent with the incentive 
alignment view, whether managerial ownership was high or low level, there was 
a significant and negative relationship between the managerial ownership and 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings; the managerial power effect was found 
in the middle levels of managerial ownership that the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings was significantly and positively correlated to the managerial ownership.  
In terms of the test of the managerial ownership and executive 
compensation, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) investigated the determination 
of CEO compensation in America, working on a sample of 110 US listed firms 
in the leisure industry for the years 1971, 1976, 1982, and 1983, and finding that 
the CEO power measured by the CEO shareholding was positively correlated to 
the CEO salary compensation. Furthermore, Mehran (1995) studied the US 
listed firms and found the CEO shareholding was positively correlated to the 
CEO cash compensation instead of the equity-based compensation. However, 
Cyert et al. (2002) examined the effect of the corporate governance level on CEO 
compensation using a sample of 1,648 US firms between year 1992 and 1993. 
Consistent with the view of managerial entrenchment effect, they found 
that CEO ownership was significantly and positively correlated to the CEO 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
84 
 
salary and equity-based compensation. In addition, Byrd and Cooperman (2010) 
argued that large shareholdings held by the CEO enabled the CEO to have more 
control on their compensation and empirically found that CEO ownership was 
significantly and positively correlated to the total CEO compensation in a 
sample of 93 publicly traded US banks. 
According to Ozkan (2007) in an empirical study of the investigation of 
the influence of corporate governance on the level of CEO compensation in a 
sample of 414 large UK companies for the fiscal year 2003/2004, CEO 
ownership was negatively and significantly correlated to the equity-based CEO 
compensation. In a study in Sweden and Norway by Randøy and Nielsen (2002), 
the CEO shareholding was negatively correlated to the CEO compensation using 
cross-sectional ordinary least-square (OLS) regression model for the sample of 
224 firms in Sweden and Norway, consistent with the agency theory.   
In China, Chen et al., (2010) empirically found that the CEO 
shareholding was significantly positively correlated to the CEO compensation 
that was consistent with the prediction of managerial power approach that CEO 
shareholding provides managers more opportunity to collude with government 
officials and extract the state property. Also, Li et al. (2007) documented the 
significantly positive association between CEO shareholding and CEO 
compensation. But, they gave different reasons from that Li et al. (2007), 
maintaining that the CEO shareholding in Chinese firms was recognised as a 
method to attract and retain talented managers. 




3.3.2.6. Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure, as an important corporate governance mechanism, 
also plays a vital role dealing with the agency problem. Different countries adopt 
different ownership structures. The dispersed ownership structure is more 
widely employed in the US and UK, but continental European, Asian, and Latin 
American countries prefer to adopt the more concentrated ownership structure 
(Barca & Becht, 2001). Some researchers conclude the factors determining the 
concentrated or dispersed ownership structure, for example Helwege et al. 
(2007), show that dispersed ownership is determined by better stock market 
conditions, such as high returns and liquidity. Also, Foley and Greenwood (2010) 
examined the sample of several countries and found that investment 
opportunities and strong investor protection were also vital variables for firms 
to adopt dispersed ownership structures. Taking the US and UK with dispersed 
ownership as an example, La Porta (1998) provided the evidence that countries 
with different legal origins had different degrees of investor protection and the 
US and UK belonged to the common-law countries with the strongest legal 
protection of investors. However, many firms in other countries do not have such 
strong investor protection. Therefore, concentrated ownership structures can 
provide more monitoring to compensate some weak corporate governance in 
those countries. In particular, concentrated ownership can increase the 
shareholders’ power to fire badly performing managers and prevent managers 
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from extracting rents for themselves than dispersed ownership (Elston & 
Goldberg, 2003), and dispersed ownership creates considerable managerial 
power, resulting in the CEOs extracting higher pay for themselves (Firth et al., 
1999). 
The literature also examined the relationship between ownership 
concentration and CEO compensation. For example, earlier both Santerre and 
Neun (1986) and Dyl (1988) examined the agency problem related to executive 
compensation and found that ownership concentration was negatively correlated 
to CEO compensation. Elston and Goldberg (2003) examined executive 
compensation in German firms and found that firms with more concentrated 
ownership structures had lower levels of executive compensation, consistent 
with the view that a concentrated ownership structure could monitor the 
manager’s behaviour and protect the shareholders’ benefits. 
Earlier, Berle and Means (1932) supported the concentrated ownership 
and argued that a more concentrated ownership structure was linearly positively 
correlated to a firm’s performance. They hold that the diffused ownership 
concentration brought free riding problems and it was hard to monitor the CEOs. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provided empirical analysis supporting the argument 
of Berle and Means (1932) and found that large shareholders played a crucial 
role in a firm’s performance, in particular, evidence showed that the stock price 
was positively correlated to the proportion of shares held by these large 
shareholders. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) also provided evidence supporting 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and found that large shareholders offered both better 
monitoring to managers and performance, particularly when the ownership was 
concentrated by institutional investors. These arguments, in the previous 
literature, showed that there was a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value.  
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) examined the influence of the 
structure of ownership on firms’ performance measured by profitability in a 
sample of 175 Greek listed firms in 2000. They found that a more concentrated 
ownership structure had a more positive impact on firms’ profitability and also 
found that higher firm profitability required less diffused ownership. 
However, some researchers found negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and a firm’s value. For example, Leech and Leahy 
(1991) investigated the ownership structure and related firm performance in UK 
firms and found that ownership concentration was negatively related to the 
firm’s value. Also, Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) used the UK sample of firms 
and confirmed the findings of Leech and Leahy (1991) and provided a similar 
finding that the ownership concentration was negatively correlated to the firm’s 
value measured by the rate of return on the stock market.  
De Miguel et al. (2004) argued that different countries adopting different 
corporate governance systems would have different firm values and ownership 
associations, especially in the cases in which these countries had different levels 
of ownership concentration, the effectiveness of boards, the development of 
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capital markets, and the role of the market for corporate control and the legal 
protection of investors. For example, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) examined 
the impact of ownership concentration on a firm’s value for several countries 
with different corporate governance systems, providing evidence that ownership 
concentration was not linearly correlated with profitability in US and German 
firms, and no association was found between ownership concentration and firms’ 
performance in the UK, France, and Canada. They hold that these different 
findings among different countries relied on the different institutional contexts 
and corporate governance systems. 
The most typical feature of corporate governance for Chinese listed firms 
was different from other countries and was in the ownership structure. Most 
Chinese listed firms have a dominant shareholder whose ownership share is 
much higher than the next largest shareholder. The largest shareholder usually 
has effective control to formulate the strategies and policies of the company 
(Firth et al., 2006).  
Given the unique characteristic of the ownership structure in China, 
some researchers examined the different ownership controller type on firm 
performance and executive compensation. For example, Firth et al. (2006) 
examined the relationship between different controller shareholder type and the 
CEOs’ compensation for Chinese listed firms and found that firms with the state 
as the largest shareholder had no relationship between CEO pay and the firm’s 
performance, but firms with the private block holders or SOEs as the controlling 
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shareholders had a relationship between a CEO’s pay and firm value. However, 
the pay for performance sensitivities of CEOs was low. Chen et al. (2010) argued 
that the block owners in China have increasingly become a useful instrument to 
monitor management and constrain executive compensation, and empirically 
found that block owners were negatively correlated to top executive 
compensation, showing that block shareholders played a monitoring role in 
restraining managers’ self-dealing. 
 
3.3.3. Political Connections 
The understanding of firms’ political connections has been widely 
documented by many previous studies focusing on developed and less 
developed countries and it is regarded as a useful means for several firms (Morck 
et al., 2000; Goldman et al., 2009). It was demonstrated that many firms had 
political connections with government, the large shareholder, or that the top 
leaders of firms were currently, or had been, government officials or party 
members. Political connections as a useful resource among firms made 
businesses successful; the firms with political connections had more policy 
privileges and could own more benefits and enrich themselves (Bunkanwanicha 
& Wiwattanakantang, 2008). Particularly, it would bring many benefits such as 
acquiring more tax reduction and bank loans (Firth et al., 2009), and looser 
regulations (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009), thus enhancing 
corporate performance (Boubakri et al., 2012). 
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However, there were mixed empirical findings on the issue of whether 
the political connections increased corporate performance (e.g. Fisman, 2001; 
Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009).  
For example, Fisman (2001) examined the influence of political 
connections to firm value in a sample of 79 listed firms of Indonesia during 
1995-1997 and found that political connections were the main reason that 
affected the firm’s performance, adding 33% to the firm’s value. Similarly, 
Ramalho (2003) found family-connected firms’ stock prices did not significantly 
decrease because of the impeached president. Fisman et al. (2012) continued to 
examine the impact of political connection to the firm’s value through the state 
of US vice president Dick Cheney’s heart attack, and found that there was no 
significant relationship between the heart attack and the firm’s performance for 
connected firms. 
Working on a large sample of 20,202 listed firms in 47 countries during 
1996-1999, Faccio (2006) studied the common features of political connection 
among several countries and the influence of political connection on firms’ 
performance. The results indicated that politically-connected firms were more 
prevalent in countries with high levels of corruption and a weak legal system, 
and the positive firm performance measured by the cumulative abnormal return 
is obtained once the large shareholders or top officers enter politics in those 
countries with high corruption level. 
In addition, Faccio et al. (2006) examined the relationship between 
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political connections and corporate bailouts in a sample of 450 politically-
connected firms from 35 countries during 1997-2002. The results showed that 
politically-connected firms possibly obtained the bailout from government and 
financial support from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank 
compared with those firms without connections as the shareholder might make 
use of political connections to secure the corporate bailouts. But the politically-
connected firms performed worse than those non-connected at the time of and 
following the bailout, specifically, the lower industry-adjusted ROA in bailed-
out connected firms than those bailed-out non-connected firms. Similarly, 
Boubakri et al. (2008) worked on the newly-privatised firms using a sample of 
245 privatised firms in 27 developing and 14 developed countries during 1980-
2002, and found that the politically-connected firms performed worse in 
accounting performance than those not connected. Consistent with the results of 
Boubakri et al., (2008), Menozzi et al. (2012) found that the political 
connections of newly-privatised Italian firms damage firms’ performance. 
Under the weak corporate governance and severe corruption of Thailand, 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) worked on a sample of the top 
2,000 largest listed and non-listed firms in Thailand in 2000, finding evidence 
that the market valuation of the large family firms with political connections 
performed better than those without connection, which was consistent with the 
result of Imai (2006) whose Thailand study showed that family firms in which 
members took part in politics had a positive performance. Also, they discovered 
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that those family businesses in regulated industries sought more top positions 
and were therefore more involved in drawing up regulations to benefit 
themselves. The results showed that owners of big business working for top 
government offices could take advantage of political power to influence policy 
decisions, thus favouring their own interests. Consistently with the Thailand 
study from Imai (2006) and Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), 
Civilize et al. (2015) found that political connection brought firms large stock 
returns and it particularly took place in regulated industry.   
Generally, politically-connected firms were not common in those 
developed countries with sound corporate governance and strong legal systems 
because government officials bore the considerable cost (e.g. political and legal 
punishment) for supporting those firms with political connections with 
government. However, Goldman et al. (2009) found that political connections 
were important in the US. Their study on the association between the political 
connections and company performance used a sample of all firms which were in 
the S&P 500 during the years 1996 and 2000. The results showed a positive 
abnormal stock return following the announcement of the nomination of a 
politically-connected individual to the board. 
Also, Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) found that German firms with political 
connections performed better than non-connected firms in accounting and 
market performance. But in the study of Ang et al. (2013), they found that 
Singapore fitted the general argument that the phenomenon of political 
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connection was not prevalent in countries with good corporate governance and 
sound legal systems, and the political connections added little value to firms in 
Singapore.  
Few studies investigated the influence of political connection on CEO 
compensation. Aslan and Grinstein (2011) examined the impact of CEOs’ 
political connections measured as campaign donations on CEO pay and found 
that the CEO political connections were positively correlated to CEO 
compensation and negatively related to the pay-performance sensitivity on a 
sample of US listed firms during 1996-2006. They argued that CEOs’ political 
capital brought firms resources and strategic values, thus they were rewarded for 
the skills and resources they brought to firms (e.g. regulation support, useful 
resources). 
Politically-connected firms are common in China as there is a weak legal 
system, weak law enforcement, and high levels of corruption. In the context of 
Chinese culture, Guanxi, or interpersonal relationship and networking, play a 
vital role at all levels of the social, economic, and political arena (Yee, 2005). 
According to Gu et al. (2008), the reason why Chinese firms prefer different 
connections is that they can take advantage of the durable social connections and 
networks to support firms’ operation. Therefore, Guanxi can be regarded as a 
useful tool which provides firms with many benefits (Xin & Pearce, 1996). In 
particular, political connections as one typical Guanxi for firms tend to be an 
efficient method in business transactions.  
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It is concluded that strong political connections exist between the 
government and Chinese listed firms. Many CEOs of Chinese listed firms are 
significantly politically-connected; they were previous, or are current, 
government officials (Yang et al., 2011) who possess a network with the 
government, control information and resources, and can collude with the state 
(Chen et al., 2010). It was reported by Fan et al. (2007) that around 25% of CEOs 
were previously, or are currently, government officers. In addition, it is common 
for independent directors to be former government officials in Chinese listed 
firms. As indicated, 13.88% of independent directors are politically-connected, 
and those independent directors can use their political connections with the 
government to provide firms with more resources and add value to them (Liao 
et al., 2009).  
The government significantly influences the allocation of resources, 
such as the granting of land use rights, the setting of prices for energy, electricity, 
and water, and the control of access to financial capital. Hence, the government 
might either grant preferential treatment to businesses or impose extra fees and 
fines on them (Li et al., 2008). In this case, CEOs’ political connections are a 
key resource to guarantee a firm’s success (Li et al., 2006). In China, the 
government provides priority access to many resources and provides benefits to 
the SOEs compared to the privately-controlled firms (Nee, 1992). The state-
controlled firms actively and easily establish and seek out political connections 
with the government through appointing CEOs with a political background. 
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Retaining the relationship with government helps the state-controlled firms to 
have influence over many more resources and obtain more preferential treatment. 
The privately-controlled firms do not have such advantages and therefore, to 
compensate the drawbacks of lacking better treatment and resources, and to 
improve market competitiveness, the privately-controlled firms more actively 
seek political connections through the politically-connected executives and 
directors. Thus, political connections also play an important role in privately-
controlled firms (He et al., 2014). This brings many genuine benefits to 
privately-controlled firms, as with state-owned firms, such as acquiring tax 
reductions and bank loans (Firth et al., 2009), and looser regulations 
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009), thus enhancing corporate 
performance (Boubakri et al., 2012).  
The political connections allow both privately-controlled and state-
owned firms to enjoy the resources to improve firms’ efficiency. Accordingly, 
the increased benefits derived from the political connections or increased 
corporate performance might lead to higher CEO compensation. Importantly, 
those CEOs with political connections might be more capable of bringing 
benefits and better treatments to firms, which also allows those CEOs to have 
more power and dominance (Pi & Lowe, 2011). For example, when CEOs have 
more power, they can enhance the impact of the board of directors’ decisions, 
such as arranging the CEO compensation (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
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Empirically, In China, some researchers maintained that political 
connections damaged firms’ performance (e.g. Ang et al., 2013). Empirically, 
Fan et al. (2007) worked on a sample of 790 newly-partially privatised firms in 
China to examine the impact of a politically-connected CEO on firm 
performance, and found that the political connection harmed the firm’s 
performance. Firms with politically-connected CEOs underperformed those 
without politically connected CEOs measured by accounting and market 
performance in post-IPO period. Ang et al. (2013) argued that the results of Fan 
et al. (2007) was consistent with the point that lower managerial ownership in 
Chinese firms (Li et al., 2007) was likely to result in managerial entrenchment 
through the political connection. Li and Zhou (2015) argued that the politically-
connected firms made IPO easier because of the looser investigation by CSRC, 
then resulting in poor corporate performance. Similarly, Li et al. (2008) 
examined the influence of CEOs’ political connections on long-run performance 
for 769 Chinese IPO firms under different ownership styles. The results showed 
that the CEO’s political connection was negatively correlated to the firms’ three-
year post-IPO stock performance in local SOEs. Consistent with the results of 
Li et al. (2008), Wu et al. (2012a) and (2012b) found that the politically-
connected CEOs were negatively correlated to the firm’s performance measured 
by ROA and Tobin’s Q for firms with local SOEs as the CEOs have to mainly 
achieve more government goals that the local SOEs required.  
However, many researchers argued that the political connections brought 
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many resources and benefits, such as reducing the cost of external financing (Xu 
et al., 2013), thus adding value to firms. Du and Girma (2010) investigated the 
impact of political connections on the post-entry performance of private start-up 
firms in China and found that the firms with political connections obtained 
higher growth and more survival prospects. To complement the findings of Fan 
et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2011) worked on a sample of the 276 listed private 
firms that made an IPO between 1993 and 2008, and found that the political 
connections were positively related to the post-IPO CARs (cumulative abnormal 
returns) which was different from the negative effect of Fan et al. (2007) for 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
According to Jiang (2008), the CEO political connection has been 
classified into two types: Developed connections (e.g. school ties) and inherited 
connections (e.g. family connections). Jiang (2008) found that the developed 
connections were positively correlated to the firm’s performance, but the 
inherited connections were negatively correlated to the firm’s performance. 
Pi and Lowe (2011) argued that the political connections allowed CEOs 
to have more power which came from their capabilities to offer firms many 
important resources, thus CEOs were difficult to replace. They worked on a 
sample of 325 listed firms during the period 1997-2006 and found that the CEOs’ 
political connections were negatively correlated to CEO turnover, which was 
consistent with the result of Cao et al. (2011). Cao et al. (2011) stated that 
political connections led to poor corporate governance, and resulted in 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
98 
 
managerial entrenchment. Consistent with the results of Pi and Lowe (2011), 
You and Du (2012) obtained a similar conclusion that the CEO with political 
connections as less likely to be dismissed by firms, stating that the CEO made 
use of the resource of political connection to benefit themselves. 
Earlier, Choi et al. (2001) examined how state policy affected the 
interaction between the cadres (party bureaucrats) and private entrepreneurs in 
China. Regressing the firms’ profits in 1992 against entrepreneurs’ past cadre 
experience and other variables, they found that the entrepreneurs’ past cadre 
experience was positively correlated to the 1992 profits at the legitimized stage 
of private business development rather than the initial stage of private business 
development. In other words, with the policy change and market development, 
the entrepreneurs’ interest was enhanced. They argued that the political 
resources played a vital role when the private business expanded, hence the 
political background facilitating entrepreneurs gaining more than those 
entrepreneurs without political connection. 
The section below reviews previous literature that discussed the 
relationship between CEO compensation and M&As decisions, and between 
CEO compensation and determinants of acquiring firms. 
 
3.3.4. CEO Compensation and M&As Decisions 
A recent stream has started to explore CEO compensation in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As), and this literature demonstrates that the CEO 
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compensation problem is acute in this area (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; 
Harford & Li, 2007; Bujela et al., 2012). In particular, the literature showed that 
CEO compensation as repackaged following M&As and empirically examined 
the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As decisions.  
For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) examined the CEO 
compensation following the M&As deals in the sample of 327 large M&As deals 
during 1993-1999 for US publicly-listed firms. In order to address the question 
of whether CEO compensation was associated with the M&As deals, an 
acquisition dummy of independent variable has been established to investigate 
the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As deals in the first model 
of the research. The results showed that CEOs obtained higher bonuses for 
acquisitions even after controlling for measures of performance and fixed effects. 
Consistent with the results of Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and 
Iliopoulou (2006) provided similar findings with completed bids in the UK and 
Australia respectively. Working on a sample of 100 UK and US bidders during 
the 1998-2002 period, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) found that the cash 
compensation received by CEOs and executives of acquiring firms was 
positively related to the M&As in the year following M&As and year after. 
Furthermore, Harford and Li (2007) then split firm performance (stock returns) 
into positive and negative returns and found that non-acquiring CEOs were 
normally penalized for poor performance, but acquiring CEOs were not 
penalized in the post-merger period, indicating that CEOs obtain higher pay even 
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if they made an underperformance acquisition. 
However, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) 
did not consider the endogeneity problem when they examined the relationship 
between CEO compensation and M&As decisions. Gust et al. (2009) used the 
GMM estimation to control the endogeneity problem. They worked on a more 
comprehensive sample, which included foreign, domestic, public, and private 
acquisitions, and found that M&As decisions resulted in significant pay 
increases in the year following M&As but declined two years after M&As. Also, 
Kumar et al. (2012) used a large sample of 2,187 US firms over a long period 
from 1993 to 2006 to investigate the influence of M&As on CEO compensation. 
Several panel data estimation methods (e.g. GMM estimation) and propensity 
score matching methods were employed and found evidence that the level of 
M&As played a considerable positive impact on CEO compensation, in 
particular, the CEO equity-based compensation, was increased following M&As 
activities. 
Furthermore, Bugeja et al. (2012) provided similar findings with 
completed bids in Australia. They provided a more comprehensive assessment 
study on all components of CEO compensation, including the different six types 
of compensation: Bonus only, salary only, salary and bonus, shares, options, and 
total compensation, and found forms of compensation CEOs received following 
M&As deals were positively related to the M&As decisions for the sample of 
177 M&As deals of Australian listed firms during the period from 2000 to 2007 
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in the year following M&As and a year after. However, Bugeja et al. (2012) did 
not consider the endogeneity problem of the panel data.  
 
3.3.5. Determination of CEO Compensation of Acquiring Firms  
3.3.5.1. CEO Compensation Post M&A and Corporate Performance  
According to agency theory, because of the lack of full observation of 
managers’ behaviour, CEO compensation was correlated to the observable firm 
such as with accounting measures. CEOs were expected to receive increases in 
their compensation when these measures increased. In terms of M&As, agency 
theory saw CEO compensation as rewarding managerial skill in seeking out only 
those M&As deals that contributed to shareholder value creation. Upon this 
opinion, it is reasonable that CEOs received higher compensation when they 
made value-increasing M&As. In literature, many researchers empirically 
analysed the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate 
performance.  
For instance, in early literature, Lambert and Larcker (1987) examined 
the effects of acquisition on the relationship between executive cash 
compensation and wealth and security market reaction measured by the 
abnormal stock returns. They compared the results of executive cash 
compensation and wealth on positive security market reaction with the negative 
security market reaction respectively using a total of 35 acquisition cases in the 
US from 1976-1980, finding evidence that for top executives (particularly the 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
102 
 
CEO) total compensation including cash and stock holding-based compensation 
increased with the positive security market reaction (the increase of the 
shareholder wealth). Khorana and Zenner (1998) also provided similar findings 
that CEOs who made good acquisitions were rewarded higher compensation; 
the bad acquisitions made by CEOs did not provide a positive impact on their 
compensation.  
Girma et al. (2006) examined whether CEOs in UK firms received higher 
compensation for the good acquisitions and/or were punished for bad 
acquisitions. They also used abnormal stock returns as a measure to capture the 
information about good or bad acquisitions. Working on a total sample of 195 
mergers between 1985-1996, they found evidence that CEOs’ compensation was 
higher when they made value-increasing mergers, and the growth of CEO 
compensation became slow because of value-reducing mergers. The results of 
Lambert and Larcker (1987), Khorana and Zenner (1998), and Girma et al. (2006) 
were consistent with the agency theory that CEOs were rewarded by higher 
performance and punished by their lower performance.  
However, a great amount of studies found evidence that bad acquisitions 
also led to CEO pay raises (e.g. Firth, 1991; Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Guest, 2009), 
indicating that CEOs’ behaviour could not with the shareholders’ interest. For 
example, Schmidt and Fowler (1990) examined the relationship between 
executive compensation and corporate financial performance post acquisitions 
in a sample of 127 US firms during the period 1975-1979, providing empirical 
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evidence that executives received higher cash compensation after acquisitions. 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) provided evidence that CEO compensation 
increased even if the acquiring bank’s stock price decreased in a sample from 
1986-1995; in particular, the loss because of the decline of stock price did not 
exceed the increase of the cash pay of the CEO. Consistent with the result of 
Bliss and Rosen (2001), Harford and Li (2007) also found that even acquisitions 
made value decline, and that the CEO still received a large amount of 
compensation for a sample of 1,508 mergers during the period 1993-2000.  
Also, Firth (1991) found evidence that bad acquisitions led to executives’ 
pay increasing in the same way as for good acquisitions for UK listed firms 
during 1974-1980 and argued that the result suggested that the motivation to 
make acquisitions was in the executives’ self-interest maximization rather than 
shareholder-interest maximization. Based on more extensive and a large sample 
of 4,528 UK acquisitions in different type of acquisitions, including domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions, and public and private acquisitions, Guest (2009) 
also found that not only were CEOs paid by good acquisitions, but also the bad 
acquisitions. However, this result was only significant for the cash compensation 
of CEOs. 
  
3.3.5.2. CEO Compensation Post M&As and Managerial Power 
A growing body of literature has analysed whether managerial power has 
an impact on CEO compensation following the completion of M&As (e.g. 
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Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012). The 
results are conflicting. 
For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Coakley and Iliopoulou 
(2006) concluded that an increased bonus was driven more by CEO power, and 
less by effort of CEOs in completing the acquisition with US and UK data 
respectively. Working on a sample of 327 large M&As deals between 1993 and 
1999, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) found that measures of managerial power (e.g. 
CEOs on the nominating committee, CEO duality) explained much of the cross-
sectional variation in the CEOs’ bonus and much more than measures of effort 
or performance; Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) examined the sample of 100 
firms including UK and US firms between 1998–2001, showing evidence that 
less independent and larger boards paid CEOs considerably higher bonuses and 
salary following M&As completion, both for the full sample and for the UK and 
US sub-samples respectively. 
However, working on a sample of 4,528 acquisitions on the executive 
pay of 2,469 publicly listed UK firms over the period 1984-2001, Guest (2009) 
used a series of weak corporate governance (e.g. large board size, CEO duality, 
less independent directors, long CEO tenure, less CEO ownership) as measures 
to examine whether the weak corporate governance would bring the acquiring 
CEO higher compensation, but the outcomes did not provide strong evidence 
that the CEOs in the acquiring firms with weak corporate governance were 
rewarded higher compensation and argued that higher CEO pay could not be 
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recognised as the result of weak corporate governance. These results are 
consistent with the results of Anderson et al. (2004) that the CEO pay of 
acquiring firms was not associated with the CEO with tenure and CEO 
shareholding. 
Also, Bugeja et al. (2012) provided empirical results in Australia which 
were more consistent with the predictions of the agency theory that CEO 
compensation in acquiring firms was significantly influenced by CEO effort and 
corporate performance such as accounting performance and stock market 
performance. However, the managerial power (the CEO sitting on the 
nominating committee has a higher level of share ownership, or the board has 
more executive directors) do not bring the CEO higher compensation, but a 
lower bonus and other compensation. Bugeja et al. (2012) argued that 
differences in corporate governance characteristics in different countries might 
provide implications for the empirical results in Australia. 
The corporate governance arrangement in Australia varies in some 
aspects from the US and UK. Australia is more compliant with ‘best practice’ on 
board governance than the UK and US, for example. Australia also has a higher 
proportion of independent directors, a lower proportion of executive directors 
(insiders) on the board, smaller board size, and CEO duality is less common than 
either the US or UK. Kumar et al. (2012) support the view that managerial power 
cannot lead to higher CEO compensation; they found empirical evidence that 
managerial power measures such as CEOs with long tenures, CEO duality, and 
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lower power of shareholders cannot provide the CEO of the acquiring firm with 
higher compensation.   
 
3.4. Summary and Gap 
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop the theoretical and 
empirical literature and discover gaps. Three main theories related to this study 
have been identified through the literature; they are agency theory, the 
managerial power perspective, and resource dependency theory. 
This chapter aimed to review previous empirical literature that discussed 
the related issues between executive compensation and corporate performance 
and corporate governance mechanisms. A discussion on these relationships post- 
M&As was also conducted. 
The dominant theoretical approach used in this study was the agency 
theory. The agency theory provides a comprehensive explanation between the 
CEO compensation and firm performance and corporate governance. The 
agency theory predicts that CEOs aligning with the interests of shareholders, and 
under the sound monitoring of corporate governance, would be likely to obtain 
higher pay when a firm’s performance increased. Therefore, the agency theory 
has been considered by government and regulators in regulating the rules and 
policies; for example, the Corporate Governance Code issued by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2002 linking executive 
compensation to the firm’s performance. However, academics increasingly 
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perceived the drawbacks of agency theory and studied other theories in CEO 
compensation. Weakened corporate governance might provide CEOs with 
power to chase self-interests to extract more compensation. The managerial 
power theory holds that the CEO can exert power to influence their own 
compensation. Bebchuk et al. (2002) argued that because of the control 
inefficiencies, managers with power could influence the effectiveness of CG 
mechanisms in determining a CEO’s compensation. For example, managers can 
use their power via control of the board. The managerial power theory can be a 
deviation in CEO compensation explained by agency theory. However, power 
could be a sound quality in the management, psychology, and sociology 
disciplines, such as to obtain critical resources for firms. 
Resources dependency theory argues that, in order to reduce the 
uncertainty from external environment and resource scarcities, power could 
allow an entity to secure the critical resources for an organisation. In China, 
CEOs with political connections could be a useful mechanism for the CEO to 
help firms deal with the uncertainties from external environments and secure 
important resources. 
In the empirical literature, the relationships between CEO compensation 
and corporate performance and corporate governance were reviewed. Also, 
many academics empirically examined the relationship between CEO 
compensation and M&As decisions. They only controlled the firm’s 
performance and firm-level and industry effects, but did not consider that other 
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important factors might influence CEO compensation, for example, the 
corporate governance mechanisms (board characteristics, ownership structure) 
examined by prior literature, which might not comprehensively explain the 
relationship between CEO compensation and M&As decisions. In this study, 
more controlling variables would be considered in the model, such as board and 
ownership characteristics and CEO political connections as a unique Chinese 
characteristic under the Chinese environment. In terms of the determination of 
CEO compensation of acquiring firms, a great amount of studies examined the 
relationship between acquiring CEO compensation and corporate performance. 
Many academics provide the empirical results consistent with the agency theory, 
demonstrating that the acquiring CEO was rewarded by good acquisitions. 
However, many other studies found evidence that bad acquisitions also led to a 
pay increase for the acquiring CEO, which was not consistent with agency theory. 
Furthermore, many researchers shared the doubts that the acquiring CEO’s 
compensation might be determined by CEO power and empirically examined 
whether the acquiring CEO’s compensation following M&As was driven more 
by CEO power instead of the efforts of completing M&As. The results were 
conflicting; some studies found that the acquiring CEO compensation following 
M&As was driven more by CEO power, but others discovered it was driven 
more by the efforts of completing the M&As. The reason for these conflicting 
results might be because of the different corporate governance practices and 
institutional environments in different countries. 
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China, under a unique institutional background (discussed in chapter 
two), might provide a new mode to test the determination of acquiring CEO 
compensation following M&As, particularly considering the political 
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Chapter Four: Conceptual Framework and 
Hypothesis Development 
4.1. Introduction  
Chapter two presented the Chinese institutional context to provide a 
description of the development of executive compensation of China and 
discussed the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms and the 
external weak legal system in China on CEO compensation. Chapter three 
reviewed the literature on the determination of CEO compensation solely and 
following M&As. In chapter four, previous studies on CEO compensation and 
the unique Chinese contextual environment were drawn upon to develop a 
conceptual framework for the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As in China. The hypotheses relating to the relationship between CEO 
compensation and the CG, and criteria factors following M&As, will be 
developed in this chapter. 
The chapter is structured as follows: In section 4.2, the conceptual 
framework for the determination of CEO compensation following M&As in 
China will be developed. In Section 4.3, several hypotheses are presented 
including the relationship between CEO compensation and the CG, and criteria 
factors following M&As. Finally, section 4.4 summaries the chapter. 
 
4.2. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this study is developed from Barkema and 
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Gomez-Mejia (1998). Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) developed a general 
framework of executive compensation identifying three important factors of 
executive compensation: The CG, criteria, and contingent factors. The factor of 
criteria on executive compensation is based on the agency theory that, in order 
to align managers’ interests with shareholders, shareholders should not only link 
executive pay to the observable firm performance, but also other informative 
signals of the agents’ efforts (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982), particularly the weak 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance found by some prior 
studies leading to consideration of other issues such as firm size, the market, 
peer compensation, behaviour, individual characteristics, and role or position 
issues suggested by Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998). 
Governance plays a vital role in executive compensation as it influences 
the executive pay-setting process, which in tum depends on its ownership 
structure, board of directors, remuneration committee (if present), the market for 
corporate control, and the general public. Furthermore, Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia (1998) argued that because of the weak relationship between CEO pay 
and firm performance found in previous empirical studies, the internal and 
extremal contingencies should also be considered, including a firm’s strategy 
(e.g. its product diversity and international diversity), R&D level, market growth, 
demand instability, industry concentration and regulation, national culture, and 
national tax system would influence executive pay.  
In this study, previous studies on the literature on executive 
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compensation and the unique Chinese contextual environment are drawn upon, 
and Barkema and Gomez-Mejia’s (1998) general framework is adapted upon to 
develop a conceptual framework for the determination of CEO compensation 
following mergers and acquisitions in China (see figure 1). The author’s 
conceptual framework identifies two important factors of CEO compensation: 
The CG and criteria.  
In terms of CG, CG factors can be categorised into the board structure, 
board leadership and power, and ownership structure. The board structure refers 
to the size of the board of directors and supervisory board, independent directors 
and remuneration committee; the board leadership and power refers to CEO 
duality, CEO shareholding, and CEO political connection; ownership structure 
refers to block ownership, state ownership, and foreign ownership.  
As agency theory suggests that strong corporate governance mechanisms 
through effective internal and external control mechanisms constrain the 
managerial opportunism, however, managerial power theory argue that 
weakened corporate governance might provide CEOs with power to chase self-
interests to extract more compensation. Given that weakened corporate 
governance might provide CEOs with power to chase self-interests and extract 
more compensation, ineffective boards of directors might allow CEOs to have 
more control and power over the board, leading to boards not functioning well. 
Generally, the managerial power hypothesis maintain that the nature of the 
director selection process, the composition of the board of directors, directors’ 
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incentives to please management, and the relative lack of director resources, 
support a finding that managers exert power over boards of directors. CEOs have 
dominant power on choosing directors of boards. They, generally, have close 
relationship with CEOs, such as CEO-directors or friends of CEOs who devote 
few of time on monitoring management, so that have little incentive to challenge 
management’s practices. Many previous studies concluded the different sources 
of this power – which for example include the board size, CEO duality and CEO 
ownership etc. allow CEOs to appoint or select supportive board members 
thereby perpetuating their power and influencing the compensation decisions. 
Consistent with the managerial power theory, as a result of the weak institutional 
environment in China, for instance, weak corporate governance, and ill-defined 
legal system, the boards of director and ownership structure cannot fully play an 
effective monitoring role in management, which allows the CEO more power to 
control boards and extract higher compensation. Particularly, under the context 
of M&As, the CEOs in firms with weak corporate governance might become 
more powerful and make use of creating M&As to bargain for higher 
compensation. The different sources of this power for this study, as the figure 1 
shows, come from Board Structure, Board Leadership and Power and 
Ownership Structure. 
In terms of criteria, this refers to a firm’s performance, size, and with 
regards to M&As, it refers to the deal size, and abnormal returns in many 
previous studies on executive compensation following M&As (e.g. Ozkan, 2011, 
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Bugeja et al., 2012; Ozkan, 2012; Conyon, 2014). According to agency theory, 
the managers’ activities are not observable, and this might provide managers 
with opportunities to take decisions to merely increase their personal wealth 
rather than increasing the principals’ benefits. Therefore, the agency problem 
rise and it means managers do not always act in the best interests of the 
principals. From the agency theory perspective, it is vital to address the agency 
problem through internal corporate governance mechanisms. One of important 
internal corporate governance mechanism is well-designed compensation 
contracts. Well-designed CEO compensation contracts play an important role in 
making sure managers act in the interest of shareholders. Shareholders cannot 
directly observe managers’ behaviour, hence, they are motivated to design an 
effective compensation contract to encourage managers’ behaviour to align with 
their interests of them and maximize shareholders’ value. The compensation 
contract has been seen as a vital and explicit mechanism to reduce moral hazard 
as the managers’ incentive compensation can be correlated with observable 
variables related to managers’ performance, such as market returns or 
profitability. Therefore, in agency theory, executive compensation has to be 
tightly related to corporate performance. The association between executive 
compensation and corporate performance demonstrates whether the 
compensation contract is optimal. The optimally-designed compensation 
packages provide managers with incentives to devote more efforts to 
maximising shareholders’ benefits. For this study, it is expected that the 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
115 
 
managerial efforts measured by firm performance, firm size, the deal size and 
abnormal returns should be positively correlated to CEO compensation 
following M&As.  
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework for CEO Compensation in China 
 
Adapted from Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) 
 
4.3. Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1. M&As Decisions and CEO Compensation  
According to the literature, CEOs can repackage their compensation by 
M&As decisions they execute as M&As which can affect the firm size and bring 
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complexity of the integrated firm (Harford and Li, 2007). Some literature 
empirically examined the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As 
decisions, and found CEOs’ compensation was actually related to M&As 
decisions (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Guest, 
2009; Bugeja et al., 2012). For example, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) examined 
CEO compensation following M&As deals in a sample of 327 large M&As deals 
from 1993-1999 for US publicly-listed firms. Results showed that CEOs 
obtained higher bonuses for acquisitions even controlling for firm performance. 
Consistent with the results of Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and 
Iliopoulou (2006) and Bugeja et al. (2012) provided similar findings with UK 
and Australian firms respectively.  
In terms of China, because of the Non-tradable Share Reform in April 
2005, a large amount of M&As deals were produced whatever the rise in the 
number or the value of deals. Anecdotal evidence in China showed that the 
CEOs of acquiring firms were, on average, awarded higher compensation 
following the completion of acquisition (Song, 2009). Hence, researchers were 
interested in studying the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As 
deals in China. For example, Zhang and Guo (2007) made an attempt to find out 
why CEOs preferred to take advantage of M&As deals to increase their 
compensation in China. They argued that CEOs owned the rights to execute 
M&As deals, which was the most important strategy of firms’ resource 
allocation. They argued that the lack of efficient long-term incentives made 
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CEOs concentrate on how to increase cash compensation. The cash 
compensation rewarded to CEOs was directly related to the firm’s profit and 
complexity of a firm’s operation. M&As would bring firms complexity of 
operation, therefore, conducting M&As has been the preferable way for CEOs 
to expand their compensation.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1: CEO total compensation (salary and annual bonus) is positively correlated 
to M&Ass decisions. 
 
4.3.2. CG and Executive Compensation 
CG factors can be categorised into the board structure, board leadership 
and power, and ownership structure. These CG factors are important for 
executive compensation in general, and following M&As completion in 
particular, as the CEO might have the power to extract more compensation for 
making M&As in weak corporate governance mechanisms, or strong corporate 
governance might provide strong monitoring on the CEO, leading CEOs to 
obtain less compensation even after making M&As.  
According to agency theory, the core function of the board of directors 
is to assist in addressing the agency problems in managing a firm. To align the 
interests of management with shareholders, the shareholder delegates the rights 
to boards of directors elected to monitor management; although it incurs the 
agency costs, shareholders expect the benefits that boards of directors bring to 
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outnumber the agency cost (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The board of directors is at 
the apex of the organisation and has an important responsibility for the 
functioning of the firm, particularly in supervising management and setting rules 
for them, for example, to recruit, dismiss, and most importantly to decide on 
executive compensation (Weisbach, 2007). The board’s effectiveness in its 
monitoring function is determined by its size, composition, and independence 
(John & Senbet, 1998).  
Different theories have different opinions on board size, in that large or 
small board sizes might be more beneficial to firms. From a resource dependence 
theory perspective, it is argued that larger boards provide more channels to 
access to resources (Kiel et al., 2003; Ntim et al., 2015), particularly in bringing 
the diversity that allows a firm to become more competitive in different aspects, 
such as having more expertise, experience, skills, resource co-optation, 
corporate strategy, innovation, creativity, and provision of broad services 
(Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
However, according to managerial power theory, it is supposed that 
larger board sizes are related to ineffective boards and higher managerial power 
(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Big boards are less likely to function effectively 
and are easier for the CEO to control, thus big board sizes allow CEOs to have 
more power to acquire higher compensation (Core et al., 1999). It is suggested 
that the problem of dysfunctional boards increases with board size; smaller 
boards tend to be more effective because they facilitate closer communication 
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channels and coordination processes between directors (Yermack, 1996; Ozkan, 
2007), and improve group cohesiveness and bonding that increase the firm’s 
performance as suggested by Donaldson and Muth (1998). There are no 
agreements from the literature on what is the perfect board size for a firm. Lipton 
and Lorch (1992) suggested that board size should be a minimum of 7 and a 
maximum of 9 while Jensen (1993) suggested that the ideal size was 8. Shaw 
(1981), however, suggested the optimal board size was 5. 
Many previous studies used board size to measure governance quality 
and empirically examined the impact of board size on CEO compensation and 
found that CEO compensation was a function of board size (Core et al., 1999; 
Ozkan, 2007). For example, Core et al. (1999), working on a sample of 205 
publicly traded US firms from 1984-1986, investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and CEO compensation, and found that 
board size was significantly and positively associated with salary, cash, and the 
total compensation of CEOs, indicating the CEOs might extract more 
compensation with bigger board size. Similarly, Chalmers et al. (2006) provided 
empirical results that board size was significantly positively correlated to the 
total Australian CEOs’ compensation, fixed salary, and bonus. They argued that 
this was consistent with the managerial power theory that board monitoring 
power would be reduced with the bigger board size. 
Also, Ozkan (2007) examined the impact of corporate governance on 
CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK companies for the fiscal year 
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2003-2004 in a cross-sectional study and found that firms with larger board sizes 
paid CEOs more compensation. Ozkan (2011) examined a similar issue with 
different data and different times during 1999-2005 and found similar results in 
the UK that board size played a significant role in increasing both cash and total 
CEO compensation. 
There were few studies examining the relationship between board size 
and executive compensation in China. For example, Li et al. (2007) did not find 
the association between board size and CEO compensation.  
Also, previous studies examined the impact of board size on executive 
and CEO compensation following M&As and had mixed results (e.g. Coakley 
& Iliopoulou, 2006; Guest, 2009). Grinstein and Hribar (2004) worked on a 
sample of 327 large M&As deals between 1993 and 1999, finding that one 
measure (board size) of managerial power was negative and significant on CEOs’ 
bonuses, which was not consistent with Yermack (1996) that smaller boards are 
more effective. However, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) examined a sample of 
100 firms – including UK and US firms – between 1998-2001, providing 
evidence that larger boards paid CEOs considerably higher bonuses and salaries 
following M&As completion, both for the full sample and the UK and US sub-
samples respectively. The results indicated that larger CEO pay around M&As 
was because of the managerial power indicated by large board size. Guest (2009) 
uses a series of weak corporate governance as measures to examine whether 
weak corporate governance would bring acquiring CEOs higher compensation; 
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the outcomes did not show that large board size increased CEO pay around 
M&As, and argued that higher CEO pay of acquiring firms could not be 
recognised as the result of weak corporate governance. 
Also, working on a sample of 177 M&As deals in Australian public firms 
during 2000-2007, Bugeja et al. (2012) provided the empirical results that CEO 
compensation in acquiring firms was not significantly influenced by managerial 
power; for example, the board size did not have significant influence on CEO 
compensation. 
In terms of China, Li et al. (2007) used a sample of 206 Chinese listed 
firms during 2000-2001 to examine the determination of CEO compensation in 
Chinese listed firms and found no relationship between board size and CEO 
compensation. They argued that the result indicated that large board size did not 
seem to weaken the control of board of directors and the CEO did not use the 
large board size to extract higher pay. Also, consistent with the results of Li et 
al. (2007), Buck et al. (2008) used a sample of 601 Chinese listed firms from 
2000-2003 to examine the relationship between top executive compensation and 
firm performance controlling the corporate governance mechanisms, finding 
evidence that board size had no significant influence on top executive 
compensation.  
Like many other countries, Chinese listed firms are required to build a 
board of directors. The board of directors plays a vital role in the Chinese internal 
corporate governance system, particularly recruiting, monitoring, and 
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dismissing top management, and making arrangements on their remuneration 
(Oliver et al., 2014). In China, the minimum required size of the board is 5 
members and the maximum is up to 19 members for listed firms. Consistent with 
the argument of Yermack (1996) and Core et al. (1999) that small board size is 
more effective as they facilitate closer communication channels and 
coordination processes between the directors, the big board size in Chinese firms 
might result in poor communication and coordination processes between 
directors and allow the CEO more power to extract higher compensation (Jiang 
& Kim, 2015). Accordingly, under the context of M&As, the CEOs in firms with 
large boards might become more powerful and control the board of directors, 
making use of creating M&As to bargain for higher compensation.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H2: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to board size.  
According to Ding et al. (2010), in a similar way to the board of directors, 
a large supervisory board size is more likely to result in poor communications 
and coordination between members, thus allowing CEOs to have more power to 
acquire higher compensation suggested by the managerial power theory. 
However, from the resource dependence theory perspective, the supervisory 
board can bring networking from stakeholders and business partners, providing 
more channels to access resources (Hopt & Leyens, 2004). 
Many countries adopt the two-tier board structure (management board 
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and supervisory board), such as Germany and the Netherlands. The main 
responsibility of the supervisory board is to appoint, dismiss, and monitor the 
management board, particularly to supervise whether the management operates 
the firms well (Van et al., 2003). Also, the supervisory board is responsible for 
financial statements and approval of the consolidated financial statements, and 
for the effective compensation arrangement of top management (Dyballa & 
Kraft, 2015). 
Empirically, previous research studied the impact of the supervisory 
board size on corporate performance (e.g. Van et al., 2003) and CEO 
compensation (e.g. Fiss, 2006). For example, Van et al., (2003) examined the 
characteristics of board and firm performance in the Netherlands using a sample 
of 94 Dutch listed non-financial (mainly manufacturing) firms in 1996, 
providing empirical evidence that the size of the supervisory board was 
negatively correlated to the firm’s performance, which showed that the 
supervisory board in Dutch firms did not function well. Fiss (2006) examined 
the social influence effects on executive compensation using original data on 
German firms and a longitudinal design, and found that the supervisory board 
size was positively and significantly correlated to executive compensation, even 
controlling firm size, which was consistent with the argument that large board 
size could not effectively supervise management (Yermack, 1996). Chen et al. 
(2010) examined internal control on Chinese executive compensation in a 
balanced panel sample of 502 Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2006, and 
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found there was no significant relationship between the supervisory board size 
and executive compensation. The empirical result was consistent with the 
outcome from Li et al. (2007). They also did not find any association between 
supervisory board size and CEO compensation. Ding et al. (2010) worked on a 
sample of 1,345 observations in 2005 and 1,410 in 2006 to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation and the supervisory board under the 
reform of corporate governance in Chinese listed firms. They found that before 
the reform of corporate governance, the supervisory board did not affect 
executive compensation, but positively influenced it after the reform of 
corporate governance; it also found that supervisory board size was positively 
correlated to the total executive compensation, but negatively correlated to the 
pay-performance sensitivity for the combined total sample, indicating the 
inefficiency of the supervisory board.  
Similar to the situation in Germany, Chinese firms adopted a two-tier 
board structure which included a supervisory board and a board of directors. The 
requirement was that the supervisory board should comprise of not less than 
three supervisors, and be comprised of representatives of shareholders and a 
reasonable proportion of representatives of employees (Articles 52 & 53, PRC 
Company Law). 
The main duty of supervisory boards is to monitor directors and 
managers, but it does not function well. The supervisory board has no true rights 
on monitoring directors and managers, and in Chinese listed firms it is not an 
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effective mechanism (Lin, 2014). Unlike the supervisory board in Germany, 
which has rights to appoint and dismiss directors and managers, supervisors of 
Chinese listed firms have no voting rights, thus they cannot appoint and dismiss 
directors and managers, and cannot take part in the firm’s operation. If any 
directors or managers breach the laws or rules of the listed firms, the supervisory 
boards only can raise the suggestion of dismissing directors or managers, but 
have no deciding power to dismiss them (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Oliver et al. (2014) 
argued that those professional skills should have been beneficial to firms in 
monitoring the manager’s behaviour, but supervisors are more involved in 
administrative activities instead of playing a monitoring role.  
In addition, supervisors in Chinese firms are not selected adequately; 
they usually lack related work experience and professional knowledge compared 
with directors and managers (Sheng, 2004). Furthermore, the representatives of 
employees in a supervisory board would usually not disobey suggestions 
proposed by the board, such as the executive pay plan, because the employees’ 
compensation was arranged by boards. It was empirically found that the majority 
of Chinese supervisory boards agreed to the board’s proposals in 2011 (Lin, 
2014). Additionally, because of the information asymmetric, the supervisory 
boards lack sufficient information as this is controlled by CEOs, and it is difficult 
for them to monitor managers (Tenev & Zhang, 2002). Therefore, the 
supervisory board is regarded as a simple decoration, and cannot be a functional 
mechanism in Chinese listed firms to effectively monitor and discipline directors 
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and management. Management might not be aligning the interests of 
shareholders, thus extracting higher compensation. Accordingly, under the 
context of M&As, the large supervisory board cannot effectively monitor CEOs, 
thus they might be more powerful in attaining higher compensation through 
making M&As. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H3: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to supervisory board size.  
The effectiveness of the board in undertaking its roles and 
responsibilities depends on its structure, in particular its composition structure. 
In terms of composition, more independent directors provide effective 
monitoring (Mangena et al., 2012; Saravanan, 2014) and would be likely to 
design an optimal executive compensation scheme.  
According to the agency theory, an independent director mechanism 
plays a vital role in monitoring and is used to protect shareholders’ benefits to 
enhance their value (Ozkan, 2007). Independent directors or outside directors, 
as an important part of boards of directors, are managers of other firms or 
important decision agents in other complex organisations. The main 
responsibility of independent directors is to provide professional knowledge to 
assist managers handling specialised decision problems such as corporate law or 
relevant technology, and to monitor managers, thus reducing the agency problem 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). From this standpoint, the proportion of independent 
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directors on the board has been used to indicate the extent of board independence 
in major previous studies (see, for example, Cannella et al., 2008; Adams et al., 
2010). Many countries introduced independent directors to the board and viewed 
them as an effective mechanism for increasing corporate governance. 
Independent directors play an active role in monitoring management as they 
serve on committees, such as nomination committees and remuneration 
committees, where they can have better access to information to monitor 
management (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2016). 
Previous literature discussed the impact of independent directors on CEO 
compensation and have mixed findings (Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007; Wan, 
2009). Core et al. (1999) examined the influence of independent directors on 
CEO compensation in a sample of large US large firms. They found CEO 
compensation was positively correlated to the percentage of independent 
directors. Ozkan (2007) worked on a sample of 414 UK firms for the fiscal year 
2003-2004 to examine whether corporate governance affected CEO 
compensation. They used the non-executive directors or outside directors to 
represent the board independence and found that CEOs were paid higher 
compensation with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on their 
boards, indicating that non-executive directors do not play an effective 
monitoring role for CEOs. Wan (2009) controlled the endogeneity and outlier 
problems and found evidence that there was no relationship between CEO total 
pay and independent directors. Li et al. (2007) used a sample of 206 Chinese 
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listed firms from 2000-2001 to examine the determination of CEO compensation 
in Chinese listed firms and found CEO compensation was positively 
significantly correlated to the independent directors. Similarly, Conyon and He 
(2008) reported a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
independent directors, indicating that independent directors did not play the 
monitoring role well. In terms of M&As, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) 
examined a sample of 100 firms including UK and US firms between period 
1998-2001, finding evidence that fewer independent boards paid CEOs 
considerably higher bonuses and salaries following M&As completion both for 
the full sample and for the UK and US sub-samples respectively. 
In China, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2003) 
requires that at least one-third of directors must be independent directors in order 
to be effective (Yang et al., 2011). Independent directors are nominated by 
boards and approved at the shareholders’ meeting. They are required to have a 
fundamental understanding of the operation of listed firms and know related 
laws and regulations; in the meantime, more than five years work experience in 
law, economics, or other fields are also required of them (Liao et al., 2009). The 
introduction of independent directors in Chinese listed firms aimed to enhance 
the effectiveness of corporate governance and monitoring of executive directors 
and/or managers. Independent directors are seen as a supplement to the 
supervisory boards because they can vote on managerial and financial decisions, 
but the supervisory boards are more like a decoration and have no true power to 
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vote on managerial and financial decisions (Yang et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
independent directors seem a useful corporate governance mechanism to oversee 
managers and reduce the agency cost for shareholders (Jiang & Kim, 2015).  
However, as the controlling shareholders know that the independent 
directors oversee them, controlling shareholders who have much more impact 
on the board would appoint the minimum number of independent directors 
required by law. Given the prevalence of the controlling shareholder in Chinese 
listed firms, research shows that many Chinese listed firms have only one-third 
independent directors on the board. This is different from the large rate in 
western developed countries; for instance, 78% in the US market. Furthermore, 
evidence shows that in Chinese listed firms, the independent directors are always 
the friends or previous schoolfellows of CEOs; they have a close social 
relationship within firms. Such independent directors having connections with 
CEOs might be more loyal to the CEOs rather than monitoring them (Westphal, 
1999). In addition, Thian (2005) states that independent directors in Chinese 
firms generally have no adequate knowledge and experience, therefore cannot 
effectively play the monitoring role well. In this case, independent directors in 
Chinese listed firms are usually regarded as only a ‘window-dressing’, and 
cannot be truly independent or effectively monitor management. Accordingly, 
under the context of M&As, independent directors cannot effectively monitor 
CEOs, thus they might be more powerful in bargaining higher compensation 
through making M&As. 
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Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H4: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to proportion of independent directors.  
The remuneration committee is common for listed firms and plays a vital 
role in monitoring management and the setting of executive compensation (Zhu 
et al., 2009). Conyon and Perk (1998) argued that the lack of a remuneration 
committee would provide senior management with opportunities to increase 
their pay, thus being divergent from the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, 
Higgs (2003) argued that the independence of the remuneration committee has 
more importance in monitoring management. For example, executive 
compensation schemes in UK listed firms are recommended to the board of 
directors by the remuneration committee. The Greenbury Committee in UK 
(Greenbury, 1995) suggests the remuneration committee should be fully 
composed of non-executive directors. Particularly, the non-executive directors 
working on the remuneration committee (as a sub-committee of the board 
influencing CEO compensation) could be more independent in restraining the 
excess of CEO compensation. Many previous studies looked at the impact of 
presence and composition of remuneration committees on executive 
compensation (e.g. Conyon & Perk, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; Gregor, 2012). For 
example, Conyon and Perk (1998) examined the role of board control and 
remuneration committees in determining management compensation in a sample 
of 94 publicly traded UK firms from 1991-1994, providing the empirical results 
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that the presence of remuneration committees was positively related to the level 
of top management compensation. Gregor (2012) investigated the impact of 
composition of remuneration committee on CEO pay in a sample of FTSE350 
firms from 1996-2008, finding the independence of remuneration committee 
was not related to CEO pay.  
In China, listed firms were recommended by the Corporate Governance 
Code in 2002 to set up a compensation committee approved by shareholder 
meetings, but not given the specific explanation on duties and responsibilities of 
the compensation committee. The code simply gave a general suggestion 
demonstrating that “to study and review the remuneration policies and schemes 
for directors and senior management personnel” (arts. 70.). Hence, the decisions 
made and approval rights on executive compensation were left with the board. 
Furthermore, the independence of compensation committee plays a vital role in 
the process of setting of executive compensation. For example, the NYSE Listed 
Manual requires members of the compensation committee to be full of 
independent directors (Lin, 2014); however, the corporate governance code of 
2002 for Chinese listed firms states that: “Boards of listed firms are 
recommended to appoint compensation committees, consisting wholly or 
mainly of independent directors and chaired by an independent director” (art. 
52). This statement simply provides a recommendation and vaguely mentions 
“wholly or mainly” rather than giving a clear requirement for the composition 
of the compensation committee. In addition, Chinese listed firms usually do not 
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disclose the details of the composition of the compensation committee. 
Therefore, it is difficult for the compensation committee to keep true 
independence and play a monitoring role in setting of CEO compensation. Under 
the context of M&As, the remuneration committee cannot effectively monitor 
the CEOs, thus they might be more powerful in bargaining higher compensation 
through making M&As. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H5: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is negatively 
correlated to the remuneration committee.  
The effectiveness of board structure mechanisms in monitoring 
managers depends on the power of the CEO. CEO power can derive from the 
CEO/chair duality, managerial share ownership, and CEO political connections. 
These might weaken the board’s independence and the quality of monitoring, 
thus increasing CEO entrenchment (Morse et al., 2014). The managerial power 
theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002; 2003) argues that powerful CEOs have the ability 
to influence the decisions of the board on compensation. They can influence 
compensation directly and/or via their influence of the board’s decisions.  
Adams et al. (2005), for example, argued that agency problems became 
more severe when the positions of CEO and chairman were combined as this 
concentrated power in a single person. Lu (2008) concluded that CEO duality 
was the most obvious expression of concentration in managerial power. For 
example, those CEOs who were also the chairman of boards dominated both the 
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agenda and content of board meetings (Mallette and Fowler, 1992), which would 
potentially reduce the board monitoring function, thus increasing CEO 
entrenchment (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994) and might influence the board in 
setting compensation which favoured themselves. In addition, CEOs holding 
both positions have more dominance on the selection of new directors, which 
increases the risk of opportunistic and inefficient behaviour by CEOs, thus 
impairing shareholder benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In contrast, 
separating the role of chairman and CEO can make the board perform more 
effectively (Jensen, 1993) and can decrease the managerial power (Brickley et 
al., 1997).  
Empirically, Cyert et al. (2002) found evidence that CEOs obtain higher 
compensation when they also sit on as the chairman of the board, in particular, 
the CEO who is also the chairman receives about 36% greater equity 
compensation than a non-chairman CEO in a sample size at 1,648 firms for 1992 
and 1993. Core et al. (1999) and Boyd (1994) found similar empirical evidence 
that CEO compensation was an increasing function of CEO duality. 
Based on a balanced panel sample of 502 Chinese listed firms between 
2001-2006, Chen et al. (2010) found that executive compensation was positively 
correlated to the CEO duality. In terms of M&As, working on a sample of 327 
large M&As deals between 1993 and 1999, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) found 
that measures of managerial power (e.g. CEO duality) explained much of the 
cross-sectional variation in the CEO’s bonus and much more than measures of 
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effort or performance. However, Kumar et al. (2012) reported that CEO duality 
could not provide CEO higher compensation through making M&As.   
In China, CEO/chair role duality is a common leadership structure in 
listed firms (Fan et al., 2007) and impacts on the executive’s compensation 
(Chen et al., 2010). It is generally accepted that CEO duality not only impairs 
the independence of the boards of directors, but leads to a more severe insider 
control problem in Chinese listed firms, thus making CEOs more powerful in 
setting compensation (Dai, 2014). Therefore, in Chinese listed firms, there is a 
trend of separating the CEO from the chairman as the CSRC holds that CEO 
duality harms the effectiveness of corporate governance (Dai, 2014). 
Accordingly, under the context of M&As, CEO duality allows CEOs to 
be more powerful and to bargain higher compensation through making M&As. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H6: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to the CEO duality.  
In terms of the managerial share ownership, the agency theory argues 
that share ownership aligns managerial interests with those of other shareholders, 
as the ownership held by the management would encourage them to increase the 
firm value (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Lotfi & Mohammadi, 2014). However, 
according to the managerial power theory, a greater share of ownership gives 
managers more power to control the board, thus enhancing the possibility of 
entrenchment (Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013). Empirically, Cyert et al. (2002) 
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examined the effect of CEO ownership on the structure of CEO compensation 
and found that CEO ownership played a significant role in determining 
managerial compensation since they found this variable had a positive and 
significant relationship to CEO salary and equity-based compensation, which 
was consistent with the argument of managerial power theory that higher CEO 
shareholding increased the possibility of entrenchment.  
Similarly, Byrd and Cooperman (2010) found that CEO ownership was 
significantly and positively associated with total CEO compensation on a sample 
of US financial firms. In terms of China, Chen et al. (2010) argued that, given 
the problem of politically-connected CEOs, the CEO shareholding could 
entrench insider managers and cause them to collude with government officials 
to extract the firm’s asset. Chen et al. (2010) empirically found that the CEO 
shareholding was significantly positively correlated to CEO compensation that 
was consistent with the prediction of managerial power approach that CEO 
shareholding provides managers more opportunity to collude with government 
officials and extract the state property. Also, Li et al. (2007) documented the 
significantly positive association between CEO shareholding and CEO 
compensation. In terms of M&As, working on a sample of 327 large M&As 
deals between 1993 and 1999, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) found that measures 
of managerial power (e.g. CEO duality) explained much of the cross-sectional 
variation in the CEOs bonus and much more than measures of effort or 
performance following M&As. 
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In China, managerial ownership was introduced in 1999 by the 
government to inspire senior management in SOEs to enhance corporate 
performance. The most distinctive characteristic of managerial shareholding is 
that executive shareholding is quite low in China (Yang et al., 2011); “zero” 
executive shareholding is common in many Chinese firms. When the firm is 
going public, senior management can purchase shares at a discounted price, but 
cannot sell these shares during their tenure. Hence, managerial shareholding is 
more like a benefit rather than an incentive (Tenve et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
the ownership allocated to management is based on their rank in the managerial 
hierarchy, the more ownership the management holds indicates higher positions 
and power in firms (Tenve et al., 2002). Hence, greater ownership gives CEOs 
more power to influence boards, increasing the possibility of entrenchment. In 
the context of M&As, higher CEO shareholding allows CEOs to be more 
powerful to bargain higher compensation through making M&As. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H7: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to the CEO shareholding.  
According to resource dependency theory, in order to reduce uncertainty 
from the external environment and resource scarcities, firms endeavouring to 
look for resources can assist in diminishing dependency between firms and the 
external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), thus reducing transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1984), and becoming competitive and surviving (Singh et al., 
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1986). In China, political connections as one typical Guanxi for firms tend to be 
an efficient method in business transactions and bring many resources and 
benefits. The government significantly influences the allocation of resources, 
such as the granting of land use rights, the setting of prices for energy, electricity, 
and water, and the control of access to financial capital. Hence, the government 
might either grant preferential treatment to businesses or impose extra fees and 
fines on them (Li et al., 2008). In this case, CEOs’ political connections turn out 
to be a key resource to guarantee the firms’ success (Li et al., 2006). Therefore, 
firms tend to actively seek political connections through politically-connected 
executives and board directors to bring many benefits and more favourable 
treatments, such as acquiring more tax reductions and bank loans (Firth et al., 
2009) and looser regulations (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009), thus 
enhancing corporate performance (Boubakriet et al., 2012). 
Empirically, previous research studied the influence of political 
connection on corporate performance (Faccio, 2006; Bunkanwanicha & 
Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Civilize et al., 2015). For example, working on a large 
sample of 20,202 listed firms in 47 countries during 1996-1999, Faccio (2006) 
studied the common features of political connection among several countries 
and the influence of political connection on a firm’s performance. The results 
indicated that politically-connected firms were more prevalent in countries with 
high levels of corruption and a weak legal system, and with event study, the 
positive performance by firms measured by a cumulative abnormal return 
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obtained once the large shareholders or top officers entered politics in those 
countries with high corruption levels. Under the weak corporate governance and 
severe corruption of Thailand, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) 
worked on a sample of the top 2,000 largest listed and non-listed firms in 
Thailand in 2000, finding evidence that the market valuation of the large families’ 
firms with political connections performed better than those without connection, 
which was consistent with the result of Imai (2006) in a study on Thailand. 
Consistent with Imai (2006), and Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), 
Civilize et al. (2015) found that political connections brought firms large stock 
returns.  
For the influence of political connections on CEO compensation, Aslan 
and Grinstein (2011) examined the impact of CEOs’ political connections 
measured as campaign donations on CEO pay and found that the CEO’s political 
connections were positively correlated to CEO compensation and negatively 
related to the pay-performance sensitivity on a sample of US-listed firms during 
1996-2006. They argued that the CEO’s political capital brought firms resources 
and strategic values, thus they were rewarded for the skills and resources they 
brought to firms (e.g. regulation support, useful resources). 
In China, many researchers have argued that political connections bring 
many resources and benefits, such as reducing the cost of external financing (Xu 
et al., 2013), thus adding value to firms. Du and Girma (2010) investigated the 
impact of political connections on the post-entry performance of private start-up 
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firms in China and found that the firms with political connections obtained 
higher growth and had better survival prospects. To complement the findings of 
Fan et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2011) worked on a sample of 276 listed private 
firms that made an IPO between 1993 and 2008, and found that political 
connections were positively related to the post-IPO CARs (cumulative abnormal 
returns) which was different from the negative effect of Fan et al. (2007) for 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
Pi and Lowe (2011) argued that the political connections allowed CEOs 
to have more power which came from their capabilities to offer firms many 
important resources, thus CEOs were difficult to replace. They worked on a 
sample of 325 listed firms during the period 1997-2006 and found CEO political 
connections were negatively correlated to CEO turnover, which was consistent 
with the results of Cao et al. (2011). Cao et al. (2011) held that political 
connections led to poor corporate governance, resulting in managerial 
entrenchment. Consistent with the results of Pi and Lowe (2011), You and Du 
(2012) obtained a similar conclusion that the CEO with a political connection 
was less likely to be dismissed by firms, stating that the CEOs made use of the 
resources of political connections to benefit themselves. 
Many CEOs of Chinese listed firms are politically connected as they are 
directly or indirectly appointed by the government and are former government 
officials (Yang et al., 2011). Politically connected CEOs own the network with 
the government and control information and resources, and may draw their 
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power from the political leaders (Fan et al., 2007). They would collude with the 
state and use their interpersonal relationships and relative power within firms to 
acquire rents from shareholders (Chen, 2005). Under these circumstances, 
politically connected CEOs who secure useful resources and benefits may draw 
their power from political leaders and become powerful. According to the 
resource dependency theory and managerial power theory, politically connected 
CEOs who bring many benefits and treatments to firms have more power and 
dominance, particularly having more control on the board (Pi & Lowe, 2011). 
Under the context of M&As, the CEO with political connections allows CEOs 
to be more powerful in order to bargain higher compensation through making 
M&As.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H8: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to the CEO political connection.  
Figure 1 also shows that the ownership structure has an effect on the 
determination of compensation. According to the agency theory, block 
ownership can serve as an important monitoring mechanism on management and 
reduce the management power (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003). The significant number of shares they hold gives them both the ability 
and incentive to monitor and restrain managers’ self-serving behaviour as the 
shareholders can obtain higher benefits if managers increase the firm’s 
performance. Cyert et al. (2002) argued that the level of executive compensation 
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tended to be lower when a company’s shares were held by large shareholders. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provided the empirical analysis supporting the 
argument of Berle and Means (1932) and found that large shareholders played a 
crucial role in a firm’s performance, in particular, evidence shows that the stock 
price was positively correlated to the proportion of shares held by those large 
shareholders. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) also provided evidence supporting 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and found that large shareholders offered both better 
monitoring to managers and performance, particularly when the ownership was 
concentrated by institutional investors. 
The block shareholders in China may be the state or private institutional 
investors (including foreign investors) (Jiang & Kim, 2014). Chen et al. (2010) 
argued that the block owners (including state and private institutional investors) 
in China have increasingly become a useful instrument to monitor the 
management and constrain executive compensation, and empirically find that 
the block ownership is negatively correlated to top executive compensation, 
showing that block shareholders play a monitoring role in restraining managers’ 
self-dealing. Under the context of M&As, the block shareholders can effectively 
monitor CEOs, thus restraining them to obtain higher compensation through 
making M&As. 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of Chinese listed firms is that 
after experiencing two important reforms, including the privatization of SOEs 
and the split share reform, ownership of Chinese listed firms is still very 
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concentrated. In many cases, the largest shareholder is the state. In the context 
of China’s socialist society, the state shares do not belong to any true owner. The 
Chinese government pronounces that the State Council of China is the eventual 
holder of the state shares, but the essence of the socialist society indicates that 
the Chinese people own all properties and the State Council of China acts on 
behalf of the all residents of China, thus in practice, there is no actual holder for 
state shares (Oliver et al., 2014), it is impossible to supervise the state shares. 
Therefore, the absence of a proper holder for the state shares easily results in 
corruption as well as weak corporate governance for Chinese listed firms (Shi & 
Weisert, 2002). As a result of the absence of supervision on state ownership, 
there is serious insider control problem with Chinese listed firms. The failure of 
supervision of the state shares allows directors and management to have 
dominant power and collude with each other in listed firms, which is likely to 
make directors and management have more discretion, empowering them to 
engage in activities in their own interests (Oliver et al., 2014). Therefore, 
managers in firms with the state as the dominant shareholder might be more 
powerful over the board and be able to extract more compensation. Under the 
context of M&As, the firms with the state as dominant shareholder allows CEOs 
to be more powerful to bargain higher compensation through making M&As. 
In addition, the increase of foreign direct investments (FDI) since the 
1990s has had a significant impact on the Chinese executive compensation. FDI 
has introduced market-oriented human resource management practices to China, 
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especially the executive reward systems and corporate governance system from 
developed capital markets (Ding et al., 2006). To follow the global pay 
benchmark effects introduced by foreign investment, CEOs generally obtain 
higher compensation in firms with the foreign investor as the controlling 
shareholder in Chinese listed firms. In addition, foreign investors provide the 
CEO with competitive compensation packages, the higher compensation attracts 
CEOs with more professional and well-developed skills and experience. Firth et 
al. (2007) and Li et al. (2007) provide evidence showing a positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and the foreign investor as the controlling 
shareholder in Chinese listed firms. Under the context of M&As, the competent 
CEOs in Chinese firms with foreign investors as the controlling shareholder are 
usually rewarded higher compensation through M&As.  
Therefore, the following three hypotheses are formulated: 
H8: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is negatively correlated 
to the block shareholding.  
H9: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively correlated 
to the state as the controlling shareholder.  
H10: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively 
correlated to the foreign investor as the controlling shareholder.  
 
4.3.3. Criteria Factors and CEO Compensation 
The optimally-designed compensation packages provide managers with 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
144 
 
incentives to devote more efforts to maximising shareholders’ benefits. The 
managerial effort can be measured in terms of the firm’s performance and firm’s 
size (Ozkan, 2011; Conyon, 2014). In terms of M&As, managerial efforts can 
also be measured in terms of the deal size and abnormal returns in many previous 
studies on executive compensation (e.g. Bugeja et al., 2012; Ozkan, 2012). 
It is generally accepted that firm size can influence executive 
compensation; the previous literature argued that large firms had more growth 
opportunities and complex operations that needed highly skilled managers who 
should devote more efforts and thus obtain higher compensation (Rosen, 1990; 
Conyon & Murphy, 2000). The empirical literature provided evidence of the 
relationship between firm size and executives’ compensation (e.g. Core et al., 
1999; Hill et al, 2016). For example, Core et al. (1999) used a sample of 205 
publicly traded US firms from 1984-1986 to find that CEO compensation was 
positively correlated to firm size. Also, a great amount of previous research 
examined the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation following 
M&As (e.g. Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Wright et al., 2002). Bliss and Rosen (2001) 
investigated the relationship between mergers and CEO compensation for the 
US banking industry in a sample of 32 banks during 1986-1995, and found that 
firm size was positively correlated to CEO compensation following acquisitions.  
In addition, many previous studies looked at the impact of firm size on 
executive and CEO compensation in China (e.g. Zhang et al., 2003; Tao et al., 
2007). For instance, working on a sample of 120 Chinese listed firms in 2006, 
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Tao et al. (2007) found that CEO compensation was positively correlated to the 
firm size, which was consistent with the results of Zhang et al. (2003). 
Bebchuk and Fried (2006) argued that the pay policy that CEOs were 
rewarded by increasing the size of the firm allowed CEOs to have motivation to 
increase the size of the firm and that even the strategy might damage the 
shareholders’ benefits. A CEO’s pay can be repackaged through M&As as it is 
deemed a fast and easy way to increase the firm’s size that is directly related to 
CEO pay as the board of directors may pay CEO compensation based on the 
firm size (Jensen, 1989), even if it is not in the best interests of shareholders 
(Harford & Li, 2007). Therefore, many studies argue that CEO compensation is 
strongly associated to firm size following M&As, as the CEO can adopt an 
M&As strategy to increase the size, thus increasing their compensation (Bliss & 
Rosen, 2001; Wright et al., 2002).   
According to agency theory, the firm’s performance is the significantly 
vital factor influencing CEO compensation; the positive relationship between a 
firm’s performance and CEO compensation indicates the alignment of the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Lambert 
et al., 1993; Core et al., 1999; Conyon et al., 2009). Previous studies have used 
a variety of performance market- and accounting-based measures, mostly using 
the ROA (return on assets) to control for a firm’s accounting performance as it 
has received a great deal of attention on CEO compensation in recent research, 
particularly in the context of M&As (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley & 
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Iliopoulou, 2006; Guest, (2009); Bugeja et al., 2012). For example, Guest (2009) 
used a sample of 4,528 acquisitions on executive pay of 2,469 publicly-listed 
UK firms over the period 1984-2001 to examine the determinates of CEO 
compensation following M&As, and did not find significant relations between 
CEO compensation of acquiring firms. However, working on a sample of 177 
M&As deals in Australian public firms from 2000-2007, Bugeja et al. (2012) 
found that CEO compensation in acquiring firms was significantly correlated to 
a firm’s performance measured by ROA.  
The annual stock market return on common stock has been found to be 
an appropriate proxy for a firm’s market-based performance as it directly reflects 
the change in shareholders’ wealth that comes from stock appreciation during 
the year and the firm’s investment opportunity set respectively (e.g. Core et al., 
1999; Murphy & Sandino, 2010; Conyon & He, 2012). According to agency 
theory, CEO compensation should be positively related to the stock return as it 
is the observable performance to measure the CEO’s effort. Many prior studies 
examined the relationship between CEO compensation and stock return, 
particularly in the context of M&As (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley & 
Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012). For example, Coakley and Iliopoulou 
(2006) examined a sample of 100 firms including UK and US firms between 
1998-2001, and only found a significantly positive relationship between stock 
return and CEO compensation of acquiring firms in the UK sample, which 
supported the agency theory that CEOs should be rewarded because of their 
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higher performance. However, Grinstein and Hribar, (2004) and Bugeja et al. 
(2012) did not find significant relations between stock return and CEO 
compensation of acquiring firms.  
Empirically, many previous studies assessed whether CEO 
compensation was linked to a firm’s performance in China, particularly, the 
accounting measure in ROA and market measure in stock return (Sun & Zhao, 
2006; Firth et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010). For example, Sun and Zhao (2006) 
used a sample of 108 Chinese listed firms from 2000-2002 to examine the 
association between CEO compensation and a firm’s performance, and provide 
evidence that CEO compensation is significantly correlated to the ROA. 
Similarly, Firth et al. (2007) found a significantly positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and a firm’s performance measured by ROA, but 
not significant between CEO compensation and stock returns. Based on a 
balanced panel sample of 502 Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2006, Chen 
et al. (2010) found that executive compensation was positively correlated to 
stock return. In China, the annual executive compensation scheme of SOEs had 
been developed in 1992. The aim of the annual executive compensation system 
was linking executive compensation to a firm’s performance, which was 
consistent with the agency theory that executive compensation should be 
positively correlated to the observable measurements (Rampling et al., 2013).  
In terms of M&As, managerial efforts could also be measured in terms 
of the deal size and abnormal returns in many previous studies on executive 
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compensation (e.g. Bugeja et al., 2012; Ozkan, 2012). Deal size reflected that 
the larger deal involves more complexity of the transaction, suggesting that 
larger deals needed much more managerial efforts and skill of managers who 
should be rewarded much more compensation than smaller deals. Empirically, 
prior studies examined the impact of deal size of M&As on CEO compensation 
following M&As and have mixed results (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; 
Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012). Grinstein and Hribar (2004) 
worked on a sample of 327 large M&As deals between 1993 and 1999, finding 
that one measure (deal size) of managerial effort had a significantly positive 
influence on CEO compensation. Consistent with the results of Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) examined a sample of 100 firms 
including UK and US firms between 1998-2001, only finding a the positive 
relationship between the deal size and CEO’s bonus at the 1% significance levels 
in UK sample. Ozkan (2012) investigated the influence of domestic and foreign 
acquisitions on CEO compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed 
bids by UK firms from 1999-2005, and found that deal size as a measure of CEO 
effort was positively correlated to a CEO’s total compensation either in domestic 
or foreign acquisitions. Also, working on a sample of 177 M&As deals in 
Australian public firms between 2000-2007, Bugeja et al. (2012) found that the 
deal size was a significantly positive impact on CEO compensation in acquiring 
firms. In terms of China, no research studied the influence of deal size of M&As 
on CEO compensation. Based on the agency theory, the author assumes that 
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CEOs should obtain higher compensation when they need to exert more skills 
and effort in completing the large deals by Chinese acquiring firms.  
In terms of M&As, the abnormal stock returns reflect the reaction of the 
market toward M&As. According to agency theory, higher abnormal stock 
returns indicate the higher skill of managers who should be rewarded higher 
compensation (Bugeja et al., 2012). Empirically, previous studies examined the 
impact of abnormal stock returns on executive and CEO compensation 
following M&As and had mixed results (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley 
& Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012). Grinstein and Hribar (2004) worked 
on a sample of 327 large M&As deals between 1993 and 1999, finding that one 
measure (abnormal stock return) of managerial effort had no significant 
influence on CEO compensation. Similarly, Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) 
examined a sample of 100 firms including UK and US firms between 1998-2001, 
showing evidence that abnormal stock return was not significantly related to 
CEO compensation, both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub-samples 
respectively, indicating that managerial pay was not linked to good performance 
or valuable acquisition decisions. Also, working on a sample of 177 M&As deals 
in Australian public firms from 2000-2007, Bugeja et al. (2012) provided the 
empirical results that there was no significant relationship between CEO 
compensation in acquiring firms and abnormal stock returns, indicating that the 
reaction of market toward M&As had no impact on CEO compensation.   
In terms of China, no previous research studied the relationship between 
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abnormal stock return and CEO compensation for M&As; prior research mainly 
focused on the abnormal stock return around M&As alone. Unlike developed 
countries, the abnormal stock return around M&As announcements for Chinese 
listed firms was usually positive, showing that the investors in China saw M&As 
positively. For instance, working on a sample of 1,148 M&As deals from 1998-
2003, Chi et al. (2008) examined market reactions to M&As deals for Chinese 
listed firms and found averagely positive abnormal returns for acquiring firms. 
Similarly, Boateng and Bi (2014) examined the acquirer characteristics in China 
in a sample of 1,370 mergers and acquisitions from 1998-2008, and found that 
there have been positive abnormal returns around M&As. According to agency 
theory, the abnormal stock returns around M&As announcement were higher, 
which means that the investor view making M&As by CEO as a correct decision 
in China, hence, the CEO should be rewarded higher compensation.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested:  
H11: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively 
correlated to the firm size.  
H12: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively 
correlated to the ROA.  
H13: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively 
correlated to the stock return.  
H14: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively 
correlated to the deal size.  
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H15: CEO total compensation of acquiring Chinese firms is positively 
correlated to the three-day abnormal returns.  
 
4.4. Summary 
In this chapter, a conceptual framework for the determination of CEO 
compensation following the mergers and acquisitions in China was developed 
from previous studies on the determination of executive compensation and the 
unique Chinese contextual environment. Based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature, and the unique Chinese contextual environment, the hypotheses 
relating the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As and the 
relationship between CEO compensation and the CG, criteria factors have been 
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Chapter Five: Research Methodology and 
Modelling 
5.1. Introduction 
In chapter 1, the research aims and objectives were specified as 
examining whether CEO compensation was related to M&As decisions and the 
determinants of CEO compensation following M&As. A unique Chinese 
institutional environment was discussed in chapter 2. The relevant theories and 
empirical studies supporting research objectives were reviewed in chapter 3, 
leading to the development of the supporting research framework and the 
hypotheses as discussed in the preceding chapter 4. The objective of this chapter 
is to discuss the research methodology adopted to test the hypotheses, thus 
addressing the research aims and objectives as specified in chapter 1. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides a discussion of 
research philosophy underpinning the study. In section 5.3, the empirical 
research models are developed, and the measurement of variables are discussed 
and justified. In section 5.4, sample selection and data collection procedures are 
presented. In section 5.5, the statistical methods that are employed in this study 
are explained, together with the diagnostic analysis of parametric assumptions 
for each model to determine their suitability and relevance. This section ends 
with a consideration of the selected estimation methods (e.g. Two-step SGMM) 
for this selection. In section 5.6, an overall summary of the chapter is provided. 
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5.2. Philosophy  
Ryan et al. (2002) defined research as “a process of intellectual discovery, 
which has the potential to transform our knowledge and understanding of the 
world around us” (pp 1). In similar fashion, Saunders et al. (2009) saw research 
as engagement by people in some activities with a view to finding out things 
using the methods to collect data in a systematic way based on logical 
relationships and analysing the results. 
According to Blumberg et al. (2005), quality research must have a clearly 
defined purpose, a detailed research process, a well-planned research design, 
high ethical standards, frankly revealed limitations, and appropriate analysis. 
Saunders et al. (2009) explained the research process as the layers of an “onion” 
including research philosophies, research approaches, research strategies, 
choices, time horizons and data collection techniques, and analysis procedures 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Different “onion” layers have different and unique 
functions in the whole research process.  
This section mainly aims to develop the research philosophy to identify 
the related research methods. It analyses the ontological and epistemological 
position based on the context of this study and decides whether the method of 
this study is the quantitative or qualitative method. The research philosophies 
play a vital and fundamental role in business research and create an impact on 
how business research can and should be directed and how the intrinsic quality 
of organisations is understood (Bryman & Bell, 2007). In this context, the first 
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critical step in the process is to start by explaining the philosophy underpinning 
the research. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) defined research philosophy as a set of basic 
beliefs that deal with how the researcher views the world and their individual 
role in it. These basic beliefs are based on assumptions of ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology. These are closely interconnected, such as the 
assumptions taken in one, taken in any order, constrains the assumptions taken 
in the others (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In other words, the ontological position 
that the researcher adopts influences the epistemological position and, 
consequently, the research methodology adopted. In the following sections, 
these philosophical issues are discussed in detail and the approach adopted in 
this research is then justified. 
 
5.2.1. Ontological Considerations 
Ontology is defined in terms of “whether social entities can and should 
be considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or 
whether they can and should be considered social constructions built up from 
the perception and actions of social actors” (Bryman & Bell, 2007，pp 22). In 
other words, ontology concerns the nature of the reality, what exists definitely 
are and how the “exists” can be represented (Gruber, 1993). Specifically, it 
addresses the question: What is the form and nature of reality and what can be 
know about that reality? Saunders et al. (2009) discussed two aspects of 
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ontology: Objectivism and constructivism. 
 
5.2.1.1. Objectivism 
Objectivism refers to how social entities exist in reality external to and 
independent of social actors (Saunders et al., 2009). There are different features 
of objectivism. First, the real world comprises of entities which would be 
classified by their properties and relations. Second, the reality is exactly and 
explicitly structured and can be shared by everyone who receives it; hence, it 
can be modelled. Third, symbols are the demonstrations of reality and can only 
be significant to the degree that they accord with reality. Fourth, the human mind 
manipulates abstract symbols so that they mirror nature. Fifth, human thought is 
symbol-manipulation and is independent of the human organism. Finally, the 
meaning of the world exists objectively, independent of the human mind (Lakoff, 
1987; Vrasidas, 2000; Cronje, 2006). Specifically, the realities can be received 
by all humans and formed with abstract symbols in a human’s mind. The human 
then operates these abstract symbols and starts to understand the world. It is 
worth noting here that the human mind only reflects the reality and that is 
independent of the human mind, which is the key point in objectivism. 
 
5.2.1.2 Constructivism 
Constructivism is “a broad family of arguments built on the notion that 
people only arrive at certain actions due to their adoption of certain ‘social 
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constructs’ to interpret their world” (Marsh & Stoker, 2010, pp 97). It is 
explained as a ‘world of our making’ (Onuf, 1989). Vrasidas (2000) explained 
that the structure of the world is created in the mind by interaction with the world 
based on interpretation, and human choices and actions are a result of 
interpretation of the world. Also, symbols are formed because of culture and they 
are used to construct reality. Furthermore, Cronje (2006) argues that, regarding 
constructivism, human thought is imaginative and develops out of perception, 
sensory experiences, and social interaction; the interpretive process relies on the 
human’ s experiences and understanding. Therefore, constructivism emphasises 
that the human’s mind plays the dominant role in interpretation to the world.  
 
5.2.2. Epistemological Considerations 
Epistemological considerations involve “what is regarded as appropriate 
knowledge about the social world; a particularly central issue in this context is 
the question of whether or not a social world can and should be studied according 
to the same principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences” (Bryman 
& Bell, 2007, pp 16). The ontological considerations seem to show the human’s 
opinion on what the world is and its nature, whereas epistemological positions 
show the human’s opinion of what we can know about the world it (Marsh & 
Stoker, 2010). It also refers to two aspects: Positivism and interpretivism. 
 
 




The main assumption of positivism depends on the existence of objective 
reality and facts, and it holds that the scientific criteria of verification can be 
used to find and test a real explanation or cause of an event or social pattern 
(Roth & Metha, 2001). Gill and Johnson (2002) argued that the natural sciences 
generally used positivism as a main consideration, and a scientific approach 
usually would be used in positivism to explain the social world. Under the 
epistemological position, positivism holds that research should be done through 
an objective approach instead of subjective methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). The observer interprets the phenomenon through recognising the 
fundamental laws by observable reality instead of human beliefs and interests 
(Saunders et al, 2003). Positivism requires the social phenomena to be 
observable and measurable (Bryman, 1988). It aims to employ the hypothesis 
and then conduct causal inferences regarding social phenomena (Lin, 1998). 
Saunders et al. (2011) explained that positivism usually uses the deductive 
method, they use the existing theory as a foundation to develop a hypothesis and 
then collect the credible data. The hypothesis will be tested and confirmed with 
empirical analysis. Also, it is emphasised that the key feature of positivism is 
that research is conducted in a value-free way, which means that “the researcher 
is independent of and neither affects nor is affected by the subject of the research” 
(Remenyi et al., 1998, pp 33), and the researcher is independent of the data 
collection process and would generally not change the nature of the data 






Interpretivism is when “the methods of research adopt the position that 
our knowledge of reality is a social construction by human actors…value-free 
data cannot be obtained, since the enquirer uses his or her preconceptions in 
order to guide the process of enquiry, and furthermore the researcher interacts 
with the human subjects of the enquiry, changing the perceptions of both parties” 
(Walsham, 1995, pp 376). Interpretivists are affected through those insights of 
people and the environment in which people behaviour, those subjective 
perceptions in different environments should be considered and explained in the 
research (Gill & Johnson, 2002). Individuals’ behaviour is influenced through 
the explanation which they give in different circumstances (Saunders et al, 2003). 
Interpretivism attempts to examine how people recognise and explain the world 
in their own perspective (Burns, 2000). Unlike the positivism that is independent 
from research, within interpretivism, the researchers, or enquirers, cannot be 
independent of the research; they are involved in the composition of the research. 
For example, in the interview, the researcher might put their feelings into the 
process to influence the respondent’s opinions. Roth and Metha (2001) 
concluded that interpretivism aims to appreciate how people interpret a 
phenomenon or event, the “construction of facts” is regarded as interpreted and 
subjective, and analyses can only be self-validating by the consistency and 
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coherence of “thick description”. Unlike positivism, interpretivism usually uses 
the inductive approach. Rather than using theory, interpretivists tend to create a 
theory to interpret meanings and insights according to prepared observations 
(Denzin, 1978).  
The main purpose of the research study is to examine the determination 
of CEO compensation following M&As, which is inclined to be objectivism. 
According to the arguments in the ontological position above, several reasons 
for this have been presented. Firstly, the acquiring CEO’s compensation and the 
determinants of CEO compensation following M&As, such as corporate 
governance mechanisms, corporate performance, and “political connection”, 
seem to be established facts; these entities are classified by their properties and 
relations. These symbols, such as CEO compensation, are demonstrations of 
reality. Although these symbols are produced by humans, the creation of these 
symbols do not rely on human experience and perception; their essence is an 
objective existence and they only mirror nature, so that they are independent of 
social actors. 
Secondly, this study aims to identify the relationship between CEO 
compensation and M&As decisions, and the relationship between the acquiring 
CEO’s compensation and those factors following M&As, which exist in reality 
external to social actors as it only reflects objective reality. The author aims to 
show this potential objective reality to others instead of creating anything that 
did not exist before. Therefore, the ontological position for this research can be 
The Determination of CEO compensation following Mergers & Acquisitions in China 
160 
 
reasonably regarded as objectivism. For the epistemological position, this study 
can be identified as positivism and conducts a deductive approach as research is 
based on the existing theories of agency theory, managerial power theory, and 
resource dependency theory. According to these theories, related literature 
would be formed and then several hypotheses based on these facts (literature) 
should be developed. Related variables such as CEO compensation and 
corporate governance will be measured with some specific measurements; for 
example, the total compensation for CEO compensation and the board size for 
one kind of corporate governance mechanism. The hypothesis would then be 
tested using the data collected. In the process of data collection, the researcher 
would not involve the person’s feeling and views about the data collection which 
is only obtained through the highly credible database and annual reports. The 
research process fits the principle of positivism; hence, this research has been 
examined to belong to positivism. After testing the hypothesis, the predicted 
results should accord with these existing theories. In some cases, the theory 
might be modified in light of the findings. Accordingly, this research follows the 
deductive approach as it is a theory testing rather than theory creation activity.  
 
5.2.3. Research Methods 
Following the philosophical ideas, it is crucial to identify the research 
methods which are qualitative and quantitative.  
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5.2.3.1 Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative methods are more linked to the interpretivism of the 
epistemological position (Secker et al., 1995). In interpretivism, reality is not 
independent of individuals’ minds. Thus it shows that reality only exists after 
investigating the object; once the investigation terminates, the reality would 
disappear (Smith, 1983). Interpretivistm began with demonstrating notions with 
regard to a phenomenon, and sought out possible associations among those 
notions (Brannen, 1992). Furthermore, it focuses more on people’s activity and 
their recognition towards the world, and pursues these deep meanings (Burns, 
2000). In addition, it concentrates more on exploring the particular details of an 
event or situation and the data would usually be collected, presented, and 
analysed in the form of words, pictures, or objects; also, the researcher is 
inclined to involve themselves into the subject research, so that it is often argued 
as a more subjective method (David et al., 2008). Maxwell (1996) argued that 
qualitative research depends on its inductive approach, and is more concerned 
with particular situations or people, with more focus on words rather than 
numbers.  
The study design in qualitative research includes the case study, oral 
history, focus groups, participant observation, holistic research, community 
discussion forums, and reflective journal log sources (Kumar, 2011). Generally, 
there are three main methods of data collection in qualitative research: 
Unstructured interviews, participant observation, and secondary sources (Kumar, 





5.2.3.2. Quantitative Methods 
Desai and Porter (2006) emphasised that quantitative methods were 
based on the positivism assumption that reality consists of objective facts, and 
that reality is independent from human minds; on an epistemological level, 
individuals should be independent from entities and not be affected by them; 
also, it involves the deductive analysis of those observed facts using existing 
theory and mainly focuses on strict objective measurement with a view to testing 
developed hypotheses. The logic of such a method is to collect data using 
standardised approaches on a range of variables; search for patterns of causal 
relationships between these variables; and test given theory by confirming or 
denying precise hypotheses (Henn et al., 2006). Bryman (1984) emphasised that 
the research designs of quantitative methodologists tend to focus more on fixed 
measurements and hypothesis testing instead of fieldwork. 
Generally, study designs commonly used in quantitative research include 
the cross-over comparative experimental design, the replicated cross-sectional 
design, trend studies, cohort studies, panel studies, blind studies, and double-
blind studies (Kumar, 2011). There are several main research methods related to 
the quantitative methods, such as structured interviewing, self-completion 
questionnaires, structured observation, and secondary analysis.  
Quantitative and qualitative approaches represent different research 
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strategies and each carries with it striking differences in terms of the role of 
theory, epistemological issues, and ontological concerns (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
Interestingly, the main aims of quantitative research methods are theory testing 
and theory modification, which is consistent with the rule of the deductive 
approach. Qualitative research’s main purpose however lies in theory creation 
and theory building, which is consistent with the rule of the inductive approach 
(Newman & Benz, 1998). Generally, the deductive approach is associated with 
positivism while the inductive approach is more associated with interpretivism 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007). Also, positivists are inclined to mainly use quantitative 
methods, while interpretivists prefer to deploy qualitative methods (Marsh & 
Stoker, 2010). Consequently, according to the argument in the philosophical 
ideas and discussion between the research approaches above, the current 
research tends to adopt the quantitative approach.  
In summary, the current study is mainly based on the agency theory, 
managerial theory, and stewardship theory; these prior theories and empirical 
literature offer a valid base to develop the hypothesis, and the hypothesis test 
will be conducted via analysing the secondary numeric data which will be 
collected through annual reports of listed companies and professional databases. 
Therefore, the current study would carry out the objective positivist and 
deductive position, and the quantitative research method would be used in this 
study.  
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5.3. Economic Modelling 
Five models are specified to address the objectives. First, three models 
are developed to address the objective of whether CEO compensation is 
correlated with the M&As decisions. Then the aim of models 4 and 5 is to 
address the second objective two of determinants of CEO compensation 
following M&As.  
The first model is based on Guest (2009); the second model is based on 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou, (2006), and Bugeja et al. 
(2012); the third model is developed based on the first two models with the 
addition of adding more other factors considered by previous studies have 
impact on CEO compensation, particularly the Chinese characteristics.    
Compensationit = α + β1Size  it−1 + β2ROAit + β3MTNVit + β4Acquisition Dummyit +
[Industry Dummies] +
εit                                                                                                               (5.1)                                                                           
 
Compensationit = α + β1Size  it−1 + β2ROAit + β3ROAGrowthit + β4TSR it +
β5Sales Growth it + β6MarginGrowthit + β7Marginit + β8MTNVit +
β9Acquisition Dummyit + β10Acquisition Dummyi(t−1) + [Industry Dummies] +
εit                                                                                                                                                               (5.2)                                                                                                                         
 
Compensationit = α + β1Size  it−1 + β2ROAit + β3ROAGrowthit + β4TSR it +
β5Sales Growth it + β6MarginGrowthit + β7Marginit + β8MTNVit +
β9Acquisition Dummyit + β10Acquisition Dummyi(t−1) + β11CEODualityit +
β12BoardSizeit + β13SupervisorySizeit + β14Independent Ratioit + β15Remuerationit +
β16CEOShareit + β17BlockShareit + β18PoliticalCEOit + β19Compensation  it−1 +
[Industry Dummies] +
εit                                                              (5.3)                                          
 
Model 4 examines the determinants of CEO compensation following the 
M&As, and derives from Grinstein and Hribar (2004); Coakley and Iliopoulou 
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(2006) and Bugeja et al., (2012). In Model 4, only the influence of block 
shareholders on CEO compensation is considered, thus in Model 5 the impact 
of different types of block shareholders on CEO compensation were considered, 
including the state controller and foreign controller.  
 
Compensationi = χ + δ1Sizei + δ2Deal Sizei + δ3CAR[−1, +1]i + δ4BoardSize i +
δ5IndependentRatio i +  δ6RemuninationCommitteei +  δ7CEODualityi +
δ8CEOShare i + δ9SupervisorySize i +  δ10BlockShareholderi +  δ11CEOPoliticali +
δ12TSR i + δ13ROA i + [Industry Dummies] +
εi                                                                    (5.4)                                               
 
Compensationi = χ + δ1Sizei + δ2Deal Sizei + δ3CAR[−1, +1]i + δ4BoardSize i +
δ5IndependentRatio i +  δ6RemuninationCommitteei +  δ7CEODualityi +
δ8CEOShare i + δ9SupervisorySize i +  δ10BlockShareholderi + δ11StateControlleri +
δ12ForeignController i +  δ13CEOPoliticali + δ14TSR i + δ15ROA i +
[Industry Dummies] +
εi                                                                                                                 (5.5)                                                                            
 
5.4. Variables Measurements 
CEO Compensation (dependent variable) 
The main composition of CEO compensation in Chinese listed firms is 
cash pay including salary and bonus. Long-term incentives are less commonly 
used in China as the presence of equity incentives is a very recent phenomenon 
in China, and until 2006, the firms were allowed to reward options to top 
executives. This is different from western countries, including the US, where 
most incentives are in the compensation package. In the US, the stock options 
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account for about 45% of the CEO compensation package (Conyon, 2014). The 
restricted stock and other equity grants related to performance have also been 
used as components of CEO compensation in the US (Bizjak et al., 2011). 
European firms are more likely to use long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) 
(Conyon et al., 2013). However, the stock options and LTIPs are not common in 
China, with only about 1% of CEOs in the listed firms being rewarded with the 
stock option from 2006 and 2010, and the value of these stock options only 
worth 30% of CEO cash compensation and 21% of non-CEO top executive 
compensation (Bryson et al., 2012). Therefore, the effect of the long-term 
incentives on compensation is limited. 
Cash compensation is important components of total compensation. This 
is the pay that is awarded by the firm and received by the CEO during the fiscal 
year. Some academics give cash compensation the definition that it includes all 
of the salary, bonuses, benefits, and allowances rewarded during the year to the 
CEOs (e.g. Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Eichholtz et al., 2008). However, some 
studies define cash compensation as comprising of salary and bonus (e.g. Ozkan, 
2007). In China, an obvious characteristic of executive compensation that differs 
from the west is that executive compensation mainly includes the salary and 
annual bonus. Buck et al. (2008) argued that even without long-term incentives, 
cash compensation still has reward and motivational influence on executives in 
China. Therefore, the main components of CEO compensation are cash and 
bonus.  
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In the period before 2001, listed firms were not obliged to publicise 
executive compensation information in their annual reports. The CSRC, since 
2001, required listed firms to go public with the sum of the top three executives’ 
compensation and the three highest board members’ compensation. Since 2006, 
listed firms were required to disclose the total compensation of individual top 
management and board members, but the components of total compensation 
were not specified. Additionally, firms were also required by the CSRC to 
disclose some information about equity incentives, such as stock options, 
restricted shares, and share appreciation rights in 2006. However, only a few 
firms issued equity incentives. As discussed above, only about 1% of CEOs in 
listed firms were rewarded the stock option from 2006-2010. The use of the 
equity incentive as a measure of CEO compensation might reduce the current 
sample. In the meanwhile, Chinese firms do not disclose details of the equity-
based compensation and previous studies usually used cash compensation 
instead of the equity incentive as a measure of CEO compensation (e.g. Conyon 
& He, 2011). Therefore, this study can only use the total cash compensation as 
a measure of CEO compensation for dependent variables.  
 
Firm Size 
Many previous studies found the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm size (Core et al., 1999; Ezzamel & Watson, 2002). 
Previous research generally used the book value of total assets (e.g. Tian & Lau, 
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2001; Firth et al., 2006) and sales (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Ezzamel & Watson, 
2002) to measure the size of a firm. This study uses the book value of total assets 
to measure firm size, which is widely used by previous studies (e.g. Kaplan, 
1994; Wang et al. 2011), particularly in studies of CEO compensation following 
M&As (e.g. Bugeja et al., 2012). 
 
M&As Decisions Variable 
According to previous literature, M&As decisions were measured by 
dummy variable coding one if a firm made an M&As (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 
2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Guest, 2009; Bugeja et al., 2012). In this 
study, the M&As decision was measured by dummy variable coding one if a 
Chinese listed firm made an M&A.  
 
Board Characteristics Variables 
The board of directors of play an important role in monitoring 
management. Board effectiveness in its monitoring function is determined by its 
size, composition, and independence. This study use variables of board size, 




Many previous studies found a relationship between CEO compensation 
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and board size (Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007). Core et al. (1999) measured 
board size as the number of members of the board of directors during each fiscal 
year. This study measures the board size by the number of members of the board 
of directors for a Chinese listed firm.  
 
Independent Ratio 
According to the literature, independent directors are defined as those 
who are not current employees of the firm, such as top management and those 
who have no connections with current or former employees of the firm, and who 
have no extensive business connections with the firms (Denis & Sarin, 1999). 
The CSRC issued ‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the 
Board of Directors of Listed Companies’ in 2002. The guidelines defined 
independent directors as “a director whom does not hold any position in the 
company other than director and who has no relationship with the listed 
company engaging him or its principal shareholders that could hinder his making 
independent and objective judgments”. Previous literature used the ratio of 
independent directors to present board independence and found its correlation 
with CEO compensation (e.g. Basu et al., 2007; Wan, 2009; Conyon, 2016). Wan 
(2009) defined the independent ratio as the number of members of independent 
directors divided by the total number of board members. This study measures 
the independent ratio by the number of members of independent directors 
divided by the total number of board members for a Chinese listed firm.  




In China, listed firms were recommended by the Corporate Governance 
Code in 2002 to set up a compensation committee approved by shareholder 
meetings. Much previous literature examined the impact of the existence of a 
remuneration committee on executive and CEO compensation (e.g. Chen et al., 
2010, Conyon & He, 2012). Chen et al. (2010) measured the remuneration 
committee by whether the boards of directors had a remuneration committee. 
This study measures the remuneration committee by whether the boards of 
directors of Chinese firms have a remuneration committee.  
 
Supervisory Board Size 
Supervisory boards are another important monitoring mechanism for 
firms. Many previous studies used the size of supervisory boards to measure 
supervisory board quality and examine their influence on CEO compensation 
(e.g. Chizema, 2008; Chen et al., 2010). Supervisory board size is defined as the 
number of members of the supervisory board (e.g. Li et al., 2007; Chen et al., 
2010; Ding et al., 2010). This study measures the supervisory board by the 
number of members of the supervisory board for a Chinese firm. 
 
Board Leadership and CEO Power Variables  
The effectiveness of board structure mechanisms in monitoring 
managers depends on the power of the CEO. CEO power for this study can 
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CEO duality means that the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board 
of directors and is also a critical corporate governance mechanism. Plenty of 
previous studies have discussed how CEO duality influences CEO compensation 
(e.g. Cyert et al., 2002; Li et al., 2007). CEO duality is defined as the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board (Cyert et al., 2002; Dai, 2014). This study 
measures CEO duality using a dummy variable coded one if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board for a Chinese firm. 
 
CEO Shareholding 
Managerial ownership is defined by previous studies as the ownership 
held by top managers and boards of directors (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999). The information of ownership for CEOs can be found 
in annual reports of Chinese listed firms. This study measures the CEO 
shareholding using the percentage of shares held by the CEO.  
 
CEO Political Connections  
Political connections are an important access to critical resources and can 
bring substantial benefits to firms, particular for the CEO with political 
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connections. Many previous studies examined the relationship between a firm’s 
performance and political connections (including CEO’s political connections) 
(e.g. Aslan & Grinstein, 2011; Civilize et al., 2015). Faccio (2006) defined 
politically-connected firms as one where at least one of the firm’s largest 
shareholders, or one of its top officers, was a member of parliament, a minister, 
a head of state, or closely related to a top official. Aslan and Grinstein (2011) 
measured the CEOs’ political connections through the CEOs’ campaign 
donations. Fan et al. (2006) defined the CEO political connections as where a 
CEO is a current or former officer of the central government, local government, 
or the military for a Chinese listed firm. This study measures a CEO’s political 
connections by whether the CEO is a current or former officer of the central 
government, local government, or the military.  
 
Ownership structure variables: 
Block Shareholding 
Ownership structure has an effect on the determination of compensation, 
particularly block shareholding (see also Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Wang & 
Xiao, 2011). According to previous studies, block ownership has had a 
significant influence on CEO compensation (Cyert et al., 2002; Hartzell & 
Starks, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2009). Previous studies measured block 
shareholding by the sum of the top five largest holders (Elston & Goldberg, 2003; 
Hartzell & Starks, 2003). This study will measure block shareholding by the sum 
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of the top five largest holders.  
 
State Controller 
The block shareholders in China may be the state or private institutional 
investors (including foreign investors). The most distinctive characteristic of 
Chinese listed firms is the ownership structure. The ownership of Chinese listed 
firms is much more concentrated compared with western developed countries. 
In many cases, the largest shareholder is the state, which as the dominant 
shareholder has a considerable influence on executive compensation (Firth et al., 
2007; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2012). 
According to the previous studies, the state controller is measured by the 
state as the largest shareholder of the firm (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 
2012). This study measures the state controller by whether the state is the largest 
shareholder of the firm.  
 
Foreign Ownership 
According to previous studies, foreign investors provide effective 
monitoring in Chinese firms and enable competitive compensation packages. 
Previous studies examined the impact of foreign ownership on executives and 
CEO compensation in China (Firth et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007; Conyon & He, 
2012). They measure foreign ownership by whether the foreign institution is the 
largest owner of the firm. Therefore, this study measures foreign ownership by 
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whether the foreign institution is the largest owner of the Chinese listed firm.  
 
Firm Performance 
According to previous studies, a firm’s performance is a significantly 
vital factor in influencing CEO compensation (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Lambert 
et al., 1993; Core et al., 1999; Conyon et al., 2009). Previous studies used a 
variety of market- and accounting-based measures to measure firms’ 
performance; the market-based measure indicated the present value of future 
streams of income while the accounting-based measure presented past 
performance (Seth, 1990). According to previous studies, ROA, ROA growth, 
margin, and margin growth, would be used to control for a firm’s accounting 
performance in this study as it has received a great deal of attention on CEO 
compensation and in the context of M&As in recent research (Grinstein & Hribar, 
2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Cadman et al, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Wang 
et al, 2011; Bugeja et al., 2012). In this study, consistent with previous studies 
(e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012), 
ROA is measured by earnings before tax divided by total assets (Cadman et al, 
2010; Chen et al., 2010); ROA growth is measured by current ROA divided by 
ROA in the previous year (Ozkan, 2012; Bugeja et al., 2012). Margin is 
measured by earnings before tax divided by sales (Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; 
Bugeja et al., 2012). Margin growth is measured by margin in the current year 
divided by the margin in the previous year (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Bugeja et 




The annual stock market return on common stock (RET) and market-to-
book have been found to be an appropriate proxy for a firm’s market-based 
performance as it directly reflects the change in shareholders’ wealth that comes 
from stock appreciation during the year and the firm’s investment opportunity 
set respectively, and have been found to have had a significant influence in CEO 
compensation only and in the context of M&As (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Perry & 
Zenner, 2001; Brick et al., 2006; Murphy & Sandino, 2010; Conyon & He, 2012). 
This study will use the stock return and market to book to measure market-based 
firm performance. Based on previous studies, the stock return in this study is 
measured by earnings per share (Core et al., 1999; Conyon & He, 2012) while 
market-to-book value is measured by the market value by book value total assets 
(Murphy & Sandino, 2010; Conyon & He, 2012). 
 
Managerial Efforts in Completing M&As 
In terms of M&As, managerial efforts can also be measured in terms of 
deal size, three-day abnormal returns in many previous studies on executive and 
CEO compensation (Harford & Li, 2007; Bugeja et al., 2012; Ozkan, 2012).  
 
Deal Size 
Deal size reflects larger deals are more complex and require greater 
managerial effort and skill which should be rewarded with more. According to 
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previous studies, deal size is measured by the value of the deal (Coakley & 
Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012). This study measures deal size by the value 
of the deal. 
 
CAR [-1, +1] 
Abnormal returns reflect the reaction of the market toward the M&As, 
higher abnormal returns show the positive reaction on the M&As deals, which 
indicate the higher skill of managers who should be rewarded with higher 
compensation (Bugeja et al., 2012). Previous studies have examined the 
abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the announcement date and its 
influence on executive and CEO compensation (Girma et al., 2006; Guest, 2009). 
This current study uses an event study methodology to calculate the abnormal 
returns around M&As so as to investigate the impact of M&As toward 
shareholder value. The market model is used as it is commonly found in M&As 
literature (Danbolt, 1995; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006). This study uses the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen index returns as the benchmark for calculating a firm’s 
abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement. It calculates the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the sample firms to examine short-run 
post-merger performance. The study estimates an event windows of 3 days (−1; 
+1) surrounding the day of the M&As announcement, which has been used in 
previous studies (Harford & Li, 2007; Bugeja et al., 2012). 
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Table 1 Variables Definition 
Variables Definition Sources of Data 
CEO compensation of acquiring firms 
Compensation Total CEO compensation (salary and 
bonus) (e.g. Conyon & He., 2012). 
CCER 
Performance and characteristics of acquiring firms  
Size  Book value of total assets of the 
acquiring firm (e.g. Kaplan, 1994). 
CSMAR 
ROA  Earnings before tax divided by total 
assets (e.g. Core et al., 1999). 
CSMAR 
ROA growth Current ROA divided by ROA in the 
previous year (e.g. Coakley & 
Iliopoulou, 2006). 
CSMAR 
TSR The stock return on the acquiring 
firms in the financial year (e.g. Lin, 
2005). 
CSMAR 
Sales growth Sales in the current year divided by 
sales in the previous year (e.g. 
Harford & Li, 2007). 
CSMAR 
Margin Earnings before tax divided by sales 
(e.g. Jones & Kato, 1996). 
CSMAR 
Margin growth Margin in the current year divided 
by the margin in the previous year 
(e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). 
CSMAR 
MTNV The market value by book value total 
assets (Murphy & Sandino, 2010; 
Conyon & He, 2012). 
CSMAR 
Deal characteristic 
Deal size The value of the deal (e.g. Guest, CSMAR 




CAR[−1,1] The three-day market adjusted return 
between the day prior to the 
announcement and the day after the 






The number of members of the board 
of directors (Core et al., 1999; 
Ozkan, 2007) 
CCER 
Supervisory size The number of members of the 
supervisory board (e.g. Li et al., 
2007; Chen et al., 2010). 
CCER 
Independent ratio The percentage of independent 
directors in board (e.g. Ozkan, 
2007). 
CCER 
Remuneration  The binary variable coded as one if 
the firm have a remuneration 
committee, zero otherwise (e.g. 
Chen et al., 2010). 
CCER 
CEO power source 
CEO duality A binary variable coded as one if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, zero otherwise (e.g. Cyert et 
al., 2002). 
CCER 
CEO shareholding The percentage of company shares 
owned by the CEO (e.g. 
Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013). 
CCER 
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CEO political A binary variable coded as one if the 
CEO was former or current official 
of government, zero otherwise.  
Annual report 
Ownership structure 
Block shareholders The square sum of the first five 
biggest shareholders’ ownership 
(Hartzell & Starks, 2003). 
CCER 
State dominator A binary variable code as one if the 
state is the largest shareholder in 
acquiring firms, zero otherwise (e.g. 
Firth et al, 2006). 
CCER 
Foreign Investment A binary variable code as one if the 
foreign shareholder is the controlling 
shareholder of a firm, zero otherwise 
(e.g. Chen et al., 2010). 
CCER 
Dummy variables 
Acquisition dummy The binary variable coded as one if 
the firm completed an M&As during 
the year, zero otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Lagged value of acquisition 
dummy 
The binary variable coded as one if 
the firm completed an M&As one 




The control factors include the industry classification which is 
considered to control the influence of industry on CEO compensation. Many 
previous studies controlled the influence of industry classification on executive 
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and CEO compensation (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; Conyon & He, 2012).  
Accordingly, this study considers the difference of industry in all models of the 
current study. The industry is based on 18 CSRC (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission classification) of industries. They are: 
i. Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, and fishery;  
ii. Mining;  
iii. Manufacturing;  
iv. Utilities; 
v. Construction;  
vi. Wholesale and retail;  
vii. Transportation;  
viii. Hotel and catering industry;  
ix. Information transmission, software and information technology service; 
x. Real estate; 
xi. Leasing and commerce service;  
xii. Scientific research and technology service;  
xiii. Water conservancy, environment, and public facilities management; 
xiv. Resident service, repair, and other service; 
xv. Education; 
xvi. Hygienic and social work; 
xvii. Culture, sports, and entertainment; 
xviii. Comprehensive. 




5.5. Sample Selection and Data Collection Procedures 
5.5.1. Data Source 
The required data is accessible mainly from the two credible databases in 
China: China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and China 
Centre for Economics Research (CCER) databases, and annual reports are also 
provided to collect the data. These two databases have been used in a number of 
previous studies (see Chen et al., 2010). The CSMAR mainly provides the data 
on the firm level M&As deals and financial information, while the CCER 
provides data on the firm level CEO compensation and CG indicators for this 
study. The annual report mainly provides the CEO profile, particularly for the 
variable of CEO political connection. The current study used the non-financial 
Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges to construct 
the sample. The timespan of the data was from 2006 to 2013 and was chosen to 
capture all the M&As since 2005 when the Non-tradable Share Reforms 
commenced, given that M&As grew significantly after the reforms. 
 
5.5.2. Sampling Process 
The whole sample includes treatment and control sample. The treatment 
sample refers to the firms which made M&As while the control sample refers to 
the firms not involved in M&As. The sampling process for the treatment sample 
started at all firms that made M&As. The sampling process for the treatment 
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sample can be seen in Panel A below: (1) excluding all financial firms as 
financial firms have different regulatory regimes from non-financial firms, (2) 
eliminating firms engaging in multiple M&As in the year to avoid conflating the 
effects of multiple transactions in the analysis. The final treatment sample 
contains 369 M&As deals. The sampling process for the control sample started 
at all firms not involved in M&As. The sampling process for the control sample 
(not involving M&As) can be seen in Panel A below:  
i. dropping all financial firms; 
ii. eliminating all firms with missing information; 
iii. then excluding the treatment sample, leaving a control sample of 9,880 
observations. 
 




Sampling process of treatment sample 
Year 2006-2013 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Initial MA deals (cases) 466 12 28 55 88 49 49 103 82 
Excluded 
         
Drop financial firms (cases) 8 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 4 
Drop all firms engaging in multiple M&As (cases) 89 2 0 5 19 2 10 22 29 
Final treatment sample (cases) 369 10 28 50 68 47 38 79 49 
          
 
Panel B 
Sampling process of control sample 
 
2006-2013 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Initial Non-MA sample (cases) 11224 1373 1423 1395 1375 1405 1416 1374 1403 
Excluded 
         
Drop financial firms (cases) 266 24 31 28 30 35 38 40 40 
Drop firms with missing information (cases) 1078 107 163 159 158 152 129 94 56 
Final control sample 9880 1242 1229 1208 1187 1218 1249 1240 1307 
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5.6. Data Analysis 
This chapter has so far discussed the research philosophy underpinning the study, 
as well as the empirical research models which were developed and the measurement 
of variables was justified. Also, sample selections and data collection procedures were 
presented. This section discussed the data analysis process and the statistical methods 
used. Data analysis included descriptive statistics followed by univariate and 
multivariate analysis. 
 
5.6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the treatment and control sample for the dependent and 
independent variables provide a preliminary understanding of the data and its 
distribution. The statistics analysed include the maximum, minimum, mean, 25th 
quantile, median, 75th quantile, standard deviation, and T test, to demonstrate how CEO 
compensation changes over time between the treatment and control sample. Finally, the 
average total CEO compensation accounting for the differences in industry types from 
year 2006 and 2013 was presented for the whole sample. 
 
5.6.2. Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis examines the correlation between the dependent and the 
individual independent variables. The thesis uses Spearman’s rho correlations. The 
strength and direction of the correlation between the variables is given by the 
correlation coefficient r, which lies between -1 and +1, where a positive (negative) value 
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signals a positive (negative) association. A higher value means a stronger association 
(Field, 2009). The coefficients and signs of correlation provide a basic understanding 
to the direction and magnitude of the correlations between dependent and independent 
variables.  
 
5.6.3. Multivariate Analysis 
Multivariate regression covers the cases in which the dependent variable is 
hypothesized to depend on more than one explanatory variable, to allow for isolating 
the contribution of each independent variable to explain variation in the dependent 
variable by holding the effect of the other variables constant (Gujarati, 2003). Four 
important assumptions have to be met for multivariate regression to guarantee the 
validity of the results of analysis (see e.g. Greene 1993; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007; 
Studenmund, 2001; Gujarati, 2003). The various checks discussed are used to examine 
the data of this study against the assumptions of the multivariate regression. 
 
i. Normality 
This assumption requires that the data must be normally distributed. Two 
common tests or checks are used to examine the normality of the variables of this study; 
namely skewness and kurtosis. Skewness refers to the symmetry around the mean, with 
positive (negative) skewness meaning more observations lying left (right) of the mean 
and a longer tail of the distribution right (left) of the mean. And kurtosis refers to the 
peakedness of a distribution. Positive kurtosis means a piling up of values around the 
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mean, thus more peaked than a normal distribution, whereas negative kurtosis means a 
flatter distribution than the normal distribution. If a distribution is normal, the values 
for both skewness and kurtosis should be zero or close to zero (Field 2009; Bryman & 
Cramer 2009). According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), data is statistically considered 
to be normally distributed if the skewness value is ±1.96 and the kurtosis value is within 
± 3. A more objective numerical test of normality of the distribution is the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. A significant result (p< 0.05) indicates that the distribution differs 
significantly from a normal distribution (Field, 2009). 
If the tests indicate that the distribution of the data is not normal, it is usually 
suggested that transforming the data is a useful way to make data of distribution normal 
(see e.g. Kenny, 1987; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Statistically, it is suggested that data 
transformation helps in overcoming the problem of non-normality and outliers by 
artificially making the data normally distributed. Even though this method might 
influence the result of the analysis through transforming the nature of the information 
which leads to the complication of any interpretation, it has been found that it is a 
valuable statistical method to enhance the normality of data (Osborne, 2002).  
ii. Linearity 
This assumption requires that the model should have linear parameters. In other 
words, the relationship between the explanatory variables (X) and the dependent 
variable (Y) should be linear. When this assumption is violated, using parameter 
methods will results in biased estimates (Ayyangar, 2007).   
 




Under this assumption, the standard deviation or the variance of the dependent 
variable within the groups is required to be equal or homogenous. Otherwise, the 
problem of heteroscedasticity will arise if the error variance is heterogonous, which 
leads to biased standard errors and inefficient estimates. With respect to the assumption 
of homoscedasticity, the widely used Breusch-Pagan and White tests were employed to 
detect the problem of heteroscedasticity. These two tests assume the variance of 
residuals is constant; if it is not, it indicates an existing problem of heteroscedasticity 
(Tabachnick & Fiedell, 2007). 
iv. Independence of error terms 
This assumption requires that error terms must be independent from each other, 
and therefore no serial correlation must exist. In other words, parameter models demand 
that the error terms are uncorrelated and therefore observations are uncorrelated, 
otherwise, there is autocorrelation. This is done via the Wooldridge test. The 
Wooldridge test assumes that there is no first-order autocorrelation, if violated, means 
autocorrelation exists. 
In addition, it is important to account for the problem of multicollinearity in the 
model. The problem of multicollinearity indicates that a strong correlation might exist 
between the explanatory variables of the model. The problem of multicollinearity might 
lead to the estimation of variables being invalid. There are two important tools to 
identify the problem of multicollinearity; the first one is the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) test. If the value exceeds 10, the problem of multicollinearity exists (Gujarati 
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2003; Field 2009). The second one is the Spearman rank correlation. The Spearman 
correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables are examined in a correlation 
matrix. If the coefficient of any pair of explanatory variables is more than 0.8, there 
might be a problem of multicollinearity.  
 
5.6.3.1. Fixed Effect and Random Effect Model 
A panel dataset is one in which each variable contains information on N units 
and each unit contains T time-series observations. Panel data regression differs from a 
regular time series or cross-section because it combines both in a double subscript on 
its variables. The equation can be written as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                            (5.6) 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                         (5.7) 
where i and t represent individual firm and time periods respectively. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is dependent variable and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is an independent variable.  𝛼  is the constant and 
is the slope of the independent variable which reflects a partial explanation or prediction 
for the value of Y.  𝑢𝑖 is unobserved individual specific effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error 
term.  
The unobserved heterogeneity would result in the OLS estimates being biased 
and inconsistent as the common variations in the series are not taken into account across 
all cross-sectional entities and over time in a pooled OLS model. In order to deal with 
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this problem, a fixed effect model or random effects model, is considered for panel data 
analysis. The main difference between the models is in their interpretations about 
unobserved individual specific effects. 
The Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model are widely used for the panel 
data as they account for individual effects (unobserved heterogeneity) that a pooled 
OLS model does not deal with. The fixed effect model is an approach that estimates the 
fixed effect of predictors on the dependent variables by controlling for the constant 
variations coming from the omitted variables and for unobserved heterogeneity 
between groups over time. The assumption of this technique is that the individual 
specific effect is related to the repressors. The fixed effect approach works by removing 
much of the error variance that arises because of the distortions resulting from the 
individual differences between groups that come from the omitted variables or the 
unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the repressors. However, this approach 
allows for correlations between the unobserved individual effects with the model’s 
variables (Greene, 2003). Random effect models on the other hand assume there is no 
correlation between the individual effects and the repressors, and thus consider the 
individual specific constant terms as being randomly distributed within or between the 
cross-sectional groups (Greene, 2007). 
In order to justify this choice statistically, research in economics usually utilises 
the Hausman test (e.g. McKnight & Weir, 2009). The Hausman test is used to 
statistically make the choice between fixed and random effect models, and works by 
facilitating the differentiation between these two approaches by examining for 
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correlations. Under the Hausman specification test, the assumptions for the choice of 
(1) the fixed effect approach is that the independent variables must be significantly 
correlated to the unobserved heterogeneity, and (2) the random effect approach is that 
the independent variables must be insignificantly correlated to the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Following previous research, the Hausman test has been used to test this 
assumption and to find out which approach is more relevant to the data. 
 
5.6.3.2. System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) 
Besides static panel estimates, the current study can also be examined by 
dynamic panel data models where dependent variables are affected their own lags based 
on previous literature (e.g. Guest, 2009). A dynamic panel data model will be used to 
examine the impact on CEO compensation against M&As decisions controlling firm 
performance, corporate governance, and CEO political connection. GMM is regarded 
as a useful estimation tool to tackle the endogeneity and fixed effect problems (Arellano 
& Bond, 1991).  
A dynamic panel data model can be written as follows: 




𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (5.8)                         
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 +
𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                          (5.9)                                      
where i and t represent individual firms and time periods respectively. 𝑋′  is a vector 
of independent variables. The error terms contain two components: The fixed effect 𝜇𝑖 
and idiosyncratic shocks   𝑣𝑖𝑡 . There are two main econometric problems for the 
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dynamic panel model. The first one is the causality problem; it might happen in both 
directions – from CEO compensation to determinants of CEO compensation and vice 
versa. These independent variables might be correlated with the error term. The second 
one is the fixed effects problem, where time-invariant firm characteristics (fixed effects 
contained in the error term in equation (4.6)) may be correlated with the independent 
variables.  
The Generalised Method of Moments estimator (GMM), also call Difference 
GMM – DGMM) developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) allows the existence of 
lagged dependent variable, control for the fixed effect, and tackles the endogeneity 
problem of independent variables. In addition, the GMM estimator is useful when the 
panel data has large N and small T, because the bias raised in dynamic panel model 
could be small when T becomes large. 
The Generalised Method of Moments estimator first-difference the panel data 
to remove the time-invariant fixed effect. But there is a problem for DGMM that if 
lagged dependent variables and explanatory variables are persistent over time, the 
lagged levels of variables (the instruments) providing little information about the first-
differenced variables are poor (Arellano & Bover, 1995). To respond to this problem, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed an alternative 
estimator – system GMM (SGMM) – to alleviate the weakness of DGMM and enhance 
precision. SGMM’s key was to simultaneously include the lagged levels and difference 
of variables as instruments (Roodman, 2009).  
Based on Arellano and Bond (1991), the SGMM estimator requires that there is 
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first-order serial correlation, but no second-order serial correlation in the residuals. This 
means that the null hypothesis must be rejected in the MA(1) test, but not rejected in 
the MA(2) test.  
This so-called overidentifying restrictions test can be performed by the Sargan 
(1958) or Hansen J (1982) tests. Under the null hypothesis, the model is correctly 
specified and the overidentifying restrictions are valid (Baum 2006, pp.190-191, p.201). 
The Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation while the 
Hansen J is. Baum (2006) argues that the most commonly used diagnostic for SGMM 
to investigate the suitability of model specification is the Hansen J-statistics test. 
Roodman (2009) also suggests that a Sargen test is biased in SGMM. Therefore, the 
validity of the instruments is tested using Hansen’s J test statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions. The Hansen J-test (p-value) does not reject the null at significance level of 
0.05 or 0.10, which implies that the instruments are valid. It is also suggested that a p-
value need to be at least as high as 0.25 (Roodman, 2009).  
The GMM estimators includes one-step and two-step estimators. This study 
used two-step SGMM. The two-step is better than one-step, since two-step SGMM is 
able to create more efficient and accurate estimates (Baltagi, 2008). Also, Roodman 
(2006) argues that the two-step SGMM could lower bias and standard errors and allows 
for heteroskedasticity of errors. 
 
5.7. Summary 
In this chapter, the research philosophy was firstly discussed and identified the 
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related research methods. As the current study is mainly based on the agency theory 
and managerial power theory, these prior theories and empirical literature offer a valid 
base to develop the hypothesis, and the hypothesis test will be conducted via analysing 
the secondary numeric data which will be collected through annual reports of listed 
companies and professional databases. Therefore, the current study would carry out the 
objective positivist and deductive position, and the quantitative research method would 
be used in this study. 
Secondly, five empirical research models have been developed based on the 
literature to address the objectives of this study. The first three models mainly address 
whether CEO compensation is correlated to the M&As decisions and Models 4 and 5 
mainly address the impact of firms’ performance, M&As deals, corporate governance, 
and political connections on CEO compensation. 
Thirdly, this chapter provides development of the measurement. Fourthly, 
sample selection and data collection procedures have been discussed and presented. 
Fifthly, this chapter demonstrated the data analysis, including the descriptive analysis, 
univariate, and multivariate analysis. The descriptive analysis of the treatment and 
control sample for the dependent and independent variables provides a preliminary 
understanding of the data and its distribution. The univariate analysis examines the 
correlations between the dependent and the independent variables for each model 
separately with the Spearman’s rho correlations. Multivariate regression is used to test 
the hypothesis and allows the isolation the contribution of each independent variable to 
explaining the variation in the dependent variable by holding the effect of the other 
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variables constant. Regression analysis is based on a set of assumptions which have to 
be tested before the analysis in order to ensure the validity of the results and the 
inferences drawn from the analysis. The assumptions refer to the normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Various checks will be discussed to 
examine the data of this study against the assumptions of the OLS regression model. 
This section ends with a consideration of the selected estimation methods and the 
statistical justifications for this selection, including the fixed effect and random effect 
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Chapter Six: Impact of M&As Decisions on CEO 
Compensation 
6.1. Introduction 
The first objective in chapter 1 was to examine whether CEO compensation was 
correlated with M&As decisions. The hypothesis relating to the relationship between 
CEO compensation and M&As decisions was developed in chapter 3. The approach to 
testing these hypothesis was discussed in the chapter 4 (research methodology). The 
purpose of this current chapter is to present and discuss the results from the hypotheses 
testing as discussed in chapter 3.  
The chapter is structured as follows: In section 5.2, the dataset used in testing 
the hypotheses is presented to provide an overall picture of the data. In Section 5.3, the 
dataset was used to examine the distributions and undertake any transformations as 
necessary to meet the assumptions of the regression approach applied in the analysis. 
The results of univariate and multiple regression analysis are presented in section 5.4 
and section 5.5 respectively. Finally, section 5.6 summarises the chapter and provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
As explained in chapter 5, two samples were used in the analysis to examine 
whether CEO compensation was related to M&As decisions: A treatment sample and a 
control sample. The treatment sample included 369 Chinese listed firms that engaged 
in M&As between 2006-2013. The control firms were firms that did not engage in 
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M&As in the same period. The summary statistics are presented in Table 2.  
As can be seen from Table 2, the average CEO compensation among acquiring 
firms in the treatment sample was RMB 0.66 million, significantly larger than firms in 
the control sample at RMB 0.51million at the 1% level or better. The result was 
consistent with the outcome of Girma et al. (2006), Kumar et al. (2012), and Bugeja et 
al. (2012) that the average CEO compensation of acquiring firms was larger than non-
acquiring firms. Acquiring firms in the treatment sample were, on average, not 
significantly larger than firms in the control sample which comprised firms not involved 
in M&As as the T value of -1.37 shows. Firms in this study’s treatment sample had an 
average of RMB 14400.00 million in total book assets, while this figure was RMB 
10400.00 million for firms in the control sample. The result was consistent with the 
outcome of Kumar et al. (2012) and Bugeja et al. (2012) that the average firm size of 
acquiring firms was larger than non-acquiring firms.   
In terms of performance, firms in the control sample performed averagely better 
than those in the treatment sample, evidenced with sales growth, ROA, ROA growth, 
margin and market ratio. The mean of sales growth, ROA, ROA growth, margin, and 
market ratio in the treatment sample were 8.16, 0.04, 0.71, 0.16, and 2.31, while the 
figure in the control sample was 16.97, 2.28, 274.33, 12.42, and 2.38 respectively. 
However, there was no significant difference of mean in sales growth, ROA, ROA 
growth, margin, and market ratio as T values of 0.12, 0.18, 0.19, 0.19, and 0.08 
respectively illustrated. The result of ROA was consistent with the result of Kumar et 
al. (2012) and Bugeja et al. (2012) that the average of ROA in firms making M&As was 
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larger than those firms not involved in M&As. However, for margin growth and stock 
return, firms in the control sample averagely performed worse than those in the 
treatment sample. The mean of margin growth and stock return in the treatment sample 
was 1.56 and 0.53 while in the control sample it was -3.95 and 0.47 respectively, but 
the differences were not significant. The result of stock return was consistent with the 
result of Kumar et al. (2012) and Bugeja et al. (2012) that the average of stock return 
in firms making M&As was larger than those firms not involved in M&As.   
With regard to board characteristics, the summary statistics showed no 
significant differences between acquiring and non-acquiring firms. The average board 
size for Chinese listed firms in both the treatment and control sample was about 9, 
which was consistent with Chen et al. (2010) and smaller than the UK board size of 10 
(Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006), the US board size of 13 (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004), and 
larger than the Australian board size of 7 (Bugeja et al., 2012). On the whole, the size 
of boards in China was in line with those in other countries and consistent with the 
minimum size of the board required by the Corporate Governance Code in 2002 which 
was 5 members and a maximum of up to 19 members for listed firms. The average 
proportion of independent directors was 37% and 36% in the treatment and control 
samples respectively. This was consistent with Li et al. (2009), but the figures were 
smaller than the 55% in the UK market (e.g. Ozkan, 2007), and 78% in the US market 
(Conyon, 2015). This was consistent with the guidelines issued by CSRC in 2003 that 
Chinese listed firms must have at least one-third of the board members as independent 
directors. This suggests that Chinese boards of directors were less independent 
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compared to the UK and US. Consistent with Conyon and He (2012), the average 
supervisory board size was about 4 in both the treatment and control samples, much 
lower than about 8 in Germany (Andreas et al., 2012). This result was consistent with 
the Company Law requirement that the supervisory board should compose of not less 
than three supervisors. The descriptive results of board size, independent ratio, and 
supervisory board size above were completely consistent with the guidance and 
requirements of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and Company 
Law.  
The proportion of CEOs serving in dual capacity (i.e. board chair along with 
CEO) was both 13% in acquiring and non-acquiring firms; this finding was similar to 
that reported by Chen et al. (2009). However, this was larger than the figure of around 
6% in UK (Veprauskait & Adams, 2013) and considerably smaller than 79% in the US 
(Pathak et al., 2013). The lower proportion of CEO duality indicated the trend of 
splitting the positions of chairman and CEO in Chinese listed firms as CEO duality 
negatively influenced a firm’s efficiency (Yang et al., 2011). Similar to many western 
developed countries such as US, most of the listed firms in China have set up 
remuneration committees. In the sample, 97% of treatment firms and 92% of control 
firms had a remuneration committee. The higher proportion of remuneration 
committees showed that Chinese listed firms complied with recommendations of CSRC 
to set up a remuneration committee. Consistent with the phenomenon of concentrated 
ownership in China, the average sum ownership of the top five owners was 54% in the 
treatment sample and 50% in the control sample. The CEO shareholding was quite low 
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in China (Yang et al., 2011), at only 0.12% and 0.28% in this study’s treatment and 
control sample respectively, which was considerably lower than the 4.48% reported by 
Bugeja et al. (2012) in Australia, and 3% reported by Ozkan (2012) in UK. 
Finally, the proportion of politically connected CEOs was 19% in the treatment 
sample, which was higher than the 7% in control sample. The figure was a little lower 
than the 25% reported by Fan et al. (2007). 
 
 




Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics
Treatment Sample vs. Control Sample-Financial Characteristics, Governance, CEO Political connection 
Treatment sample Control sample
Mean Min Max 25th quartile Median 75th Quartile Std. Mean Min Max 25th quartile Median75th Quartile Std. T-test  (mean)
CEOCOM(¥ mil) 0.66 0.04 6.80 0.30 0.48 0.78 0.74 0.51 0.00 14.00 0.20 0.37 0.63 0.59 4.70***
Size (¥mil) 14400.00 33.00 1100000.00 1600.00 3300.00 8000.00 65300.00 10400.00 0.95 2200000.00 1200.00 2600.00 6200.00 54400.00 -1.37
Sales Growth 8.16 0.12 1498.16 1.01 1.20 1.49 88.95 16.97 -0.05 134608.00 0.97 1.11 1.28 1362.64 0.12
ROA 0.04 -0.42 0.47 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 2.28 -2146.16 23509.80 0.01 0.03 0.06 237.63 0.18
ROA Growth 0.71 -81.07 69.05 0.44 0.88 1.30 7.72   274.33 -492.37 2700000.00 0.35 0.89 1.25 27163.70 0.19
Margin 0.16 -1.18 3.30 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.27 12.42 -3366.03 116766.00 0.04 0.08 0.17 1183.22 0.19
Margin Growth 1.56 -34.88 92.53 0.61 0.99 1.32 6.51 -3.95 -91397.00 24300.10 0.55 0.93 1.19 967.94 -0.11
Stock Return 0.53 -0.80 11.85 -0.26 0.11 0.92 1.44 0.47 -0.86 16.12 -0.24 0.13 0.95 1.08 -0.91
marketratio 2.31 0.14 24.63 0.82 1.48 2.78 2.63 2.38 0.00 1657.03 0.77 1.37 2.46 17.81 0.08
Board Size 9.11 0.00 18.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 2.12 9.12 0.00 19.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 2.15 0.17
Independent Ratio 0.37 0.00 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.06 0.36 0.00 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.07 -1.60
Supervisory Size 3.94 0.00 9.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 1.32 3.96 0.00 13.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 1.38 0.25
Herfindahl5 0.54 0.15 1.49 0.41 0.53 0.66 0.18 0.50 0.02 1.92 0.37 0.49 0.60 0.17 -4.37
CEO Share 0.12 0.00 19.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 0.28 0.00 95.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.57 1.14
CEO Duality 0.13 0.13 -0.64
Remuneration 0.97 0.92 -3.86
Political CEO 0.17 0.09 -4.94
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of acquiring firms that completed their takeover bids during the financial years from 2006 to 2013 (treatment sample). The 
treatment sample includes 369 deals (firm-year) between companies listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Securities Exchange. Panel A presents a comparison of financial 
statistics between the treatment sample and control sample. All listed firms which were not involved in a merger and acquisition during the year are included in the control 
sample. There are 9,880 firm-year observations in the control sample over the period 2006-2013.
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To demonstrate how CEO compensation changed over time between the 
treatment and control sample, this study plotted the average total compensation paid to 
the CEOs in each sample in Table 3 and Figure 1. Generally, the average total CEO 
compensation for firms involved in M&As was higher than those firms in the control 
sample during the period 2006-2013. For example, the average CEO compensation of 
firms that completed an acquisition during the year increased from approximately RMB 
0.42 million in 2007 to RMB 0.68 million in 2012, with a peak of RMB 0.86 million in 
2010. In contrast, the average compensation paid to CEOs of firms in this study’s 
control sample was around RMB 0.38 million in 2007 and reached RMB 0.67 million 
in 2012. This result might indicate that higher CEO compensation occurred as a result 
of making M&As.  
 
Table 3 Average CEO Compensation 2006-2013 
year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Control sample 0.28 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.64 0.67 0.71
Treatment sample 0.24 0.42 0.73 0.53 0.86 0.81 0.68 0.67
Average CEO total compensation of treatment sample versus control sample − 2006−2013
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Average CEO total compensation of treatment sample versus control sample − 
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Table 4 and Figure 2 below show that the average total CEO compensation 
differed by industry type between 2006 and 2013 for the aggregate sample. The industry 
was based on 18 CSRC classifications of industries. The findings showed that CEOs in 
real estate obtained the highest average compensation compared with their counterparts 
in other industries, earning around RMB 0.82 million. On average, the CEOs who were 
awarded the lowest compensation of about RMB 0.28 million were in agriculture, 
forestry, livestock farming, and fishery. The CEOs were rewarded between RMB 0.5 
million and RMB 0.6 million in 10 industries (including mining, construction, 
wholesale and retail, transportation, information transmission, software and 
information technology service, leasing and commerce service, scientific research and 
technology service, resident service, repair and other service, hygienic and social work, 
culture, sports and entertainment), with the highest by around RMB 0.59 million in 
leasing and commerce service and the lowest by around RMB 0.51 million in resident 
service, repair, and other service. Furthermore, the CEOs were rewarded between RMB 
0.39 million and RMB 0.50 million in 6 industries (including manufacturing, utilities, 
hotel and catering industry, water conservancy, environment and public facilities 
management, education; comprehensive), with the highest by around RMB 0.49 million 
in water conservancy, environment and public facilities management and the lowest by 
around RMB 0.39 million in education. The descriptive analysis above indicates that 
there was a difference in CEO compensation in different industries. It is therefore 
necessary to control the factor of industry when examining the determination of CEO 
compensation. 
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Table 4 Average CEO total compensation by industry 
Industry CEOCOM (¥ million) 





Wholesale and retail 0.58 
Transportation 0.56 
Hotel and catering industry 0.42 
Information transmission, software and information 
technology service 
0.57 
Real estate 0.82 
Leasing and commerce service 0.59 
Scientific research and technology service 0.57 
Water conservancy, environment and public facilities 
management 
0.49 
Resident service, repair and other service 0.51 
Education 0.39 
Hygienism and social work 0.52 
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Figure 3 Average CEO total compensation by industry 
 
Note: 1= Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishery; 2= Mining; 3=Manufacturing; 4= Utilities; 5= Construction; 6= Wholesale and retail; 7= Transportation; 8= Hotel 
and catering industry; 9= Information transmission, software and information technology service; 10= Real estate; 11= Leasing and commerce service; 12= Scientific research 
and technology service; 13= Water conservancy, environment and public facilities management, 14= Resident service, repair and other service; 15= Education; 16= Hygienic 
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6.3. Normality Tests and Data Transformations 
The importance of data normality for regression analysis was discussed. This 
section reports the results of normality tests for both the dependent and the continuous 
independent variables. In order to test for deviations from normality, the Kolmogorv-
Smirnov (KS) test was carried out. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
statistically, data is considered to be normally distributed if the skewness value is ±1.96 
and the kurtosis value is within ± 3. For normally distributed data, the KS statistic would 
be insignificant (p>0.05).  
From Table 5, the results for skewness and kurtosis indicated that the variables 
were positively or rightly skewed except for margin growth, board size, independent 
ratio, and remuneration that were negatively or left skewed, and all variables were thus 
non-normally distributed. However, other checks were applied to confirm these 
findings. The results of Kolmogorv-Smirnov test in Table 5 confirmed that the 
assumption of normality was not met.  
Statistically, it is suggested that data transformation helps in overcoming the 
problem of non-normality and outliers by artificially making the data normally 
distributed. Although this technique could affect the output of the analysis by changing 
the fundamental nature of the information, which results in complicating any 
interpretation, it has been found that using this technique for improving the normality 
of data is a valuable statistical method (Osborne, 2002).  
The techniques used to reduce the influence of outliers are usually trimming and 
winsorizing data (e.g. Tabachinick & Fidell, 2007; Muino & Trombetta, 2009). 
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Consistent with previous literature (e.g. Bugeja et al., 2012), this study chose to 
winsorize data, because doing so reduces the influence of extreme values at both ends 
of the distribution without removing the observations, and so improves the distribution 
of data. The trimming method might remove some observations that contain important 
information. When data is winsorized, the top and bottom ends of the distribution are 
set equal to a specified percentile or value of the data. In this thesis, because of the 
outliers, the variables (sales growth, ROA, ROA growth, margin, margin growth, stock 
return, and CEO shareholding) were winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile; that is, 
values below the 5th were set to the value at the 5th percentile, and values above the 
95th percentile were set to the value at the 95th percentile. This study then used the 
natural logarithm of CEOCOM and size because of their positive skewness and strong 
deviation from normality. After transforming the data, the skewness and the kurtosis 
were close to ±1.96 and ± 3 respectively, as indicated in Panel B in table 5, which 
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Table 5 Data Transformations 
    Mean Median Std. Skew. Kurt. KS test 
Panel A: Untransformed variables           
CEOCOM (¥ mil) 0.52 0.37 0.60 5.84 69.42 0.00 
Size (¥ mil) 10600.00 2600.00 54800.00 21.67 636.22 0.00 
Sales growth 16.66 1.11 1337.99 99.46 9993.66 0.00 
ROA  2.20 0.03 233.31 99.74 10057.75 0.00 
ROA growth 264.48 0.89 26670.23 101.22 10246.64 0.00 
Margin  11.98 0.09 1161.73 99.20 9957.40 0.00 
Margin growth -3.75 0.93 950.35 -84.62 8397.75 0.00 
Stock return 0.48 0.13 1.10 2.36 15.13 0.00 
Market ratio  2.38 1.37 17.49 84.46 7852.68 0.00 
Board size  9.12 9.00 2.15 -0.10 6.97 0.00 
Independent ratio  0.36 0.33 0.07 -0.76 13.84 0.00 
Supervisory size  3.96 3.00 1.38 0.94 5.53 0.00 
Block share  0.50 0.50 0.17 0.56 4.97 0.00 
CEO share (% shareholding)  0.27 0.00 2.54 15.58 347.75 0.00 
CEO duality  0.13 0.00 0.33 2.24 6.01 0.00 
Remuneration  0.92 1.00 0.27 -3.08 10.47 0.00 
Political CEO    0.09 0.00 0.29 2.82 8.94 0.00 
Panel B: Transformed variables           
CEOCOM Ln 12.75 12.82 0.94 -0.44 4.00 0.00 
Size Ln 21.81 21.68 1.34 0.49 4.40 0.00 
Sales growth WS95 1.16 1.11 0.31 0.88 3.83 0.00 
ROA WS95 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.27 3.62 0.00 
ROA growth WS95 0.69 0.89 1.55 -1.30 6.17 0.00 
Margin WS95 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.83 3.86 0.00 
Margin growth WS95 0.77 0.93 0.97 -1.03 4.64 0.00 
Stock return WS95 0.29 0.04 0.81 0.97 2.97 0.00 
Market ratio WS95 1.88 1.37 1.52 1.36 4.09 0.00 
CEO share (% shareholding) WS95 0.01 0.00 0.02 3.31 12.72 0.00 
Notes: Ln means natural logarithm of the variables; WS95 means the variables were winsorized at the 
5th and 95th percentile that is values below the 5th were set to the value at the 5th percentile, and values 
above 95th percentile were set to the value at 95th percentile. 
 
6.4. Univariate Analysis 
This section presents the results of the univariate correlations investigation 
between CEO compensation and the independent variables. The correlation between 
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CEO compensation and each independent variable provided a first understanding of 
how each independent variable related to CEO compensation. In the previous section, 
the data was tested for normality and measures were taken, where appropriate, to obtain 
a more normal distribution of variables with normality violations, but not perfectly 
achieving normal distribution. Hence the analysis was carried out on the transformed 
variables using the Spearman’s rho correlations, which was appropriate for not perfectly 
normally distributed data (Field, 2009). Table 6 shows the Spearman’s rho correlations 
between the CEO compensation and the independent variables. 
Table 6 shows the correlations of CEO compensation with the M&As decision 
and other factors. CEO compensation presents a significant positive relationship with 
size, sales growth, ROA, ROA growth, margin, margin growth, board size, independent 
ratio, supervisory size, block share, CEO share, remuneration, political CEO and ACQ 
and Lag ACQ (p<0.01), and a significant negative relationship with stock return and 
market ratio (p<0.01). The CEO compensation was positively related to the M&As 
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Table 6 Correlations between CEO Compensation and other factors 
  CEOCOM 
Size 0.463*** 
Sales growth 0.089*** 
ROA 0.312*** 
ROA growth 0.134*** 
Margin 0.183*** 
Margin growth 0.135*** 
Stock return -0.120*** 
Market ratio -0.095*** 
Board size 0.084*** 
Independent ratio 0.024** 
Supervisory size 0.036*** 
Block share 0.133*** 
CEO share (%) 0.179*** 
CEO duality -0.005 
Remuneration 0.165*** 
Political CEO  0.077*** 
ACQ 0.062*** 
Lag ACQ 0.061*** 
***. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), **. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), * Significant at 
the 0.1 level. 
6.5. Multiple Regression Analysis  
While the correlation analysis provided some insights into the relationship 
between CEO compensation and the other factors, it cannot be concluded that 
relationships exist because the univariate analysis suffered from the omitted variables 
problem. In this case, the relationship observed might be a result of other variables not 
controlled for. In order to address this problem, multiple linear regression analysis was 
carried out.  
 
6.5.1. Regression Assumptions 
Multiple regression analysis is based on a number of assumptions to ensure 
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validity of the results. These assumptions were discussed in chapter 4, including 
normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Additionally, 
multicollinearity of the data has to be ruled out. To test whether these assumptions were 
met, numerical methods were used.  
For regression analysis, the main problem was the multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. In Table 7, the Spearman’s rho correlations among the 
independent variables are presented; the outcomes indicate that there were many 
significant relationships (p<.01) among the independent variables. Although the 
correlations were significant, all except margin growth and ROA growth (r= 0.741) 
were below 0.7. It is suggested that multicollinearity may damage or threaten regression 
analysis if the degree of correlation exceeds 80% (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 1995). 
Since all correlations are below the threshold benchmark in Table 8, multicollinearity 
was not considered to be a big problem. In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
for each independent variable were computed and analysed. The VIFs for all 
independent variables were far below the critical value of 10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996), suggesting that multicollinearity was not a major problem. Considering the 
strong relationship between ROA growth and margin growth, this study would not put 
them in the same regression model.  
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Table 7 The Spearman’s rho correlations for Model 1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Size (1) 1.000
Sales Growth (2) 0.103*** 1.000
ROA (3) 0.117*** 0.305*** 1.000
ROA Growth (4) 0.099*** 0.254*** 0.430*** 1.000
Margin (5) 0.115*** 0.180*** 0.681*** 0.274*** 1.000
Margin Growth (6) 0.103*** 0.056*** 0.375*** 0.741*** 0.319*** 1.000
Stock Return (7) -0.157*** 0.066*** 0.088*** 0.165*** 0.068*** 0.168*** 1.000
Market Ratio (8) -0.529*** 0.108*** 0.338*** 0.078*** 0.189*** 0.062*** 0.431*** 1.000
CEO Duality (9) -0.063*** -0.018* -0.007 0.001 -0.014 0.003 0.003 0.047*** 1.000
Board Size (10) 0.175*** 0.042*** 0.024** 0.016 0.028*** 0.017* -0.020** -0.076*** -0.110*** 1.000
Supervisory Size (11) 0.127*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.020** 0.017* 0.014 -0.009 -0.068*** -0.099*** 0.340*** 1.000
Independent Ratio (12) 0.025** -0.007 -0.000 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.020** -0.228*** -0.033*** 1.000
Remuneration (13) 0.115*** 0.020** 0.040*** -0.012 0.028*** -0.014 -0.125*** 0.025** -0.004 0.028*** 0.017* -0.009 1.000
CEO Share (14) 0.114*** 0.022** 0.120*** 0.067*** 0.034*** 0.072*** -0.002 -0.020** 0.043*** 0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.000 1.000
Block Share (15) 0.295*** 0.116*** 0.194*** 0.055*** 0.126*** 0.055*** -0.006 -0.052*** -0.073*** 0.086*** 0.064*** 0.017* -0.019** -0.140*** 1.000
Political CEO (16) 0.074*** 0.029*** 0.070*** 0.020** 0.102*** 0.031*** -0.015 0.002 0.056*** -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.033*** 1.000
ACQ (17) 0.035*** 0.054*** 0.038*** 0.007 0.043*** 0.028*** -0.012 0.015 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.017* 0.038*** -0.002 0.040*** 0.049*** 1.000
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Table 8 VIF Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ROA 2.5 0.4 
ROA growth 2.13 0.47 
Margin growth 2.05 0.49 
Market ratio 2.03 0.49 
Margin 1.85 0.54 
Size 2.17 0.46 
Stock return 1.28 0.78 
Board size 1.24 0.81 
Supervisory size 1.23 0.81 
Block share 1.24 0.8 
Sales growth 1.14 0.88 
Remuneration 1.01 0.99 
CEO duality 1.02 0.98 
Political CEO  1.02 0.98 
ACQ 1.01 0.99 
Independent ratio 1.02 0.98 
Lag ACQ 1.01 0.99 
Mean VIF 1.4   
 
With respect to the assumption of homoscedasticity, the widely-used Breusch-
Pagan test (Null hypothesis: Constant variance) and White tests (Null hypothesis: 
homoscedasticity) were employed to detect the problem of heteroscedasticity. The 
findings of both tests illustrated that the problem of heteroscedasticity existed (Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000) in model 1(1), model 1(2) and model 1(3). In addition, a Wooldridge 
test was used in this study since it is the most common technique employed to detect 
autocorrelation for panel data. The results of this test showed that the assumption of 
independence of the error terms was met in model 1(1) and model 1(2), but not met in 
model 1(3). In the presence of panel data sets, it was suggested that it was necessary to 
account for individual effects (unobserved heterogeneity). In order to deal with this 
problem, individual effects models, by estimating either the Fixed Effects or Random 
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Effects Model, were considered for panel data analysis. 
To justify this choice statistically, research in economics usually utilises the 
Hausman test (e.g. McKnight & Weir, 2009). The Hausman test (1978) is used to 
statistically make the choice between Fixed Effects or Random Effects Model, and 
works by facilitating the differentiation between these two approaches by examining 
for correlations. The results of this test can be interpreted as follows. If the correlation 
between X variables and εi is found to be: 
i.Significant or less than 0.05, then the fixed effect approach is preferred. 
ii.Insignificant or more than 0.05, then the random effect approach is 
preferred. 
Therefore, under the Hausman specification test, the assumptions for the choice 
of (1) the fixed effect approach was that the X variables must be significantly correlated 
to the unobserved heterogeneity, and (2) the random effect approach was that the X 
variables must be insignificantly correlated to the unobserved heterogeneity. According 
to this test, the results of (Prob>chi2 = 0.0000) indicated that the fixed effect model was 
preferred for the model 1(1) and model 1(2) and model 1(3). However, the problems of 
heteroscedasticity cannot be handled using the Fixed Effects Model. To address the 
problem arising from heteroscedasticity in model 1(1) and model 1(2); t-statistics in the 
current study were computed with White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance as it dealt with the problem of errors that were not identically distributed. 
Fixed effect (robust) regression becomes the main regression for model 1(1) and model 
1(2). 
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For model 1(3), the problem of autocorrelation cannot be handled using the 
Fixed Effects Model. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested that SGMM was a better 
estimation method to address the problem of autocorrelation and unobservable fixed 
effect problems for the dynamic panel data model. Thus SGMM becomes the main 
regression for model 1(3). 
 
6.5.2. Multivariate Analysis: CEO Compensation and M&As Decisions 
This section tests whether CEO compensation in Chinese listed firms was 
related to M&As decisions in a multivariate setting, with industry controls. The industry 
was based on 18 CSRC classifications of industries. The analysis used Fixed Effect 
Regression with robust standard errors. The results are reported in Table 9.  
Table 9 presents that the R2 of 0.206 suggest that the model 1(1) or the equation 
had a good fit. The results of model 1(1) show that size was positively related to CEO 
compensation, significant at level 0.01. There was a significantly positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and ROA, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The 
market ratio was positively related to CEO compensation, significant at the 0.01 level. 
The acquisition dummy was positively correlated to the CEO compensation significant 
at the 0.01 level.  
Model 1(2) showed the empirical results of Fixed Effect Regression (robust) of 
CEO pay against M&As activity controlling other factors. Two separate sub-models 
were created to deal with the multicollinearity problem between ROA growth and 
margin growth for Model 1(2). They both considered the industries effect on CEO 
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compensation. The R2 of 0.231 and 0.232 respectively in two sub-models suggested that 
the model or the equation had a good fit.  
The results of model 1(2) showed that size was positively related to CEO 
compensation, significant at level 0.01 in two sub-models. The coefficients on sales 
growth were negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 levels in both ROA growth 
and margin growth models after controlling the industry effect. There was a 
significantly positive relationship between the CEO compensation and ROA, 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. The coefficient of the 
margin was negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level in two sub-models, 
also the stock return was negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in two 
sub-models. There was a positive relationship between CEO compensation and market 
ratio, significant at 0.01 levels in two sub-models. The coefficients on acquisition were 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. Also, the 
coefficients on lag acquisition were positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 levels 
in both ROA growth and margin growth models after controlling the industry effect.  
Model 1(3) shows the main regression (SGMM) of CEO compensation on 
M&As decisions after controlling other factors. Two separate sub-models were created 
to deal with the multicollinearity problem between ROA growth and margin growth for 
Model 1(3) controlling the industries effect. 
The current study performed several specification tests for the dynamic GMM 
estimation framework. Specifically, if the assumptions of the GMM IV estimator were 
valid, then the residuals in the first differences (AR (1)) should be correlated but there 
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should be no serial correlation in the second differences (AR (2)). Using the test 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), the current study was unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that there was zero autocorrelation in the second differences for the CEO 
compensation in two sub-models (p-value: 0.464 and 0.527). Next, the Hansen test was 
applied for the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions from the use of 
multiple lags as instruments. The author does not reject the null hypothesis of the 
validity of instruments for CEO compensation (p-value: 0.269 and 0.397) for two-sub 
models of model 1(3) that are controlling the industries effect. The p-value of the 
Hansen test should be a higher value than the conventional significance level of 0.05 or 
0.10, at least as high as 0.25 is suggested by Roodman (2007), otherwise it would be a 
concern. Hence, the two sub-models of model 1(3) that controlled the industries effects 
are the appropriate models.  
Similar to model 1(1) and model 1(2), the coefficient of the size variable in 
model 1(3) was significantly positive across all specifications, significant at the 0.01 
level in two sub-models. There was a significantly positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and ROA, statistically significant at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. 
The coefficients of the margin and stock return were negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. The coefficient of the CEO shareholding 
was positive and significant at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. The block shareholding 
was positively related to the CEO compensation at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. 
Also, the coefficients on acquisition dummy were positive and statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level in two sub-models. Margin growth was positively related to the CEO 
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Table 9 The determinants of CEO compensation in Chinese firms: M&As Activity and other 
Factors 
  Model1(1) Model1(2) Model1(3) 
    ROA Growth Margin Growth ROA Growth Margin Growth 
  CEOCOM CEOCOM CEOCOM CEOCOM CEOCOM 
Market ratio 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.01 
 -9.55 -14.16 -14.24 -0.80 -1.10 
Size 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 -23.27 -23.71 -23.68 -4.15 -4.28 
Sales growth -0.06** -0.06** 0.01 0.01 
  (-2.56) (-2.43) -0.26 -0.5 
ROA 1.94*** 2.77*** 2.75*** 2.91*** 2.81*** 
 -9.33 -7.18 -7.24 -5.60 -5.80 
ROA growth 0.004  0.01  
  -0.76  -1.02  
Margin  -0.44*** -0.45*** -0.59*** -0.59*** 
  (-3.11) (-3.15) (-3.44) (-3.56) 
Stock return -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
  (-13.12) (-13.26) (-3.94) (-4.17) 
CEO duality   -0.02 -0.01 
    (-0.47) (-0.23) 
Board size   0.01 0.02 
    -1.33 -1.63 
Supervisory size   -0.003 -0.005 
    (-0.35) (-0.56) 
Independent ratio   0.08 0.002 
    -0.37 -0.01 
Remuneration   -0.02 -0.01 
    (-0.34) (-0.14) 
CEO share   2.86*** 2.77*** 
    -4.27 -4.17 
Block share   0.39*** 0.38*** 
    -2.98 -2.93 
Political CEO    -0.02 -0.02 
    (-0.21) (-0.20) 
ACQ 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 -4.10 -4.01 -3.98 -2.83 -2.86 
Lag ACQ  0.07* 0.07* -0.02 -0.02 
  -1.92 -1.93 (-0.69) (-0.67) 
Margin growth  0.01  0.02* 
   -1.36  -1.78 
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Lagged dependent variables included  Yes Yes 
Industry included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 1.27** 1.49*** 1.49*** 2.70*** 2.76*** 
 -2.54 -3.12 -3.13 -7.95 -8.19 
R-sq 0.21 0.23 0.23   
N 10249 10249 10249 6147 6147 
MA (1) (p-value)   0 0 
MA (2) (p-value)   0.46 0.53 
Hansen test (p-value)     0.27 0.39 
***. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), **. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), * Significant at 
the 0.1 level. 
 
6.5.3. Discussion of Results 
The acquisition dummy showed a significant positive association with CEO 
compensation in model 1 (1), (2), and (3) (p<0.01). Hence Hypothesis 1 was supported, 
that the M&As decisions were positively correlated to CEO compensation. The main 
findings were consistent with those by, for instance, Grinstein and Hribar (2004), 
Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), Guest (2009), and Bugeja et al. (2012). This suggests 
that in model 1 (1), after controlling for size, market ratio, and ROA, acquiring firms 
paid higher CEO total compensation for acquisitions in the year of completing the 
M&As; in model 1(2) after controlling for size, market ratio, ROA, ROA growth, 
margin, margin growth, sales growth, and stock return, acquiring firms paid higher CEO 
total compensation for acquisitions in the year of completing M&As and one year after; 
in model 1(3), after controlling for variables of size, market ratio, ROA, ROA growth, 
margin, margin growth, sales growth, stock return, board size, independent ratio, 
supervisory size, block share, CEO share, remuneration, and political CEO, acquiring 
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firms paid higher CEO total compensation for acquisitions in the year of completing 
M&As, but not one year after. The non-significant relationship between the lag 
acquisition dummy and CEO compensation in model 1(3) might be as a result of the 
consideration of more corporate governance factors and the endogeneity problem with 
GMM methods.  
The significantly positive results reflected the phenomenon in China that CEOs 
of acquiring firms were on average awarded higher compensation following completion 
of acquisitions in the context of large amount of M&As deals produced following the 
Non-tradable Share Reform in April 2005. Also, the results were consistent with the 
argument by Zhang and Guo (2007) that CEOs owned the rights to execute M&As deals, 
which was the most important strategy of a firm’s resource allocation. The lack of 
efficient long-term incentive makes CEOs concentrate on how to increase cash 
compensation which was rewarded to CEOs that directly related to a firm’s profit and 
complexity of operation. M&As would bring firms complexity of operation. Therefore, 
making M&As has been the preferable way for CEOs to expand their compensation.   
In terms of the control variables of a firm’s performance, the coefficient of the 
size variable was positive across all specifications, suggesting that larger firms were 
more complex to operate and prone to pay higher CEO compensation (see Conyon, 
2014). The findings were consistent with those by, for instance, Core et al. (1999), 
Conyon et al. (2009), and Cadman (2010). There was a positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and ROA. The findings were consistent with those by, for instance, 
Grinstein and Hribar, (2004), Cadman et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2010), Wang et al. 
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(2011), Bugeja et al. (2012), and Conyon and He (2012), and the results suggested that 
firms would pay their CEOs more total cash compensation if they achieved a superior 
higher ROA. There was no significantly positive relationship between ROA growth and 
CEO compensation, which was consistent with findings by Grinstein and Hribar (2004) 
and Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006). The coefficient of the market ratio variable was 
positive, implying that firms would pay their CEOs more total cash compensation if 
they achieved a superior higher market ratio. The findings were consistent with those 
by, for instance, Murphy and Sandino (2010) and Conyon and He (2012). There was no 
significantly positive relationship between sales growth and CEO compensation in 
model 1(3) that was consistent with those by, for instance, Grinstein and Hribar (2004), 
Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), and Bugeja et al. (2012). The margin had a strong 
negative correlation with CEO compensation, implying firms would pay their CEOs 
more total cash compensation if they achieved a lower margin. The findings were not 
consistent with Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), or Bugeja 
et al. (2012). The margin had no strong positive correlation with CEO compensation in 
model 1(2), which was consistent with the findings of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and 
Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006). Stock return had strong negative correlations with CEO 
compensation, implying firms would pay their CEOs more total cash compensation if 
the stock returns decreased. 
In terms of the control variables of corporate governance, there was no 
significant relationship between variables of CEO duality, board size, remuneration, 
supervisory board size, and independent ratio and CEO compensation. The findings 
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were consistent with those by, for instance, Wintoki (2007), Li et al. (2007), Buck et al. 
(2008), Liang et al. (1999), Chen et al., (2010), Ding et al., (2010), Wan (2009), Conyon 
and He (2012), and Li et al. (2006). The results showed that these corporate governance 
mechanisms did not have a significant influence on CEO compensation in Chinese 
listed firms. However, the variable of CEO share had a strongly positive influence on 
CEO compensation, at the 0.01 significant levels. The finding was consistent with those 
by, for instance, Mehran (1995), Cyert et al. (2002), Li et al. (2007), and Chen et al. 
(2010). The result was consistent with the argument by, for instance, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989), that increasing stock ownership gave managers more control and 
power to enhance their pay. The block share was positively correlated to CEO 
compensation, at significant levels of 0.01, which was not consistent with previous 
findings that the block share was negatively correlated to CEO compensation, 
indicating that the block share might not be an effective monitoring mechanism in 
Chinese listed firms. In addition, the variable of political CEO had no strong influence 
on CEO compensation, showing that the CEO with a political background might not 
have a strong impact on CEO compensation.  
Overall, in response to the first objective of whether CEO compensation was 
correlated with M&As decisions, the empirical analysis results provided above show 
that CEO compensation in Chinese firms was related to M&As completion when 
controlling factors as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Also, CEO compensation in 
Chinese firms was related to M&As completion when controlling other corporate 
governance factors and factors related to the Chinese institutional environment, e.g. a 
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CEO’s political connections. 
 
6.6. Summary 
The main purpose of this chapter was to test the hypotheses relating to the 
relationship between CEO compensation and M&As. Before presenting the discussion 
of empirical findings, the data description was presented to provide an overall picture 
of the data. The dataset was then used to examine the distributions and undertake any 
transformations as necessary to meet the assumptions of the regression approach 
applied in the analysis. The results of univariate and multiple regression analysis are 
presented as follows. 
In terms of data description, the treatment sample and a control sample were 
used in the analysis. Generally, the average executive compensation and firm size in 
acquiring firms in the treatment sample was significantly larger than firms in the control 
sample. Furthermore, the current study did not observe significant differences between 
acquiring and non-acquiring firms in terms of board and CEO characteristics. For 
example, board size, the number of independent director, supervisory board size, and 
the ratio of CEO duality in both the treatment and control sample was nearly the same. 
The descriptive results of board characteristics were consistent with the guidance of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and Company Law.  
The importance of data normality for regression analysis was discussed. In order 
to test for deviations from normality, the Kolmogorv-Smirnov (KS) test was carried out. 
The results of the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test confirmed that the assumption of normality 
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for all variables was not completely met. Statistically, it is suggested that data 
transformation helps in overcoming the problem of non-normality and outliers, thus 
improving the normality of data. Consistent with previous literature, this study chose 
to winsorize data, because to do so reduces the influence of extreme values at both ends 
of the distribution without removing the observations, and so improves the distribution 
of data. In this thesis, because of the outliers, the variables (sales growth, ROA, ROA 
growth, margin, margin growth, stock return, and CEO shareholding) were winsorized 
at the 5th and 95th percentile. Also, the natural logarithm of CEO compensation and 
size was used because of their positive skewness and strong deviation from the 
normality. After transforming the data, the skewness and the kurtosis were close to the 
requirements, improving the normality.  
After transforming the data, the univariate correlations between CEO 
compensation and the independent variables were examined and have provided a first 
understanding of how each independent variable relates to CEO compensation. They 
were carried out on the transformed variables using the Spearman’s rho correlations, 
which was appropriate for not perfectly normally distributed data. The results showed 
the correlations of CEO compensation with M&As decisions and other factors. The 
CEO compensation presented a significant positive relationship with size, sales growth, 
ROA, ROA growth, margin, margin growth, board size, independent ratio, supervisory 
size, block share, CEO share, remuneration, political CEO and ACQ and Lag ACQ, and 
a significant negative relationship with stock return and market ratio. Importantly, CEO 
compensation was positively related to the M&As decisions, indicating that the CEOs 
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of firms involved in M&As were rewarded higher compensation from univariate 
analysis.   
Multiple regression analysis is based on a number of assumptions in order to 
ensure validity of the results. These assumptions include normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Additionally, multicollinearity of 
the data has to be ruled out. To test whether these assumptions were met, numerical 
methods were used. For the multicollinearity problem, the outcomes of Spearman’s rho 
correlations and the variance inflation factors (VIFs) indicated the high correlation in 
margin growth and ROA growth. Considering the multicollinearity problem, ROA 
growth and margin growth was separately put into two models. In terms of the 
assumption of homoscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan test and White tests were used to 
detect the problem of heteroscedasticity in this study. The findings of both tests 
illustrated that the problem of heteroscedasticity existed in model 1(1), model 1(2) and 
model 1(3). In addition, a Wooldridge test was used in this study since it is the most 
common technique for detecting the problem of autocorrelation for panel data. The 
results of this test showed that the assumption of independence of the error terms was 
met in model 1(1) and model 1(2), but was not met in model 1(3). Based on the results 
of tests for assumptions, the fixed effect (robust) regression became the main regression 
for model 1(1) and model 1(2) as it could address the problem arising from 
heteroscedasticity in model 1(1) and model 1(2). As a result of the problem of 
autocorrelation, the SGMM method was suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) to 
address problems in dynamic panel data model.   
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After the methods were decided, the multivariate analysis was developed to 
address the first hypothesis of this study, of whether CEO compensation in Chinese 
listed firms was related to M&As decisions after controlling other factors. The results 
showed that M&As decisions were positively correlated to CEO compensation, 
indicating that Chinese acquiring firms paid higher CEO total compensation for 
acquisitions in the year of completing the M&As after controlling firm size, corporate 
performance, and corporate governance characteristics.   
The main findings were consistent with those by, for instance, Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004), Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), Guest (2009), and Bugeja et al. (2012). 
The results reflected the phenomenon in China that CEOs of acquiring firms were, on 
average, awarded higher compensation following the completion of acquisitions in the 
context of large amounts of M&As deals produced following the Non-tradable Share 
Reform in April 2005. Also the results were consistent with the argument by Zhang and 
Guo (2007) that CEOs owned the rights to execute M&As deal, which was the most 
important strategy of a firm’s resource allocation. The lack of efficient long-term 
incentive made CEOs concentrate on how to increase cash compensation. The cash 
compensation rewarded to CEOs was directly related to the firm’s profit and complexity 
of operation. M&As would bring firms complexity of operation, therefore, making 
M&As has been the preferable way for CEOs to expand their compensation.   
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Chapter Seven: Determination of CEO 
Compensation Following M&As 
7.1. Introduction 
In chapter 1, the second objective was to examine the factors influencing the 
determination of the CEO compensation following M&As in Chinese firms. The 
hypotheses detailing the relationship between CEO compensation and the factors were 
developed in chapter 4. The approach to testing these hypotheses was discussed in 
chapter 5 (research methodology). The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss 
the results from the hypotheses testing as discussed in chapter 4.  
The chapter is structured as follows: In section 7.2 the dataset used in testing 
the hypotheses is presented to provide an overall picture of the data. In section 7.3, the 
dataset used to examine the distributions and undertake any transformations as 
necessary to meet the assumptions of the regression approach applied in the analysis. 
Both the results of univariate and multivariate analyses are presented in section 7.4 and 
the findings discussed in section 7.5. In section 7.6, robustness checks are undertaken. 
Finally, section 7.7 summarises the chapter and provides concluding remarks. 
 
7.2. Descriptive Statistics  
As explained in chapter 4, two samples were used in the analysis: A treatment 
sample and a control sample. The treatment sample included 369 M&As deals that 
Chinese listed firms engaged in during the period 2006-2013. The control firms were 
those companies that did not engage in M&As in the same period. Although the 
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summarised statistics of variables for model 1 in the treatment and control sample have 
been presented in chapter six, the summarised statistics of other variables for model 2 
in the treatment sample should be discussed in this chapter. Table 10 below presents the 
summarised statistics of other important variables for model 2.  
From Table 10 below, the average state controller in acquiring firms in the 
treatment sample is 62%, which showed that 62% of firms have the state as the largest 
shareholder, while the average foreign controller in acquiring firms in the treatment 
sample was 2%, which showed that 2% of firms had a foreign entity as the largest 
shareholder. The findings were approximately consistent with the 55% of state 
controllers and 2% of foreign controllers from 2000-2010 reported by Conyon and He 
(2012). In terms of the M&As characteristics, the average deal size was around RMB 
992 million, while the median figure was approximately RMB 234 million. The deal 
size was lower than developed western countries such as the UK (£254 million), US 
(£804 million) (Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006), and Australia with $344 million (Bugeja 
et al., 2012). The market averagely reacted quite positively to the M&As announcement, 
having a positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 0.03 over the event window, 
three days surrounding the announcement [−1,1], which was consistent with the 
findings of positive cumulative abnormal return in Asian countries, particularly in 
China (Ma et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2009), but not completely consistent with the mixed 
findings of western countries; some obtained the positive cumulative abnormal return, 
but others obtained a negative cumulative abnormal return (e.g. Moeller et al., 2003; 
Gaughan, 2005; Girma et al., 2006 ). 
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Table 10 Descriptive Statistics 
Treatment Sample - Financial characteristics, Governance, Political connection and M&As characteristics 
  Mean Min Max 25th quartile Median 75th Quartile Std. 
Financial Characteristics               
Size (¥mil) 14400.00 33.00 1100000.00 1600.00 3300.00 8000.00 65300.00 
ROA 0.04 -0.42 0.47 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 
Stock return 0.53 -0.80 11.85 -0.26 0.11 0.92 1.44 
Board and CEO Characteristics         
Board size 9.11 0 18 9 9 10 2.12 
Independent director ratio 0.37 0 0.6 0.33 0.33 0.4 0.06 
Supervisory size 3.94 0 9 3 3 5 1.32 
CEO duality 0.13       
Remuneration committee 0.97       
Ownership Characteristics           
Block shareholder 0.54 0.15 1.49 0.41 0.53 0.66 0.18 
CEO shareholding 0.12 0 19.73 0 0 0 1.16 
State controller 0.62       
Foreign controller 0.02       
Political connection           
Political CEO  0.17       
M&As characteristics           
Deal size(¥mil) 992 0.13 17300 57.1 234 822 2180 
CAR (-1,1) 0.03 -0.17 3.94 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.22 
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7.3. Normality Tests and Data Transformations 
This section reports the results of the normality tests for both the dependent and 
the continuous independent variables for model 2. As discussed in the methodology 
chapter, in order to test for deviations from normality, skewness and kurtosis would be 
considered and the Kolmogorv-Smirnov (KS) test was carried out. From table 11, the 
results for skewness and kurtosis indicated that the variables were positively or right 
skewed, except for the ROA, board size and independent ratio that was negatively or 
left skewed, and all variables were thus non-normally distributed. However, other 
checks were applied to confirm these findings. The results of the Kolmogorv-Smirnov 
test in table 10 confirmed that the assumption of normality was not met.  
As discussed in the methodology chapter, data transformation assists in 
overcoming the problem of non-normality and outliers by artificially making the data 
normally distributed, and it has been found that using this technique for improving the 
normality of data is a valuable statistical method. Winsorizing was chosen as the 
technique to transform the data for this study. When data is winsorized, the top and 
bottom ends of the distribution are set equal to a specified percentile or value of the 
data. In this thesis, the variables (CAR (-1,1), ROA, stock return, CEO shareholding) 
were winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile; that is, values below the 5th were set to 
the value at the 5th percentile, and values above 95th percentile were set to the value at 
the 95th percentile. This study then used a natural logarithm of CEOCOM and size 
because of their positive skewness and strong deviation from normality. After 
transforming the data, the skewness and the kurtosis were close to ±1.96 and ± 3 
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respectively, as indicated in Panel B in Table 11, which improved the normality. 
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Table 11 Data Transformations 




CEOCOM (¥ mil) 0.66 0.04 6.80 0.30 0.48 0.78 0.74 4.33 28.14 0.000 
Size (¥mil) 14400.00 33.00 110000.00 1600.00 3300.00 8000.00 65300.00 13.53 214.00 0.000 
ROA 0.04 -0.42 0.47 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 -0.53 17.87 0.000 
Stock return 0.53 -0.80 11.85 -0.26 0.11 0.92 1.44 3.82 24.91 0.000 
Board size 9.11 0.00 18.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 2.12 -0.01 6.54 0.000 
Independent ratio 0.37 0.00 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.06 -0.35 13.35 0.000 
Supervisory size 3.94 0.00 9.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 1.32 0.74 3.68 0.000 
CEO duality 0.13          
Remunication 0.97          
Block share 0.54 0.15 1.49 0.41 0.53 0.66 0.18 0.69 5.08 0.000 
CEO share 0.12 0.00 19.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 14.22 228.01 0.000 
State controller 0.62          
Foreign controller 0.02          
Political CEO  0.17          
Deal size (¥mil) 992.00 0.13 17300.00 57.10 234.00 822.00 2180.00 4.59 28.99 0.000 




CEOCOM Ln 13.05 10.52 15.74 12.61 13.07 13.56 0.82 -0.06 3.93 0.173 
Size Ln 22.04 17.31 27.73 21.19 21.92 22.80 1.41 0.46 4.13 0.008 
Deal Size (¥mil) Ln 8.34 5.13 10.24 7.76 8.37 8.91 0.84 -0.24 2.96 0.767 
CAR (-1,1) WS95 0.02 -0.06 0.14 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.60 2.63 0.054 
ROA WS95 0.04 -0.04 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.34 3.20 0.001 
Stock return WS95 0.40 -0.67 2.64 -0.26 0.11 0.92 0.91 1.06 3.22 0.000 
CEO share WS95 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 3.17 11.76 0.000 
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Notes: Ln means natural logarithm of the variables; WS95 means the variables were winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile that is values below the 5th were set to the value 
at the 5th percentile, and values above 95th percentile were set to the value at 95th percentile. 
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7.4. Univariate Analysis 
This section presents the results of investigating the univariate correlations 
between CEO compensation and the independent variables for model 2. The correlation 
between CEO compensation and each independent variable provided a first 
understanding of how each independent variable related to CEO compensation. In the 
previous section, the data was tested for normality and measures were taken, where 
appropriate, to obtain a more normal distribution of variables with normality violations, 
but not perfectly achieving normal distribution. Hence the analysis was carried out on 
the transformed variables using the Spearman’s rho correlations, which was appropriate 
for not perfectly normally distributed data (Field, 2009). Table 12 shows the 
Spearman’s rho correlations between the CEO compensation and the independent 
variables. 
Table 12 shows correlations between CEO compensation and other factors 
following M&As. CEO compensation presented a significant positive relationship with 
size, ROA, block share, CEO share, political CEO, and deal size (p<0.01), and a 
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Table 12 Correlations between CEO Compensation and Other Factors Following M&As 
  CEOCOM 
Size 0.465*** 
ROA 0.271*** 
Stock return -0.127** 
Board size 0.108** 
Independent ratio -0.062 
Supervisory size 0.065 
Block share 0.226*** 
State controller 0.013 
Foreign controller 0.202 
CEO share (%) 0.165*** 
CEO duality 0.072 
Remuneration 0.077 
Political CEO  0.196*** 
CAR (-1,+1) -0.003 
Deal size 0.138*** 
 
7.5. Multiple Regression Analysis  
While the correlation analysis provided some insights into the relationship 
between CEO compensation and other factors, one cannot conclude that relationships 
exist because the univariate analysis suffered from the omitted variables problem. In 
this case, the relationship observed might be a result of other variables not controlled 
for. In order to address this problem, multiple linear regression analysis was carried out.  
 
7.5.1. Regression Assumptions 
Multiple regression analysis is based on a number of assumptions to ensure 
validity of the results. These assumptions were discussed in chapter 4 including 
normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Additionally, 
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multicollinearity of the data has to be ruled out. To test whether these assumptions were 
met, numerical methods were used.  
For regression analysis, the main concern was multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. In Table 13, the Spearman’s rho correlations between the 
independent variables for model 2 identified whether a multicollinearity problem was 
presented. In Table 13, the outcomes indicated that there were many significant 
relationships (p<.01) among the independent variables. Although the correlations were 
significant, all were below 0.7 in model 2. Statistically, it was suggested that 
multicollinearity could damage or threaten regression analysis if the degree of 
correlation exceeded 80% (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 1995). Therefore, 
multicollinearity was not considered to be a big problem. In addition, the current study 
also computed and examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each independent 
variable of model 2. The VIFs for all independent variables were far below the critical 
value of 10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), suggesting multicollinearity was not a major 
problem.  
With respect to the assumption of homoscedasticity, the widely-used Breusch-
Pagan test (Null hypothesis: Constant variance) and White tests (Null hypothesis: 
homoscedasticity) were employed to detect the problem of heteroscedasticity. The 
findings of both tests illustrated that the problem of heteroscedasticity existed (Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000) in model 2 (1) and model 2 (2). In addition, a Wooldridge test was used 
in this study since it is the most common technique employed to detect the problem of 
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autocorrelation for panel data. The results of this test showed that the assumption of 
independence of the error terms was met in model 2 (1) and model 2 (2). 
In the presence of cross-sectional data sets, it is suggested the OLS estimates 
could be used for model 2. However, the problems of heteroscedasticity could not be 
handled using the OLS estimates. To address the problem arising from 
heteroscedasticity model 2 (1) and model 2 (2), t-statistics in the current study were 
computed with White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance. This dealt 
with the problem of errors that were not identically distributed. The OLS (robust) 
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Table 13 Spearman’s rho Correlations among Independent Variables Model 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Size (1) 1.000
ROA (2) 0.024 1.000
Stock Return (3) -0.195*** 0.057 1.000
Board Size (4) 0.140*** 0.040 0.022 1.000
Independent Ratio (5) 0.056 -0.067 0.002 -0.291*** 1.000
Supervisory Size (6) 0.110** -0.034 -0.067 0.427*** -0.083 1.000
Block Share (7) 0.303*** 0.343*** -0.099* 0.052 0.001 0.032 1.000
CEO Share (8) 0.096* 0.093* 0.004 0.060 -0.097* 0.017 -0.036 1.000
CEO Duality (9) 0.046 0.052 0.000 0.004 -0.043 0.034 0.126** 0.094* 1.000
Remuneration (10) 0.048 -0.074 -0.128** 0.014 0.023 0.059 0.043 -0.052 0.065 1.000
Political CEO (11) 0.157*** 0.111** -0.095* 0.035 -0.102* 0.058 0.104** 0.060 0.132** 0.029 1.000
CAR(-1,+1) (12) 0.050 -0.063 0.024 0.053 -0.054 -0.003 0.029 -0.046 -0.040 -0.061 0.005 1.000
Deal size (13) 0.353*** 0.174*** -0.153*** 0.013 0.001 -0.005 0.325*** -0.055 0.070 0.042 0.034 0.042 1.000
State Controller (14) 0.196*** -0.068 -0.017 0.157*** -0.034 0.084 0.047 0.030 -0.090* 0.066 0.101* 0.025 0.084 1.000
Foreign Controller (15) -0.001 0.074 0.014 -0.031 0.051 -0.006 0.082 0.042 -0.050 0.021 0.058 0.018 0.031 -0.112** 1.000  
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Table 14 VIF test for Model 2 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.4 0.71 
Block share 1.37 0.73 
Board size 1.36 0.74 
Supervisory size 1.33 0.75 
Deal size 1.23 0.81 
ROA 1.2 0.83 
State controller 1.11 0.9 
CEO share 1.11 0.9 
Stock return 1.1 0.91 
CEO duality 1.09 0.92 
Political CEO  1.07 0.93 
Foreign controller 1.06 0.95 
Independent ratio 1.05 0.96 
Remuneration 1.04 0.96 
CAR (-1,+1) 1.03 0.97 
Mean VIF 1.17   
 
7.5.2. Empirical Results and Analysis for the Second Model: (Multivariate 
Analysis) 
The main aim of model 2 was to examine the factors influencing the 
determination of CEO compensation following M&As in Chinese firms. The analysis 
tested the impact of the multi variables on CEO compensation as dependent variables. 
Therefore, a multiple regression was supposed to be relevant for this research.  
Table 15 shows the empirical results of OLS (robust) regression of CEO pay 
against multi factors following M&As for model 2. Two separate sub-models for model 
2 respectively on CEO compensation considering the industries effect had been 
developed; model 2(1) only considered the impact of block shareholders on CEO 
compensation, and model 2(2) also considered the impact of specific shareholder types 
on CEO compensation. The industry was based on 18 CSRC classifications of 
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industries. Table 15 presents R2 of 0.307 for model 2(1) and 0.309 for model 2(2) 
respectively, showing that the model or the equation had a good fit.  
The results of model 2(1) and model 2(2) showed that the size was positively 
related to CEO compensation, significant at level 0.01 in both models. There was a 
significantly positive relationship between CEO compensation and ROA, statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level in both models. The coefficient of the CEO shareholding 
was positive and significant at the 0.05 level in both models. Also, the coefficients on 
political CEO were positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both models. 
However, the coefficients of stock return, CEO duality, board size, supervisory size, 
independent ratio, remuneration, block share, deal size, CAR (-1,+1), state controller, 
and foreign controller were not significant in either model, indicating that there was no 
strong relationship between those factors and CEO compensation.  
 
7.5.3. Discussion of Results 
According to agency theory, the optimally-designed compensation packages 
provide managers with incentives to devote more efforts to maximising shareholders’ 
benefits (Otten, 2008). Managerial effort can be measured in terms of firm performance 
and firm size (Ozkan, 2011; Conyon, 2014). The coefficient of the size variable was 
positive across all specifications, suggesting that the larger acquiring firms were more 
complex to operate and prone to pay higher CEO compensation (see Conyon, 2014). 
The findings were consistent with those by, for instance, Core et al. (1999), Bliss & 
Rosen, (2001), Wright et al. (2002), Conyon et al. (2009), and Cadman (2010). The 
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result was consistent with the previous argument that large firms had more growth 
opportunities and were complex operations that needed highly skilled managers who 
should devote more efforts and thus obtain higher compensation (Rosen, 1992; Conyon 
& Murphy, 2000). 
There was a positive relationship between CEO compensation and ROA. The 
findings were consistent with those by, for instance, Grinstein and Hribar (2004), 
Cadman et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2011), Bugeja et al. (2012), and 
Conyon and He (2012). The results suggested that Chinese acquiring firms would pay 
their CEOs more total cash compensation if they had achieved a superior higher ROA. 
The result was consistent with agency theory that the optimal CEO compensation 
arrangement was designed to align the interests of shareholders, particularly providing 
managers with incentives to devote more efforts to maximising shareholders’ benefits 
(Otten, 2008). As agency theory suggested that moral hazard might occur when the 
shareholders could not directly observe managers’ behaviour, the managers would 
engage in activities that would harm the shareholders’ benefits. In this case, the 
shareholders were motivated to design compensation contracts to encourage the 
managers’ behaviour to align with their interests and maximize shareholders’ value; the 
compensation contract then has been seen as a vital and explicit mechanism to reduce 
moral hazard as the incentive compensation of managers can be correlated with the 
observable variables related to a manager’s performance, such as market returns or 
profitability (Holmstrom, 1979; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Therefore, in agency theory, 
executive compensation has to be tightly related to corporate performance, using profits 
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and share prices as measures (Dorff, 2005). The association between executive 
compensation and corporate performance demonstrated whether the compensation 
contract was optimal. The optimal contract would reward executives who worked hard 
and spend efforts enhancing corporate performance. However, in terms of other firm 
performance measures for this study, the regression result indicated that there were no 
statistically significant associations between stock return, deal size, and CAR (-1,+1), 
and CEO compensation. The finding of stock return was consistent with Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004); the finding of deal size was consistent with Bugeja et al. (2012); the 
finding of CAR (-1, +1) was consistent with Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006) and Bugeja 
et al. (2012).  
According to Table 15 below, CEO share was positively correlated to CEO 
compensation, at the 0.05 significant levels, implying that CEOs obtained higher 
compensation when they owned higher ownership in Chinese acquiring firms. The 
finding was consistent with those by, for instance, Mehran (1995), Cyert et al. (2002), 
Li et al. (2007), and Chen et al. (2010). The result was consistent with the argument of 
managerial power theory, that increasing stock ownership gave managers more control 
and power to enhance their pay (Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013). In terms of China, it 
was consistent with the argument that more ownership by management in Chinese listed 
firms indicated the more power that CEOs had, thus influencing the board and 
increasing possibility of entrenchment. Under the context of M&As, the higher CEO 
shareholding allowed CEOs to be more powerful and obtain higher compensation 
through making M&As. 
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Importantly, the political CEO was positively correlated to CEO compensation, 
at the 0.05 significant levels, implying that CEOs obtained higher compensation when 
CEOs have political connection for Chinese acquiring firms. The result was consistent 
with the managerial power theory combined with resource dependency theory. To 
reduce the uncertainty from the external environment and resource scarcities, firms 
endeavoured to look for resources which could assist in diminishing dependency 
between firms and the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), thus reducing 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1984), and become competitive in order to survive 
(Singh et al., 1986). In China, political connections as one typical Guanxi for firms 
tends to be an efficient method in business transactions and brings many resources and 
benefits. Therefore, firms tend to actively seek political connections through politically 
connected executives and board directors to obtain benefits and favourable treatment, 
such as acquiring tax reductions and bank loans (Firth et al., 2009) and loose regulations 
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009), thus enhancing corporate performance 
(Boubakriet et al., 2012). The need for political connections in Chinese firms 
encouraged firms to appoint CEOs who were politically connected with government. 
They were usually former government officials, who are in networks with the 
government and control information and resources, and may draw their power from 
political leaders (Fan et al., 2007), thus colluding with the state and using their 
interpersonal relationships and relative power within firms to acquire rents from 
shareholders (Chen, 2005). Importantly, those CEOs with political connections might 
be more capable of bringing benefits and better treatment to firms, which also allows 
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them to have more power and dominance (Pi & Lowe, 2011), thus obtaining more 
compensation. 
The coefficients of stock return, CEO duality, board size, supervisory size, 
independent ratio, remuneration, block share, deal size, CAR (-1,+1), state controller, 
and foreign controller are not significant, indicating that there was no strong 
relationship between those factors and CEO compensation, which was not consistent 
with the hypothesis developed in chapter four.  
There was no significant relationship between variables of CEO duality and 
CEO compensation for Chinese acquiring firms, indicating that the CEO who also held 
the position of chairman of the board could not influence their compensation. The 
finding was not consistent with the hypothesis that CEO duality increased the insider 
control problem in Chinese listed firms, thus making CEOs more powerful in setting 
compensation. The finding was consistent with the results of Conyon (1997), Conyon 
and Peck (1998), Li et al. (2007), Guest (2009), and Kumar et al. (2012).  
In terms of board size, regression results indicated no statistically significant 
association between CEO compensation and board size, which was not consistent with 
the hypothesis. The findings showed that a larger board size did not increase CEO 
compensation, implying that a large board size does not appear to bring poor 
communication or weaken the control of directors, leading to CEOs becoming more 
powerful and increasing their compensation. The finding was consistent with the results 
of Li et al. (2007), Buck et al. (2008), Liang et al. (1999), Wintoki (2007), and Guest 
(2009). 
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The regression results also indicated that there was no statistically significant 
association between CEO compensation and supervisory size, which was not consistent 
with the hypothesis. The findings showed that a larger supervisory board size did not 
increase CEO compensation, implying that supervisory board size did not appear to 
corrupt supervisors over CEOs regarding compensation, and CEOs did not make use of 
a large supervisory board size to extract more compensation. The finding was consistent 
with the results of Li et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2010). The result showed the limited 
function of the supervisory board suggested by, for example, Xi (2006) and Tam (1995). 
As the members of supervisory boards do not possess adequate qualifications – and 
suffer from a lack of professional knowledge or work experience – and the supervisory 
boards for Chinese firms cannot influence the executive decisions and have no right to 
select the directors, managers, and financial officers, they have limited responsibilities 
and monitoring role. In addition, because of the information asymmetric, the 
supervisory board lacks efficient information which is often controlled by CEOs. 
Therefore, supervisory boards in Chinese listed firms are ‘decorative’, and might not 
play an effective role in corporate governance in Chinese firms. 
In terms of independent directors and remuneration committees, the regression 
results indicated that there was no statistically significant association between 
independent ratio, remuneration, and CEO compensation, which was not consistent 
with the hypothesis. The findings showed that more independent directors did not 
decrease CEO compensation, implying that independent directors did not appear to 
effectively monitor CEOs. The findings were consistent with the results of Wan (2009), 
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Guest (2009), and Conyon and He (2012). Additionally, the findings showed that 
having a remuneration committee did not decrease CEO compensation, implying a 
remuneration committee did not appear to effectively monitor CEOs. The results were 
consistent with the argument by Liao et al. (2009) that independent directors in Chinese 
listed firms might not play a monitoring role because of the low rate of independent 
directors in many Chinese listed firms. The statistic results showed that many Chinese 
listed firms had only one-third independent directors, the minimum required by law 
(Jiang & Kim, 2015). Also, the remuneration committees in Chinese firms were 
composed of a majority of independent directors. Therefore, the results for this study 
showed that the independent directors and remuneration committees might not 
effectively monitor CEOs.  
In terms of ownership, the regression results indicated that there were no 
statistically significant associations between CEO compensation and three ownership 
variables (block share, state controller, and foreign controller), which were not 
consistent with the hypothesis. The finding of block share on CEO compensation was 
not consistent with Santerre and Neun (1986), Dyl (1988), Elston and Goldberg (2003), 
or Chen et al. (2010). The finding of state controller on CEO compensation was 
consistent with Chen et al. (2010) and Conyon and He, 2012; the finding of foreign 
controller on CEO compensation was not consistent with Firth et al. (2007), Li et al. 
(2007), or Conyon and He (2012). The non-significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and block share indicate that the block shareholding could not effectively 
monitor managers’ behaviour or protect shareholders’ benefits, particularly for those 
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countries with weak corporate governance suggested by La Porta (1998). The non-
significant relationship between CEO compensation and state controller was consistent 
with the argument by Fan et al. (2007) that CEOs in firms with the state as a controlling 
shareholder were mostly like to pursue political promotion rather than higher 
compensation. In addition, the non-significant relationship between CEO compensation 
and foreign controller showed that firms with foreign investors as controlling 
shareholders did not increase CEO compensation, implying that foreign investors did 
not bring competent CEOs of Chinese firms higher compensation. 
Overall, regarding the determination of CEO compensation following M&As, 
no theory could perfectly explain the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As. Some results were more consistent with the agency theory that the optimal CEO 
compensation arrangement was designed to align the interests of shareholders; the 
measure of firm performance and managerial efforts should be positively correlated to 
CEO compensation, for example, empirical results showed that size and ROA were 
significantly and positively correlated to CEO compensation. In addition, some results 
were more consistent with managerial power theory. For example, the CEO 
shareholding was significantly positively correlated to CEO compensation, showing 
that CEO shareholding gave CEOs more power to obtain higher compensation. More 
importantly, with regard to whether the CEO compensation of acquiring firms was 
associated to a CEO’s political connections, the results of political CEO were consistent 
with the managerial power theory combined with resource dependency theory. 
Specifically, the positive relationship between CEO compensation and CEO political 
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connection showed that those CEOs who brought many benefits and preferential 
treatments to firms through political connections allowed them to have more power and 
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Table 15 empirical results of OLS (robust) regression of CEO pay against multi factors 
following M&As for Model 2. 
  Model 2(1) Model 2(2) 
  CEOCOM CEOCOM 
Size 0.267*** 0.273*** 
  (6.68) (6.59) 
ROA 3.590*** 3.530*** 
  (3.16) (3.10) 
Stock return -0.035 -0.034 
  (-0.69) (-0.68) 
CEO duality 0.031 0.023 
  (0.24) (0.18) 
Board size 0.003 0.004 
  (0.18) (0.24) 
Supervisory size 0.013 0.013 
  (0.38) (0.38) 
Independent ratio -0.293 -0.359 
  (-0.55) (-0.66) 
Remuneration 0.265 0.275 
  (1.33) (1.34) 
CEO share 5.017** 4.721** 
  (2.34) (2.16) 
Block share -0.180 -0.200 
  (-0.81) (-0.88) 
Political CEO  0.179** 0.186** 
  (1.98) (2.05) 
Deal size -0.021 -0.021 
  (-0.43) (-0.43) 
CAR (-1,+1) -0.188 -0.196 
  (-0.28) (-0.29) 
State controller   -0.078 
    (-0.89) 
Foreign controller   0.093 
    (0.58) 
_cons 7.266*** 7.200*** 
  (8.88) (8.60) 
Controlling industry? Yes Yes 
N 369 369 
R-sq 0.307 0.309 
***. Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), **. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), * Significant at 
the 0.1 level. 




The main purpose of this chapter was to examine the factors influencing 
the determination of CEO compensation for Chinese acquiring firms. Before 
presenting the discussion of empirical findings, the data description was 
presented to provide an overall picture of the data. Then, the dataset used to 
examine the distributions and undertake any transformations as necessary to 
meet the assumptions of the regression approach applied in the analysis was 
presented. The results of univariate and multiple regression analysis are 
presented as follows. 
In terms of data description, more summarised statistics of other 
variables in the treatment sample for model 2 are presented in this chapter. For 
example, the average state controller and foreign controller for acquiring firms 
were consistent with previous literature. In terms of the M&As characteristics, 
the deal size was lower than developed western countries such as the UK, US, 
and Australia. The market averagely reacted quite positively to M&As 
announcements, which was consistent with findings of positive cumulative 
abnormal return in Asian countries, particularly in China. 
In terms of the data normality for regression, in order to test for 
deviations from normality, the Kolmogorv-Smirnov (KS) test was carried out. 
The results of the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test confirmed that the assumption of 
normality for all variables was not completely met. The variables CAR (-1, 1), 
ROA, stock return, CEO shareholding were winsorized at the 5th and 95th 
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percentile. After transforming the data, the skewness and the kurtosis were close 
to the requirements, greatly improving the normality. 
After transforming the data, the univariate correlations between CEO 
compensation and the independent variables were examined and provide a first 
understanding of how each independent variable related to CEO compensation 
for model 2. They were carried out on the transformed variables using the 
Spearman’s rho correlations, which was appropriate for not perfectly normally 
distributed data. The results showed correlations between CEO compensation 
and other factors. CEO compensation presented a significantly positive 
relationship with size, ROA, block share, CEO share, political CEO and deal 
size (p<0.01), and a significantly negative relationship with stock return. 
Multiple regression analysis was based on a number of assumptions in 
order to ensure validity of the results. These assumptions included normality, 
linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Additionally, 
multicollinearity of the data had to be ruled out. To test whether these 
assumptions were met, numerical methods were used. For the multicollinearity 
problem, the outcomes of Spearman’s rho correlations and the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) indicated multicollinearity was not a major problem. In terms of 
the assumption of homoscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan tests and White tests were 
employed to detect the problem of heteroscedasticity in this study. The findings 
of both tests illustrated that the problem of heteroscedasticity existed in model 2 
(1) and model 2 (2). In addition, a Wooldridge test was used in this study since 
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it is the most common technique employed to detect the problem of 
autocorrelation for panel data. The results of this test showed that the assumption 
of independence of the error terms was met in model 2 (1) and model 2 (2). 
Based on the results of tests for assumptions, it was suggested that the OLS 
estimates could be used in the presence of cross-sectional data sets for the model 
2. However, the problems of heteroscedasticity could not be handled using the 
OLS estimates. To address the problem arising from heteroscedasticity model 2 
(1) and model 2 (2); t-statistics in the current study were computed with White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance; this dealt with the problem of 
errors that were not identically distributed. The OLS (robust) regression became 
the main regression for model 2 (1) and model 2 (2). 
After the methods were decided, the multivariate analysis was developed 
to mainly address the hypothesis for model 2. Some of results were consistent 
with the expectations, but others were not. According to agency theory, the 
optimally-designed compensation packages provided managers with incentives 
to devote more efforts to maximising shareholders’ benefits (Otten, 2008). 
Managerial efforts could be measured, such as firm performance and firm size. 
The coefficient of the size variable was positive across all specifications, which 
was consistent with the hypothesis, suggesting that larger acquiring firms were 
more complex to operate and prone to pay higher CEO compensation. For firm 
performance, there was a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
ROA, which was consistent with the hypothesis, suggesting that Chinese 
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acquiring firms would pay their CEOs more total cash compensation if they 
achieved a superior higher ROA. The results of firm size and ROA on CEO 
compensation were consistent with agency theory that the optimal CEO 
compensation arrangement was designed to align the interests of shareholders, 
particularly providing managers with incentives to devote more efforts to 
maximising shareholders’ benefits. However, in terms of other firm performance 
measures for this study, the regression result indicated that there were no 
statistically significant associations between stock return, deal size, and CAR (-
1,+1) and CEO compensation, indicating that stock return, deal size, and CAR 
(-1,+1) had no influence on CEO compensation.   
As expected, the CEO share was positively correlated to CEO 
compensation, implying that CEOs obtained higher compensation when they 
gained increased ownership of Chinese acquiring firms. The result was 
consistent with the managerial power theory argument that increasing stock 
ownership gave managers more control and power to enhance their pay. 
Importantly, the political CEO was positively correlated to CEO 
compensation, implying that CEOs obtained higher compensation when they 
were CEOs with political connections for Chinese acquiring firms. The result 
was consistent with the managerial power theory combined with resource 
dependency theory. In order to reduce the uncertainty from external environment 
and resource scarcities, firms endeavoured to look for resources to assist with 
diminishing dependency between firms and the external environment, thus 
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adding value to the firm. In China, firms tend to actively seek political 
connections through politically connected executives and board directors, thus 
bringing many benefits and preferential treatment. The need for political 
connections in Chinese firms has encouraged firms to appoint many CEOs who 
are politically connected with government. Furthermore, those CEOs with 
political connections might be more capable of bringing benefits and better 
treatment to firms, which also allows those CEOs to have more power and 
dominance in firms (Pi & Lowe, 2011) and thereby obtaining more 
compensation. However, the coefficients of stock return, CEO duality, board 
size, supervisory size, independent ratio, remuneration, block share, deal size, 
CAR (-1,+1), state controller and foreign controller were not significant, 
indicating that there was no strong relationship between those factors and CEO 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has investigated the relationship between CEO compensation 
and M&As decisions and the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As. This chapter begins by restating a summary of research objectives and 
questions. This is followed by a summary of research methodology, research 
findings, implications of the study, contribution of the study, limitations of the 
study, and, finally, suggestions for future research. 
8.2. Research Objectives and Questions 
The main aim of this research is to investigate CEO compensation for 
acquiring firms following the completion of M&As in China, mainly using the 
agency theory and managerial power theory, resource dependency theory. 
Specifically, the research has two main objectives.  
i. To explore the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As 
completion in Chinese firms. 
ii. To examine the factors influencing the determination of the CEO 
compensation following the M&As in Chinese firms.  
The thesis addresses the following research questions: 
i. Is there a relationship between CEO pay and M&As completion in 
Chinese firms? 
ii. Do corporate governance factors influence CEO pay following 
M&As completion. 
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iii. Does CEO pay in Chinese M&As link to corporate performance and 
CEO effort in completing the deal? 
iv. Do the effects of CEO political connection influence CEO pay 
following M&As? 
 
8.3. Summary of Research Methodology 
The thesis is based on panel and cross-sectional analysis of a sample of 
10,249 observations from 2006 to 2013. The time span of the data chosen from 
2006 to 2013 is because of fact that M&As have grown significantly since the 
2005 Non-tradable Share Reforms. The required data is accessible mainly from 
two databases in China: The China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) and Centre for Economics Research (CCER) databases. Where data 
was unavailable from the CSMAR and CCER, annual reports were used. The 
CSMAR mainly provides the data at firm level in relation to M&As deals and 
financial information, while the CCER provides the data at the firm level of CEO 
compensation and CG indicators for this study. The annual report mainly 
provides the CEO profile that specifies whether the CEO had a political 
connection.  
To answer the research questions, five empirical research models have 
been developed. The first three models are used to examine whether CEO 
compensation was correlated to the M&As decisions and addresses the first 
research question. Models 4 and 5 are used to examine the impact of a firm’s 
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performance, M&As deals, corporate governance, and political connection on 
CEO compensation, thus addressing research questions two, three, and four. 
The measurements of independent variables (e.g. performance, corporate 
governance, political connection) were developed from prior studies (e.g. Core 
et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007; Li et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2012; 
Dai, 2014). The dependent variable was measured by the total CEO 
compensation, composed of salary and bonus.  
The data analysis included the descriptive analysis, univariate, and 
multivariate analysis. The descriptive analysis of the sample for the dependent 
and independent variables provided a preliminary understanding of the data and 
its distribution. The data transformation was carried out when data of variables 
could not meet normality. The univariate analysis examined the correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables for each model, separately 
using Spearman’s rho correlations and to find the potential multicollinearity 
problems. Multivariate regression was used to test the hypothesis and to allow 
the isolation of the contribution of each independent variable to explain variation 
in the dependent variable by holding the effect of the other variables constant. 
Regression analysis was based on a set of assumptions which have to be tested 
before the analysis in order to ensure the validity of the results and the inferences 
drawn from the analysis. The assumptions refer to the normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of error terms. Various checks were 
discussed to examine the data of this study against the assumptions of the OLS 
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(Ordinary Least Squares) regression model. This section ended with a 
consideration of the selected estimation methods and the statistical justifications 
for the selection, including the fixed effect and two-step SGMM (System 
Generalized Method of Moments) methods. 
 
8.4. Research Findings 
With regard to research question that is there a relationship between CEO 
pay and M&As completion in Chinese firms, the results of the empirical analysis 
showed that CEO compensation in Chinese firms was related to M&As 
completion when controlling factors as in the Anglo-Saxon countries (size, 
market ratio, ROA, ROA growth, margin, margin growth, sales growth, and 
stock return). Also, CEO compensation in Chinese firms was related to M&As 
completion when controlling other corporate governance factors and factors 
related to the Chinese institutional environment (board size, independent ratio, 
supervisory size, block share, CEO share, remuneration, and political CEO). 
 With regard to questions that do corporate governance factors influence 
CEO pay following M&As completion and does CEO pay in Chinese M&As 
link to corporate performance and CEO effort in completing the deal,  None of 
the theories could perfectly explain the determination of CEO compensation 
following M&As. Some of the results were more consistent with the agency 
theory that the optimal CEO compensation arrangement was designed to align 
the interests of shareholders; the measure of firm performance and managerial 
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efforts should be positively correlated to CEO compensation, for example, the 
empirical results showed that size and ROA were significantly and positively 
correlated to CEO compensation. In addition, some of the results were more 
consistent with the managerial power theory. For example, the CEO 
shareholding was significantly positively correlated to CEO compensation, 
showing that the CEO shareholding gave the CEO more power to obtain higher 
compensation.  
With regard to question that do the effects of CEO political connection 
influence CEO pay following M&As, the result of political CEO was consistent 
with the managerial power theory. Specifically, the positive relationship between 
CEO compensation and a CEO’s political connection shows those CEOs who 
brought benefits and treatments to firms through political connections allowed 
them to have more power and dominance, thus obtaining more compensation.  
However, in terms of other firm performance measures for this study, 
regression result indicated that there were no statistically significant associations 
between stock return, deal size, and CAR (-1,+1) and CEO compensation. The 
finding of stock return implied firms would pay their CEOs more or less 
compensation if stock returns increase; the finding of deal size implied firms 
would pay their CEOs more or less compensation if the deal value increase; the 
finding of CAR (-1, +1) indicated that firms would pay their CEOs more or less 
compensation if the CAR (-1, +1) increased. Other corporate governance factors 
did not have a significant influence on CEO compensation following M&As. 
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For example, CEO duality, board size, supervisory size, independent ratio, 
remuneration, block share, state controller, and foreign controller was not 
significantly correlated to CEO compensation following M&As.  
8.5. Implications of the Study 
The findings of the thesis have plenty of implications for firms, 
regulators, and policy makers. These implications are discussed here. 
The results of the empirical analysis showed that CEO compensation in 
Chinese firms was related to M&As completion when controlling factors as in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries. Also, CEO compensation in Chinese firms was 
related to M&As completion when controlling other corporate governance 
factors and factors related to the Chinese institutional environment. These results 
implied that a strong motivation for CEOs to make M&As was to increase their 
own compensation. Shareholders should strengthen monitoring on the 
motivation of CEOs to make M&As, and question whether it was to increase 
their own compensation or enhance the firm’s performance. In the meantime, 
the policymakers should initiate more regulations to approve M&As and pay 
more attention to examining the process of M&As to make sure CEOs would 
not extract excessive compensation.  
Regarding to the determination of CEO compensation following M&As, 
the measures of efforts of making M&As (e.g. deal size, abnormal return around 
the announcement) do not have significant influence on CEO compensation, but 
the measure of managerial power, the CEO shareholding, is significantly 
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positively correlated to the CEO compensation, implying that the CEO 
shareholding gives CEO more power to obtain higher compensation though 
M&As. However, for this study, I could not find that internal corporate 
governance mechanisms have a strong effect on the CEO compensation. For 
example, CEO duality, board size, supervisory size, independent ratio, 
remuneration, block share, state controller, and foreign controller was not 
significantly correlated to CEO compensation following M&As, which indicate 
that these internal corporate governance mechanisms do not create effective 
influence in the Chinese context. Although Chinese regulators have made great 
efforts to enhance the corporate governance and attempt to make Chinese firms 
be in“best practice” corporate governance models, many of laws and corporate 
governance codes have been enacted. For example, the Corporate Governance 
Code issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2002 
give the explanation of responsibility of board of directors, introducing 
compensation committees, supervisory board and independent directors. The 
results of this study shows that those internal and external governance 
mechanisms that have positive influence in developed countries seem to be less 
useful in China. Therefore, Chinese firms should pay more attention on 
designing their internal governance and regulators and policy makers with hints 
that firms should improve the corporate governance to monitor CEOs’ behaviour. 
 There is an important implication for the evidence that a CEO’s political 
connection is significantly correlated to CEO compensation following M&As. 
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Although the political connection of a CEO can bring useful resources and 
benefits to firms, they might use these abilities to become powerful and 
dominant on a company’s board and obtain excessive compensation. That is, 
central and local governments should keep reducing personnel connections in 
listed firms. The government should only take on the responsibility as the 
regulator instead of both regulator and the major market participant. 
Furthermore, a truly independent judicial system is needed for Chinese 
listed firms, particularly, having the state as the regulator as well as the 
participant of the market results in the legal system not being genuinely 
independent, a situation which might violate the effectiveness of corporate 
governance.  
 
8.6. Contribution of the Study 
The research makes significant contributions to the literature in general, 
and to Chinese CEO Compensation in particular. The following contributions 
are presented: 
i. This study provides a contribution to CEO compensation following 
M&As literature since it is the first to examine CEO compensation 
following M&As in China. The issue has been investigated in western 
developed countries in prior literature (e.g. Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; 
Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Bugeja et al., 2012), but not in China. In 
the context of China, studies have focused on examining the 
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relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, 
and corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Li et al., 2007; Buck et al., 
2008; Conyon & He, 2008; Wan, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Ding et al., 
2010; Conyon & He, 2012). Therefore, this study extends Chinese 
literature on CEO pay by examining the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As. 
ii.Taking advantage of the institutional environment in China, this study 
provides contributions to literature by considering unique Chinese 
corporate governance factors and CEO political connections when 
examining the relationship between CEO compensation and M&As 
decisions and the determination of CEO compensation following 
M&As. Previous studies only controlled for firm performance, size, 
and corporate governance when investigating whether CEO 
compensation was correlated to an M&As decision (e.g. Grinstein & 
Hribar, 2004; Coakley & Iliopoulou, 2006; Guest, 2009; Bugeja et al., 
2012). This study contributes to control more corporate governance 
factors (e.g. supervisory board and ownership characteristics) and CEO 
political connections. Also, by investigating the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As in Chinese listed firms, this study 
contributes by providing an understanding of the influence of corporate 
governance factors (e.g. supervisory board and ownership 
characteristics) and CEO political connection on CEO compensation 
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following M&As. The impact of these governance factors of CEO 
compensation following M&As have not been investigated in prior 
literature. 
iii.On an international basis, this is the first study to examine the impact 
of CEO political connections on the determination of CEO 
compensation following M&As. The results demonstrating that 
politically-connected CEOs are rewarded higher compensation than 
non-politically-connected CEOs is new.  
 
8.7. Limitations of the Study 
There have been several limitations to this study which should be 
considered, however these limitations do not influence the value of the research. 
1. Data and sample limitations 
The study’s sample cannot randomly include all firms as many Chinese 
companies do not disclose information about CEO compensation, an 
individual’s profile, details of corporate governance, and M&As. For example, 
many Chinese firms do not release the completion date of M&As, which 
considerably reduces the sample size. Therefore, the non-randomly selected 
sample size might result in a bias of sampling and lead to a sample composition 
that is not perfectly accurate. 
In addition, since there are different accounting practices and regulations 
in the financial industry, they are excluded from the sample of this study, which 
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might result in a problem in generalising the result to all industry sectors in 
China. Furthermore, the data of this study is specific only in China, which might 
lead to a problem in generalising findings into other countries, as other countries 
have different institutional environments, levels of capital markets, economic 
scales, cultures, and laws.  
2. Constructs and Variables Limitations 
With regard to the dependent variable, this study only used the total CEO 
compensation measuring the CEO compensation, and did not use other 
components of CEO compensation, such as bonus, salary, stock options, and 
Long-Term Incentive Plans as other studies have identified because Chinese 
firms only release the total compensation CEOs received and do not disclose the 
details of equity-based deals. Solely using total CEO compensation as a measure 
of dependent variable might not be able to undertake a more comprehensive 
assessment of the relationship between CEO compensation and other 
determinants, particularly different components of CEO compensation have 
different influences on managerial behaviour.  
  
8.8. Suggestions for Future Research 
Even though this study has examined the impact of many corporate 
governance mechanisms, firm performance, and M&As features on CEO 
compensation, some other characteristics relevant to the determination of CEO 
compensation could be considered. For example, the composition of 
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remuneration committees might influence CEO compensation. The 
remuneration committee generally consists of independent directors, which 
could effectively monitor management and restrain excess CEO compensation. 
Since not all Chinese firms currently disclose the details of composition of 
remuneration committees, it could be examined in future research when Chinese 
firms release information of composition of remuneration committee.  
Furthermore, because of resource and time constraints at the data 
collection stage, the time span of this study only covered 8 years from 2006 to 
2013 and excluded the following years. As the number of M&As increased 
quickly after 2013 for Chinese firms, it would be interesting to undertake another 
study using a different data set including the following years (i.e. 2014-2016) to 
see whether the findings were consistent with this study.   
Also, this research excluded financial and investment firms because of 
the different accounting practices and regulations. It provided further research 
with an opportunity to examine only the financial and investments firms on the 
issue of determination of CEO compensation following M&As. 
This study focused on the issue of CEO compensation following M&As 
only for Chinese firms. In future research, it would be interesting to undertake a 
comparative study between China and developed Anglo-Saxon countries on the 
issue of CEO compensation following M&As. Also, it would be interesting to 
conduct a comparative study between the one-tier and two-tier board systems on 
the issue of CEO compensation following M&As. 
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In recent years, Chinese firms have conducted an increased number of 
cross-border M&As; the number of cross-border M&As increased from 206 
cases in 2011 with total value of $42.5 billion to 382 cases in 2015 with $67.4 
billion (created from Qingke Database). An interesting area for future research 
would be in conducting a study to examine the issue of CEO compensation 
following cross-border M&As for Chinese firms, particularly the motivation of 
undertaking cross-border M&As for CEOs and the determination of CEO 
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